

Cartel Regulation

Contributing editor
A Neil Campbell



2018

GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH

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Cartel Regulation 2018

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CONTENTS

Editor's foreword	7	European Union	89
A Neil Campbell McMillan LLP		Anna Lyle-Smythe and Murray Reeve Slaughter and May	
Global overview	8	Hans-Jörg Niemeyer and Hannah Ehlers Hengeler Mueller	
Peter K Huston, Ken Daly and Lei Li Sidley Austin LLP		Jolling de Pree and Martijn Snoep De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek	
Brexit	12	Finland	101
Anna Lyle-Smythe Slaughter and May		Mikael Wahlbeck and Antti Järvinen Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd	
Hans-Jörg Niemeyer Hengeler Mueller		France	108
Jolling de Pree De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek		Jacques-Philippe Gunther, Faustine Viala and David Kupka Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP	
ICN	15	Germany	116
John Terzaken Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP		Thorsten Mäger and Florian von Schreitter Hengeler Mueller	
Jana Steenholdt Allen & Overy LLP		Greece	124
Australia	18	Marina Stavropoulou DRAS-IS	
Rosannah Healy and Carolyn Oddie Allens		Hong Kong	130
Austria	25	Natalie Yeung Slaughter and May	
Astrid Ablasser-Neuherber and Florian Neumayr bvp Hügel Rechtsanwälte		India	137
Brazil	33	Suchitra Chitale C&C Chitale & Chitale Partners	
Onofre Carlos de Arruda Sampaio and André Cutait de Arruda Sampaio OC Arruda Sampaio		Indonesia	143
Bulgaria	40	HMBC Rikrik Rizkiyana, Albert Boy Situmorang and Anastasia PR Daniyati Assegaf Hamzah and Partners	
Anna Rizova and Hristina Dzhevlekova Wolf Theiss		Israel	149
Canada	47	Eytan Epstein, Mazor Matzkevich and Shani Galant-Frankfurt M Firon & Co Law Offices	
A Neil Campbell, Casey W Halladay and Guy Pinsonnault McMillan LLP		Italy	157
China	56	Rino Caiazzo and Francesca Costantini Caiazzo Donnini Pappalardo & Associati	
Susan Ning and Hazel Yin King & Wood Mallesons		Japan	167
Colombia	65	Eriko Watanabe Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu	
Danilo Romero Raad and Bettina Sojo Holland & Knight		Kenya	174
Croatia	71	Anne Kiunuhe and Njeri Wagacha Anjarwalla & Khanna	
Irina Jelčić and Ivan Dilber Hanžeković & Partners		Korea	182
Denmark	77	Hoil Yoon, Sinsung (Sean) Yun and Kenneth T Kim Yoon & Yang LLC	
Olaf Koktvedgaard, Søren Zinck and Frederik André Bork Bruun & Hjejle		Macedonia	191
Ecuador	84	Tatjana Popovski Buloski and Metodija Velkov Polenak Law Firm	
Daniel Robalino-Orellana Ferrere Abogados			

Malaysia	199	Spain	268
Sharon Tan Suyin and Nadarashnaraj Sargunraj Zaid Ibrahim & Co		Juan Jiménez-Laiglesia, Alfonso Ois and Arturo Lacave EY Abogados, SLP	
Malta	207	Sweden	275
Mark Refalo Refalo & Zammit Pace Advocates		Tommy Pettersson, Johan Carle and Stefan Perván Lindeborg Mannheimer Swartling	
Mexico	213	Switzerland	284
Rafael Valdés-Abascal and Enrique de la Peña Fajardo Valdés Abascal Abogados SC		Mario Strelbel and Christophe Rapin Meyerlustenberger Lachenal Ltd	
Netherlands	220	Taiwan	294
Jolling de Pree and Martijn Snoep De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek NV		Mark Ohlson and Charles Hwang Yangming Partners	
Nigeria	230	Turkey	301
Babatunde Irukera and Ikem Isiekwena SimmonsCooper Partners		Gönenç Gürkaynak and K Korhan Yıldırım ELİG, Attorneys-at-Law	
Portugal	236	Ukraine	310
Mário Marques Mendes and Alexandra Dias Henriques Gómez-Acebo & Pombo		Nataliia Isakhanova, Ivan Podpalov and Igor Kabanov Sergii Koziakov & Partners	
Russia	246	United Kingdom	318
Evgeniya Rakhmanina Linklaters CIS		Lisa Wright and Shruti Hiremath Slaughter and May	
Singapore	253	United States	332
Lim Chong Kin and Corinne Chew Drew & Napier LLC		Steven E Bizar, Ethan E Litwin and Morgan J Feder Dechert LLP	
Slovenia	262	Quick reference tables	340
Stojan Zdolšek, Irena Jurca and Katja Zdolšek Zdolšek Attorneys at Law			

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Legislation and institutions

1 Relevant legislation

What is the relevant legislation?

The relevant legislation on cartel regulation is the Law on Protection of Competition No. 4054 of 13 December 1994 (the Competition Law). The Competition Law finds its underlying rationale in article 167 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, which authorises the government to take appropriate measures and actions to secure a free market economy. The applicable provision for cartel-specific cases is article 4 of the Competition Law, which lays down the basic principles of cartel regulation.

2 Relevant institutions

Which authority investigates cartel matters? Is there a separate prosecution authority? Are cartel matters adjudicated or determined by the enforcement agency, a separate tribunal or the courts?

The national authority for investigating cartel matters in Turkey is the Competition Authority. The Competition Authority has administrative and financial autonomy and consists of the Competition Board (the Board), presidency and service departments. Five divisions with sector-specific work distribution handle competition law enforcement work through approximately 130 case handlers. A research department, a leniency unit, a decisions unit, an information-management unit, an external-relations unit and a strategy development unit assist the five technical divisions and the presidency in the completion of their tasks. As the competent body of the Competition Authority, the Board is responsible for, inter alia, investigating and condemning cartel activity. The Board consists of seven independent members. If a cartel activity amounts to a criminally prosecutable act such as bid rigging in public tenders, it may separately be adjudicated and prosecuted by Turkish penal courts and public prosecutors.

3 Changes

Have there been any recent changes, or proposals for change, to the regime?

After a long wait on the sidelines, the Prime Ministry finally sent the Draft Law on Protection of Competition to the Presidency of the Turkish Parliament on 23 January 2014. The draft law is designed to introduce new concepts into the Turkish competition cartel regime such as the *de minimis* defence and the settlement procedure. In 2015, the draft law became obsolete again owing to the general elections in June and November 2015. It is yet to be seen whether the new Parliament or the government will renew the draft law. As reported in the 2015 Annual Report of the Competition Authority, the Competition Authority has requested the re-initiation of the legislative procedure concerning the draft law. The 2015 Annual Report notes that the Competition Authority may take steps toward the amendment of certain articles if Parliament does not pass the draft law. At present, the draft law is statute-barred. In order to restart the parliamentary process, the draft law must again be proposed and submitted to the Presidency of the Turkish Parliament. Although it is not possible to indicate the exact timing, it is likely that a draft reform law will remain on the agenda.

The Competition Authority announced for public consultation the Draft Regulation on Administrative Monetary Fines (the Draft Regulation). The Draft Regulation is set to replace the current Regulation on Monetary Fines for Restrictive Agreements, Concerted Practices, Decisions and Abuses of Dominance (the Regulation on Fines). Consultations on the Draft Regulation are still ongoing. The most significant changes the Draft Regulation will bring are as follows:

- the base fine to be determined based on ‘the turnover generated in the relevant market, which is directly or indirectly related to the respective competition law infringement’;
- the impact and the duration of the infringement will also be taken into account in calculating the base fine;
- the Competition Board will take into account factors such as the concerned undertaking’s market power, the infringement’s nature and the actual or potential damages of the infringement, as well as the geographical scope of the violation;
- three aggravating factors, which increase the base fine by 50 or 100 per cent, are:
 - being the leader or the initiator of the infringement;
 - coercion; and
 - non-compliance with commitments previously made to the Competition Board and recidivism;
- the Competition Board is obliged to reduce the fine when mitigating factors exist, without any discretion;
- the Competition Board has the discretion to increase the fines in certain cases, with the intent to ensure deterrence; and
- where the administrative fine would compromise the ability of maintaining the respective undertaking’s economic activities, the Board can reduce the fine upon request.

Finally, the following key legislative texts were announced or enacted between 2013 and the time of writing:

- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2016/5 on R&D Agreements;
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2017/3 on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector;
- Communiqué No. 2017/2 Amending the Communiqué on Mergers and Acquisitions Calling for the Authorisation of the Competition Board (Communiqué No:2010/4);
- Communiqué on the Increase of the Lower Threshold for Administrative Fines Specified in paragraph 1, article 16 of Act No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (Communiqué No. 2017/1);
- Guidelines Explaining the Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector (Communiqué No 2017/3) enacted on 7 March 2017;
- Guidelines on the Evaluation of the Abuse of Dominance through Discriminatory Practices, enacted on 7 April 2014;
- Guidelines on Exclusionary Abusive Conducts by Companies in Dominant Positions, enacted on 29 January 2014;
- Block Exemption Communiqué on Specialisation Agreements (Communiqué No. 2013/3), entered into force on 26 July 2013;
- Guidelines on Undertakings Concerned, Turnover and Ancillary Restraints in Mergers and Acquisitions, enacted on 26 March 2013;
- Guidelines on Active Cooperation for the Exposure of Cartels, enacted on 17 April 2013;
- Guidelines on the Protection of Horizontal Agreements in line with articles 4 and 5 of the Competition Law, Act No. 4054, enacted on 30 April 2013;

- Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions, enacted on 4 June 2013;
- Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions, enacted on 4 June 2013;
- Guidelines on Cases Considered as Merger and Acquisition and Concept of Control, enacted on 16 July 2013; and
- Guidelines on General Principles of Exemption, enacted on 28 November 2013.

4 Substantive law

What is the substantive law on cartels in the jurisdiction?

Article 4 of the Competition Law is akin to and closely modelled on article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly article 81(1) of the EC Treaty). It prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that have (or may have) as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within a Turkish product or services market or a part thereof. Article 4 does not bring a definition of 'cartel'. Rather, it prohibits all forms of restrictive agreements, which would include any form of cartel agreement. Unlike the TFEU, article 4 does not refer to 'appreciable effect' or 'substantial part of a market' and thereby excludes any de minimis exception. The enforcement trends and proposed changes to the legislation are, however, increasingly focusing on de minimis defences and exceptions.

Article 4 prohibits agreements that restrict competition by object or effect. The assessment whether the agreement restricts competition by object is based on the content of the agreement, the objectives it attains and the economic and legal context. The parties' intention is irrelevant to the finding of liability but it may operate as an aggravating or mitigating factor, depending on circumstances. Article 4 also prohibits any form of agreement that has the potential to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Again, this is a specific feature of the Turkish cartel regulation system, recognising a broad discretionary power of the Board. Both actual and potential effects are taken into account. Pursuant to the Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, the restrictive effects are assessed on the basis of their adverse impact on at least one of the parameters of the competition in the market, such as price, output, quality, product variety or innovation. Article 4 brings a non-exhaustive list of restrictive agreements that is, to a large extent, the same as article 101(1) TFEU. The list includes examples such as price fixing, market allocation and refusal-to-deal agreements. A number of horizontal restrictive agreement types, such as price fixing, market allocation, collective refusals to deal (group boycotts) and bid rigging, have consistently been deemed to be per se illegal. Certain other types of competitor agreements such as vertical agreements and purchasing cartels are generally subject to a competitive effects test.

The prohibition on restrictive agreements and practices does not apply to agreements that benefit from a block exemption or an individual exemption (or both) issued by the Board. The applicable block exemption rules are:

- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2002/2 on Vertical Agreements;
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2017/3 on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector;
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2008/3 for the Insurance Sector;
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2008/2 on Technology Transfer Agreements;
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2013/2 on Specialisation Agreements; and
- Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2016/5 on R&D Agreements.

These are all modelled on their respective equivalents in the EU. The newest of these block exemptions, the Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2017/3 on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector, sets out revised rules for the motor vehicle sector in Turkey, overhauling Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2005/4 for Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector.

Restrictive agreements that do not benefit from the block exemption under the relevant communiqué or an individual exemption issued by the Board are caught by the prohibition in article 4.

The Turkish antitrust regime also condemns concerted practices and the Competition Authority easily shifts the burden of proof

in connection with concerted practice allegations through a mechanism called 'the presumption of concerted practice'. The special challenges posed by the proof standard concerning concerted practices are addressed in question 14.

Application of the law and jurisdictional reach

5 Industry-specific provisions

Are there any industry-specific infringements? Are there any industry-specific defences or antitrust exemptions? Is there a defence or exemption for government-sanctioned activity or regulated conduct?

There are no industry-specific offences or defences. The Competition Law applies to all industries, without exception. To the extent that they act as an undertaking within the meaning of the Competition Law, state-owned entities also fall within the scope of application of article 4.

Owing to the 'presumption of concerted practice' (see question 14), oligopoly markets for the supply of homogeneous products (eg, cement, bread yeast, ready-mixed concrete) have constantly been under investigation for concerted practice. Nevertheless, whether this track record (over 32 investigations in the cement and ready-mixed concrete markets in 20 years of enforcement history) leads to an industry-specific offence would be debatable.

There are sector-specific antitrust exemptions. The block exemptions applicable in the motor vehicle sector and in the insurance sector are notable examples. The Competition Law does not provide any specific exceptions to government-sanctioned activities or regulated conduct. There are, however, examples where the Competition Board took the state action defence into account (see, eg, *Paper Recycling*, 8 July 2013, 13-42/538-238; *Waste Accumulator*, 4 October 2012, 12-48/1415-476; *Pharmaceuticals*, 2 March 2012, 12-09/290-91; *Et-Balık Kurumu*, 16 June 2011, 11-37/785-248; *Türkiye Şöförler ve Otomobilciler Federasyonu*, 3 March 1999, 99-12/91-33; *Esgaz*, 9 August 2012, 12-41/1171-384).

6 Application of the law

Does the law apply to individuals or corporations or both?

The Competition Law applies to 'undertakings' and 'associations of undertakings'. An undertaking is defined as a single integrated economic unit capable of acting independently in the market to produce, market or sell goods and services. The Competition Law therefore applies to individuals and corporations alike if they act as an undertaking.

7 Extraterritoriality

Does the regime extend to conduct that takes place outside the jurisdiction? If so, on what jurisdictional basis?

Turkey is one of the 'effect theory' jurisdictions where what matters is whether the cartel activity has produced effects on Turkish markets, regardless of the nationality of the cartel members, where the cartel activity took place or whether the members have a subsidiary in Turkey. The Board has refrained from declining jurisdiction over non-Turkish cartels or cartel members in the past, as long as there has been an effect on the Turkish markets (see, for example, *Sisecam/Yioula*, 28 February 2007; 07-17/155-50; *Gas Insulated Switchgear*, 24 June 2004; 04-43/538-133; *Refrigerator Compressor*, 1 July 2009; 09-31/668-156). It should be noted, however, that the Board is yet to enforce monetary or other sanctions against firms located outside of Turkey without any presence in Turkey, mostly due to enforcement handicaps (such as difficulties of formal service or failure to identify a tax number). The specific circumstances surrounding indirect sales are not tried under Turkish cartel rules. Article 2 of the Competition Law would support at least a colourable argument that the Turkish cartel regime does not extend to indirect sales because the cartel activity that takes place outside of Turkey does not in and of itself produce effects in Turkey.

The Board finds the underlying basis of its jurisdiction in article 2 of the Competition Law, which captures all restrictive agreements, decisions, transactions and practices to the extent they produce an effect on a Turkish market, regardless of where the conduct takes place.

8 Export cartels

Is there an exemption or defence for conduct that only affects customers or other parties outside the jurisdiction?

It is fair to say that export cartels do not fall within the scope of jurisdiction of the Competition Authority as per article 2 of the Competition Law. In *Poultry Meat Producers* (25 November 2009, 09-57/1393-362), the Competition Authority launched an investigation into allegations that included, inter alia, an export cartel. The Competition Board found that export cartels are not sanctioned as long as they do not affect the markets of the host country. Although some other decisions (*Paper Recycling*, 8 July 2013, 13-42/538-238) suggest that the Competition Authority might sometimes be inclined to claim jurisdiction over export cartels, it is fair to assume that an export cartel would fall outside of the Competition Authority's jurisdiction if and to the extent it does not produce an impact on Turkish markets.

Investigations

9 Steps in an investigation

What are the typical steps in an investigation?

The Board is entitled to launch an investigation into an alleged cartel activity ex officio or in response to a complaint. In the case of a complaint, the Board rejects the notice or complaint if it deems it not to be serious. Any notice or complaint is deemed rejected if the Board remains silent for 60 days. The Board decides to conduct a pre-investigation if it finds the notice or complaint to be serious. At this preliminary stage, unless there is a dawn raid, the undertakings concerned are not notified that they are under investigation. Dawn raids (unannounced on-site inspections) (see question 10) and other investigatory tools (eg, formal information request letters) are used during this pre-investigation process. The preliminary report of the Competition Authority experts will be submitted to the Board within 30 days after a pre-investigation decision is taken by the Board. The Board will then decide within 10 days whether to launch a formal investigation. If the Board decides to initiate an investigation, it will send a notice to the undertakings concerned within 15 days. The investigation will be completed within six months. If deemed necessary, this period may be extended, once only, for an additional period of up to six months by the Board.

The investigated undertakings have 30 calendar days as of the formal service of the notice to prepare and submit their first written defences (first written defence). Subsequently, the main investigation report is issued by the Competition Authority. Once the main investigation report is served on the defendants, they have 30 calendar days to respond, extendable for a further 30 days (second written defence). The investigation committee will then have 15 days to prepare an opinion concerning the second written defence. The defending parties will have another 30-day period to reply to the additional opinion (third written defence). When the parties' responses to the additional opinion are served on the Competition Authority, the investigation process will be completed (the written phase of investigation involving claim or defence exchange will close with the submission of the third written defence). An oral hearing may be held ex officio or upon request by the parties. Oral hearings are held within at least 30 and at most 60 days following the completion of the investigation process under the provisions of Communiqué No. 2010/2 on Oral Hearings Before the Competition Board. The Board will render its final decision within 15 calendar days of the hearing if an oral hearing is held, or within 30 calendar days of completion of the investigation process if no oral hearing is held. The appeal case must be brought within 60 calendar days of the official service of the reasoned decision. It usually takes around three to eight months (from the announcement of the final decision) for the Board to serve a reasoned decision on the counterpart.

10 Investigative powers of the authorities

What investigative powers do the authorities have? Is court approval required to invoke these powers?

The Board may request all information it deems necessary from all public institutions and organisations, undertakings and trade associations. Officials of these bodies, undertakings and trade associations are obliged to provide the necessary information within the period fixed by the Board. Failure to comply with a decision ordering the production of

information may lead to the imposition of a turnover-based fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). The minimum fine is 18,377 Turkish liras (Communiqué on the Increase of the Lower Threshold for Administrative Fines Specified in paragraph 1, article 16 of Act No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (Communiqué No. 2017/1)). In cases where incorrect or incomplete information has been provided in response to a request for information, the same penalty may be imposed.

Article 15 of the Competition Law also authorises the Board to conduct on-site investigations and dawn raids. Accordingly, the Board is entitled to:

- examine the books, paperwork and documents of undertakings and trade associations, and, if necessary, take copies of the same;
- request undertakings and trade associations to provide written or verbal explanations on specific topics; and
- conduct on-site investigations with regard to any asset of an undertaking.

Refusal to grant the staff of the Competition Authority access to business premises may lead to the imposition of a fixed fine of 0.5 per cent of the Turkish turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the Turkish turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). It may also lead to the imposition of a fine of 0.05 per cent of the Turkish turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision, for each day of the violation (if this is not calculable, the Turkish turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account).

The Competition Law provides vast authority to the Competition Authority on dawn raids. A judicial authorisation is obtained by the Board only if the subject undertaking refuses to allow the dawn raid. Other than that, the Competition Authority does not need to obtain judicial authorisation to use its powers. While the wording of the Law is such that employees can be compelled to give verbal testimony, case handlers do allow a delay in giving an answer so long as there is a quick written follow-up correspondence. Therefore, in practice, employees can avoid providing answers on issues that are uncertain to them, provided that a written response is submitted within a mutually agreed time. Computer records are fully examined by the experts of the Competition Authority, including but not limited to deleted items.

Officials conducting an on-site investigation must be in possession of a deed of authorisation from the Board. The deed of authorisation must specify the subject matter and purpose of the investigation. The inspectors are not entitled to exercise their investigative powers (copying records, recording statements by company staff, etc) in relation to matters that do not fall within the scope of the investigation (that is, that which is written on the deed of authorisation).

International cooperation

11 Inter-agency cooperation

Is there cooperation with authorities in other jurisdictions? If so, what is the legal basis for, and extent of, cooperation?

Article 43 of Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council (Decision No. 1/95) authorises the Competition Authority to notify and request the European Commission (DG Competition) to apply relevant measures if the Board believes that cartels organised in the territory of the European Union adversely affect competition in Turkey. The provision grants reciprocal rights and obligations to the parties (the EU and Turkey), and thus the European Commission has the authority to request the Board to apply relevant measures to restore competition in relevant markets.

There are also a number of bilateral cooperation agreements between the Competition Authority and the competition agencies in other jurisdictions (eg, Romania, Korea, Bulgaria, Portugal, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Croatia and Mongolia) on cartel enforcement matters. The Competition Authority also has close ties with the OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, ICN and the World Bank.

The research department of the Competition Authority makes periodic consultations with relevant domestic and foreign institutions and organisations about the protection of competition in order

to assess their results, and submits its recommendations to the Board. As an example, a cooperation protocol was signed on 14 October 2009 between the Turkish Competition Authority and the Turkish Public Procurement Authority in order to procure a healthy competition environment with regard to public tenders by cooperating and sharing information. Informal contacts do not constitute a legal basis for the Turkish Competition Authority's actions.

12 Interplay between jurisdictions

Which jurisdictions have significant interplay with your jurisdiction in cross-border cases? If so, how does this affect the investigation, prosecution and penalising of cartel activity in cross-border cases in your jurisdiction?

It is fair to say that the interplay between jurisdictions does not in practice materially affect the Board's handling of cartel investigations, including cross-border cases. Principle of comity does not take part as an explicit provision in Turkish Competition law. A cartel's conduct that was investigated elsewhere in the world can be prosecuted in Turkey if it has had an effect on non-Turkish markets.

Cartel proceedings

13 Decisions

How is a cartel proceeding adjudicated or determined?

The Board can initiate an inspection about an undertaking or an association of undertakings upon complaint or ex officio. Cartel matters are primarily adjudicated by the Board. Enforcement is supplemented with private lawsuits as well. Private suits against cartel members are tried before regular courts. Due to a treble damages clause allowing litigants to obtain three times their loss as compensation, private antitrust litigations increasingly make their presence felt in the cartel enforcement arena. Most courts wait for the decision of the Competition Authority and build their own decision on that decision.

14 Burden of proof

Which party has the burden of proof? What is the level of proof required?

The most important material issue specific to Turkey is the very low standard of proof adopted by the Board. The participation of an undertaking in a cartel activity requires proof that there was such a cartel activity or, in the case of multilateral discussions or cooperation, that the particular undertaking was a participant. With a broadening interpretation of the Competition Law, and especially of the 'object or effect of which...' branch, the Board has established an extremely low standard of proof concerning cartel activity. The standard of proof is even lower as far as concerted practices are concerned; in practice, if parallel behaviour is established, a concerted practice might readily be inferred and the undertakings concerned might be required to prove that the parallel behaviour is not the result of a concerted practice. The Competition Law brings a 'presumption of concerted practice', which enables the Board to engage in an article 4 enforcement in cases where price changes in the market, supply-demand equilibrium or fields of activity of enterprises bear a resemblance to those in the markets where competition is obstructed, disrupted or restricted. Turkish antitrust precedents recognise that 'conscious parallelism' is rebuttable evidence of forbidden behaviour and constitutes sufficient ground to impose fines on the undertakings concerned. Therefore, the burden of proof is very easily switched and it becomes incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that the parallelism in question is not based on concerted practice, but has economic and rational reasons behind it.

Unlike in the EU, where the undisputed acceptance is that tacit collusion does not constitute a violation of competition, the Competition Law does not give weight to the doctrine known as 'conscious parallelism and plus factors'. In practice, the Competition Board does not go to the trouble of seeking 'plus factors' along with conscious parallelism if naked parallel behaviour is established.

Recent indications in practice also suggest that the Competition Authority officials are increasingly inclined to adopt a broadening interpretation of the definition of 'cartel'.

15 Circumstantial evidence

Can an infringement be established by using circumstantial evidence without direct evidence of the actual agreement?

The Board considers communication evidence and economic data that indicate coordination between competitors as circumstantial evidence. Communication evidence, for instance, can prove that the possible parties to an agreement communicated with or met each other, yet cannot demonstrate the actual content of such communication. If there is no direct evidence demonstrating the existence or content of a violation, the Board might establish an infringement through circumstantial evidence by itself or along with direct evidence, especially in concerted practice cases.

16 Appeal process

What is the appeal process?

As per Law No. 6352, which entered into force as of 5 July 2012, final decisions of the Board, including its decisions on interim measures and fines, can be submitted to judicial review before the administrative courts in Ankara by filing an appeal case within 60 days of receipt by the parties of the justified (reasoned) decision of the Board. Decisions of the Competition Board are considered as administrative acts, and thus legal actions against them shall be pursued in accordance with the Turkish Administrative Procedural Law. The judicial review comprises both procedural and substantive review.

As per article 27 of the Administrative Procedural Law, filing an administrative action does not automatically stay the execution of the decision of the Board. However, at the request of the plaintiff the court, by providing its justifications, may decide on a stay of execution if the execution of the decision is likely to cause serious and irreparable damages, and the decision is highly likely to be against the law (that is, showing of a prima facie case).

The judicial review period before the Ankara administrative courts usually takes about 12 to 24 months. Decisions by the Ankara administrative courts are, in turn, subject to appeal before the regional courts (appellate courts) and the High State Court. If the challenged decision is annulled in full or in part, the administrative court remands it to the Board for review and reconsideration.

After the recent legislative changes, administrative litigation cases will now be subject to judicial review before the newly established regional courts (appellate courts). The new legislation has created a three-level appellate court system consisting of administrative courts, regional courts (appellate courts) and the High State Court. The regional courts will go through the case file both on procedural and substantive grounds and investigate the case file and make their decision considering the merits of the case. The regional courts' decisions will be considered as final in nature. The decision of the regional court will be subject to the High State Court's review in exceptional circumstances, which are set forth in article 46 of the Administrative Procedure Law. In this case, the decision of the regional court will not be considered as a final decision. In such a case, the High State Court may decide to uphold or reverse the regional courts' decision. If the decision is reversed by the High State Court, it will be remanded back to the deciding regional court, which will in turn issue a new decision which takes into account the High State Court's decision. As the regional courts have recently been established, there is not yet experience on how long does it take for a regional court to finalise its review of a file. Accordingly, the Council of State's review period (for a regional court's decision) within the new system should also be tested before providing an estimated time period. The appeal period before the High State Court usually takes about 24 to 36 months. Decisions of courts in private suits are appealable before the Supreme Court of Appeals. The appeal process in private suits is governed by the general procedural laws and usually lasts 24 to 30 months.

An appeal process is typically initiated by the infringing party in cases where the Board finds a violation, or by complainants if there is no finding of a violation. The Competition Authority does have the right to challenge a court decision by initiating a judicial review process if a decision of the Board is overturned by the deciding court.

Sanctions

17 Criminal sanctions**What, if any, criminal sanctions are there for cartel activity?**

The sanctions that could be imposed under the Competition Law are administrative in nature. Therefore, the Competition Law leads to administrative fines (and civil liability), but no criminal sanctions. Cartel conduct will not result in imprisonment against individuals implicated. That said, there have been cases where the matter had to be referred to a public prosecutor before or after the competition law investigation was complete. On that note, bid-rigging activity may be criminally prosecutable under section 235 et seq of the Turkish Criminal Code. Illegal price manipulation (manipulation through disinformation or other fraudulent means) may also be punished by up to two years of imprisonment and a judicial fine under section 237 of the Turkish Criminal Code.

18 Civil and administrative sanctions**What civil or administrative sanctions are there for cartel activity?**

In the case of a proven cartel activity, the undertakings concerned will be separately subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of their Turkish turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the Turkish turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). Employees or members of the executive bodies of the undertakings or association of undertakings that had a determining effect on the creation of the violation may also be fined up to 5 per cent of the fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings. After the recent amendments, the new version of the Competition Law makes reference to article 17 of the Law on Minor Offences to require the Board to take into consideration factors such as the level of fault and amount of possible damage in the relevant market, the market power of the undertakings within the relevant market, the duration and recurrence of the infringement, the cooperation or driving role of the undertakings in the infringement, the financial power of the undertakings or the compliance with their commitments, etc, in determining the magnitude of the monetary fine.

In addition to the monetary sanction, the Board is authorised to take all necessary measures to terminate the restrictive agreement, to remove all de facto and legal consequences of every action that has been taken unlawfully and to take all other necessary measures in order to restore the level of competition and status as before the infringement. Furthermore, such a restrictive agreement shall be deemed legally invalid and unenforceable with all its legal consequences. Similarly, the Competition Law authorises the Board to take interim measures until the final resolution on the matter in case there is a possibility of serious and irreparable damages.

There have not been many fining decisions on cartels in 2016 and 2017 (*İzmir Chamber of Jewellers*, 27 October 2016, 16-35/603-268). The great majority of investigations in 2016 and 2017 into cartel allegations have not resulted in monetary fines against defendants.

The highest administrative monetary fine ever imposed by the Board in a cartel case is 213,384,545.76 Turkish liras, which was imposed on the economic entity comprising Türkiye Garanti Bankası AŞ ve Garanti Ödeme Sistemleri AŞ and Garanti Konut Finansmanı Danışmanlık AŞ (*Banking Industry*), 8 March 2013, 13-13/198-100). This amount represented 1.5 per cent of Garanti's annual gross revenue for 2011. The case also represents the highest ever combined administrative monetary fine, which amounted to 1,116,957,468.76 Turkish liras.

Civil actions are still rare but increasing in practice.

19 Guidelines for sanction levels**Do fining or sentencing principles or guidelines exist? If yes, are they binding on the adjudicator? If no, how are penalty levels normally established? What are the main aggravating and mitigating factors that are considered?**

After the recent amendments, the new version of the Competition Law makes reference to article 17 of the Law on Minor Offences to require the Board to take into consideration factors such as the level of fault and amount of possible damage in the relevant market, the market power

of the undertakings within the relevant market, the duration and recurrence of the infringement, the cooperation or driving role of the undertakings in the infringement, the financial power of the undertakings, compliance with their commitments, etc, in determining the magnitude of the monetary fine. In line with this, the Regulation on Monetary Fines was recently enacted by the Turkish Competition Authority. The Regulation on Fines sets out detailed guidelines as to the calculation of monetary fines applicable in the case of an antitrust violation. The Regulation on Fines applies to both cartel activity and abuse of dominance, but illegal concentrations are not covered by the Regulation on Fines. According to the Regulation on Fines, fines are calculated by first determining the basic level, which in the case of cartels is between 2 and 4 per cent of the company's turnover in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover for the financial year nearest the date of the decision); aggravating and mitigating factors are then factored in.

The aggravating and mitigating factors are set forth in the Regulation on Fines. As per article 5/3 of the Regulation on Fines, the amount of fine determined according to the above-mentioned method may be increased by 50 per cent for violations that lasted between one and five years, and by 100 per cent for violations that lasted more than five years. Pursuant to article 6 of the Regulation on Fines, the base fine may be increased by 50 to 100 per cent for each instance of repetition if the violation is repeated and if the cartel is maintained after the notification of the investigation decision. Moreover, the base fine may be increased by:

- 50 to 100 per cent, where the commitments made for the elimination of the competition problems raised within the scope of article 4 of the Competition Law have not been met;
- up to 50 per cent, where no assistance with the examination is provided; and
- up to 25 per cent in cases such as coercing other undertakings into the violation.

Mitigating factors on the other hand are regulated under article 7 of the Regulation on Fines in a non-exhaustive manner. In this regard, the base fine may be reduced at a rate of 25 to 60 per cent if the undertakings or association of undertakings concerned prove certain facts such as provision of assistance to the examination beyond the fulfilment of legal obligations, existence of encouragement by public authorities or coercion by other undertakings in the violation, voluntary payment of damages to those harmed, termination of other violations, and occupation of a very small share by practices subject to the violation within annual gross revenues. The Regulation on Fines applies also to managers or employees who had a determining effect on the violation (such as participating in cartel meetings and making decisions that would involve the company in cartel activity), and provides for certain reductions in their favour.

The Regulation on Fines is binding on the Competition Authority.

20 Debarment**Is debarment from government procurement procedures automatic, available as a discretionary sanction, or not available in response to cartel infringements? If so, who is the decision-making authority and what is the usual time period?**

Bid riggers in government procurement tenders may face blacklisting (ie, debarment from government tenders) for up to two years under article 58 of the Public Tenders Law No. 4734. The blacklisting is decided by the relevant ministry implementing the tender contract or by the relevant ministry that the contracting authority is subordinate to or is associated with. It is even a duty, not an option, for administrative authorities to apply for blacklisting in the case of bid rigging in government tenders.

Blacklisting is only applicable to bid rigging – it is not available in cases of other forms of cartel infringement.

21 Parallel proceedings

Where possible sanctions for cartel activity include criminal and civil or administrative sanctions, can they be pursued in respect of the same conduct? If not, how is the choice of which sanction to pursue made?

Yes. The same conduct can trigger administrative or civil sanctions (or criminal sanctions in the case of bid rigging or other criminally prosecutable conduct) at the same time.

Private rights of action

22 Private damage claims

Are private damage claims available for direct and indirect purchasers? What level of damages and cost awards can be recovered?

One of the most distinctive features of the Turkish competition law regime is that it provides for lawsuits for treble damages. Article 57 et seq of the Competition Law entitle any person injured in his or her business or property by reason of anything forbidden by the antitrust laws to sue the violators for three times their damages plus litigation costs and attorney fees. The Turkish obligation law regulates the joint creditors and prevents the debtor from the double recovery. All the creditors shall pursue a claim against the debtor and in that case, the debtor shall pay on the amount of their shares. However, in the event that the debtor make a payment to only one creditor as a whole, this creditor shall be liable to the others and the other creditors.

Antitrust-based private lawsuits are rare but increasing in practice. The majority of private lawsuits in Turkish antitrust enforcement rely on refusal-to-supply allegations. Civil damage claims have usually been settled by the parties involved prior to the court rendering its judgment.

Indirect purchaser claims have not yet been tested before the courts.

23 Class actions

Are class actions possible? If yes, what is the process for such cases? If not, what is the scope for representative or group actions and what is the process for such cases?

Turkish procedural law does not allow for class actions or procedures. Class certification requests would not be granted by Turkish courts. While article 73 of Law No. 6502 on the Protection of Consumers allows class actions by consumer organisations, these actions are limited to violations of Law No. 6502, and do not extend to cover antitrust infringements. Similarly, article 58 of the Turkish Commercial Code enables trade associations to take class actions against unfair competition behaviour, but this has no reasonable relevance to private suits under articles 57 et seq of the Competition Law.

Turkish procedural law allows group actions under article 113 of the Turkish Procedure Law No. 6100. Associations and other legal entities may initiate a group action to 'protect the interest of their members', 'to determine their members' rights', and 'to remove the illegal situation or prevent any future breach'. Group actions do not cover actions for damages. A group action can be brought before a court as one single lawsuit only. The verdict shall encompass all individuals within the group.

Cooperating parties

24 Immunity

Is there an immunity programme? If yes, what are the basic elements of the programme? What is the importance of being 'first in' to cooperate?

The Regulation on Active Cooperation for Discovery of Cartels (Regulation on Leniency) was enacted on 15 February 2009. The Regulation on Leniency sets out the main principles of immunity and leniency mechanisms. In parallel to the Regulation on Leniency, the Board published the Guidelines on Explanation of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Discovery of Cartels on April 2013.

The leniency programme is only applicable for cartel cases. It does not apply to other forms of antitrust infringement. Section 3 of the Regulation on Leniency provides for a definition of cartel that

encompasses price fixing, customer, supplier or market sharing, restricting output or placing quotas and bid rigging.

A cartel member may apply for leniency until the investigation report is officially served on it. Depending on the timing of the application, the applicant may benefit from full immunity or fine reduction.

The first one to file an appropriately prepared application for leniency before the investigation report is officially served may benefit from full immunity. Employees or managers of the first applicant can also benefit from the full immunity granted to the applicant firm. However, there are several conditions an applicant must meet to receive full immunity from all charges. One of them is not to be the coercer of the reported cartel. If this is the case (ie, if the applicant has forced the other cartel members to participate in the cartel), the applicant firm and its employees may only receive a reduction of between 33 per cent and 100 per cent. The other conditions are as follows:

- the applicant shall submit information and evidence in respect of the alleged cartel, including the products affected, the duration of the cartel, the names of the undertakings party to the cartel, specific dates, locations and participants of cartel meetings;
- the applicant shall not conceal or destroy information or evidence related to the alleged cartel;
- the applicant shall end its involvement in the alleged cartel except when otherwise is requested by the assigned unit on the ground that detecting the cartel would be complicated;
- the applicant shall keep the application confidential until the end of the investigation, unless otherwise is requested by the assigned unit; and
- the applicant shall maintain active cooperation until the Board takes the final decision after the investigation is completed.

25 Subsequent cooperating parties

Is there a formal partial leniency programme for parties that cooperate after an immunity application has been made? If yes, what are the basic elements of the programme? If not, to what extent can subsequent cooperating parties expect to receive favourable treatment?

The Regulation on Leniency provides for the possibility of a reduction of the fine for 'second-in' and subsequent leniency applicants. Also, the Competition Authority may consider the parties' active cooperation after the immunity application as a mitigating factor as per the provisions of Regulation on Fines.

26 Going in second

What is the significance of being the second cooperating party? Is there an 'immunity plus' or 'amnesty plus' option?

The second firm to file an appropriately prepared application would receive a fine reduction of between 33 and 50 per cent. Employees or managers of the second applicant that actively cooperate with the Competition Authority would benefit from a reduction of between 33 and 100 per cent.

The third applicant would receive a 25 per cent to 33 per cent reduction. Employees or managers of the third applicant that actively cooperate with the Competition Authority would benefit from a reduction of 25 per cent up to 100 per cent.

Subsequent applicants would receive a 16 per cent to 25 per cent reduction. Employees or managers of subsequent applicants would benefit from a reduction of 16 per cent up to 100 per cent.

Amnesty Plus is regulated under article 7 of the Regulation on Fines. According to article 7, the fines imposed on an undertaking that cannot benefit from immunity provided by the Regulation on Leniency will be decreased by 25 per cent if it provides the information and documents specified in article 6 of the Regulation on Leniency prior to the Board's decision of preliminary investigation in relation to another cartel.

27 Approaching the authorities

Are there deadlines for initiating or completing an application for immunity or partial leniency? Are markers available and what are the time limits and conditions applicable to them?

As stated in question 24, a cartel member may apply for leniency until the investigation report is officially served. Although the Regulation on

Leniency does not provide detailed principles on the 'marker system', the Competition Authority can grant a grace period to applicants to submit the necessary information and evidence. For the applicant to be eligible for a grace period, it must provide minimum information concerning the affected products, duration of the cartel and names of the parties. A document (showing the date and time of the application and request for time to prepare the requested information and evidence) will be given to the applicant by the assigned unit.

Leniency applications submitted after the official service of the investigation report would not benefit from conditional immunity. Still, such applications may benefit from fine reductions.

28 Cooperation

What is the nature, level and timing of cooperation that is required or expected from an immunity applicant? Is there any difference in the requirements or expectations for subsequent cooperating parties?

The applicant must submit: information on the products affected by the cartel; information on the duration of the cartel; names of the cartellists; dates, locations, and participants of the cartel meetings; and other information or documents about the cartel activity. The required information may be submitted verbally. A marker is also available. Admission of actual price effect is not a required element of leniency application. The applicant must avoid concealing or destroying the information or documents concerning the cartel activity. Unless the Leniency Division decides otherwise, the applicant must stop taking part in the cartel. Unless the Leniency Division instructs otherwise, the application must be kept confidential until the investigation report has been served. The applicant must continue to actively cooperate with the Competition Authority until the final decision on the case has been rendered. The applicant must also convey any new documents to the Authority as soon as they are discovered; cooperate with the Authority on additional information requests; and avoid statements contradictory to the documents submitted as part of the leniency application.

These ground rules apply to subsequent cooperating parties as well.

Indications in practice show that the Authority was, until recently, inclined to adopt an extremely high standard regarding what constitutes 'necessary documents and information for a successful leniency application' and the 'minimum set of documents that a company is required to submit'. In 3M (27 September 2012; 12-46/1409-461), the investigation team recommended that the Board revoke the applicant's full immunity on the grounds that the applicant did not provide all of the documents that could be discovered during a dawn raid. Unfortunately, the reasoned decision did not go into the details of the matter, since the case was closed without a finding of violation. This approach arguably sets an almost impossible standard for 'cooperation' in the context of the leniency programme that very few companies will be able to meet. The trend towards adopting an extremely broadening interpretation of the concepts of 'coercion' and 'the Authority's already being in possession of documents that prove a violation at the time of the leniency application' are all alarming signs of this new trend.

Recently, however, the Board eased the tensions a little and handed a new decision that could beckon a new era for the Turkish leniency programme. On 30 March 2015, the reasoned decision of the fresh yeast producers investigation was released (14-42/738-346). The decision is the first of its kind to be entered by the Board where it granted full immunity, based on article 4/2 of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels. This immunity was afforded to a submission made after the initiation of the preliminary investigation and dawn raids. It serves as a landmark case as it is the first instance where the Board granted immunity after dawn raids. The Board justified its unprecedented application by claiming that substantive evidence and added value was brought in through the leniency application. The case is therefore expected to result in an increase in number of leniency applications in Turkey in the near future.

29 Confidentiality

What confidentiality protection is afforded to the immunity applicant? Is the same level of confidentiality protection applicable to subsequent cooperating parties? What information will become public during the proceedings and when?

According to the principles set forth under the Regulation on Leniency, the applicant (the undertaking or the employees or managers of the undertaking) must keep the application confidential until the end of the investigation, unless otherwise requested by the assigned unit. The same level of confidentiality is applicable to subsequent cooperating parties as well. While the Competition Board can also evaluate the information or documents ex officio, the general rule is that information or documents that are not requested to be treated as confidential are accepted as not confidential. Undertakings must request in writing confidentiality from the Competition Board and justify their reasons for the confidential nature of the information or documents that are requested to be treated as commercial secrets. Non-confidential information may become public through the reasoned decision, which is typically announced within three to four months after the Competition Board has decided on the case.

30 Settlements

Does the investigating or prosecuting authority have the ability to enter into a plea bargain, settlement or other binding resolution with a party to resolve liability and penalty for alleged cartel activity? What, if any, judicial or other oversight applies to such settlements?

The Board does not enter into plea bargain arrangements. A mutual agreement on other liability matters (which would have to take the form of an administrative contract) has also not been tested in Turkey. When enacted, the new Draft Law is expected to introduce a form of settlement procedure.

31 Corporate defendant and employees

When immunity or partial leniency is granted to a corporate defendant, how will its current and former employees be treated?

The current employees of a cartel entity also benefit from the same level of leniency or immunity that is granted to the entity. There are no precedents about the status of former employees as yet.

Apart from this, according to the Regulation on Leniency a manager or employee of a cartel entity may also apply for leniency until the investigation report is officially served. Such an application would be independent from applications by the cartel member itself, if there are any. Depending on the application order, there may be total immunity from, or reduction of, a fine for such manager or employee. The reduction rates and conditions for immunity or reduction are the same as those designated for the cartellists.

32 Dealing with the enforcement agency

What are the practical steps for an immunity applicant or subsequent cooperating party in dealing with the enforcement agency?

Since active cooperation is required from all applicant cartel members in order to maintain the leniency or immunity granted by the Board, extra effort should be spent to keep the Board informed to the maximum possible extent regarding the cartel that is subject to investigation.

33 Policy assessments and reviews

Are there any ongoing or anticipated assessments or reviews of the immunity/leniency regime?

There are no ongoing or proposed leniency and immunity policy assessments or policy reviews. That said, the Turkish Competition Authority has recently published the Guidelines on Explanation of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Discovery of Cartels in April 2013.

Update and trends

The year in review did not witness any ground-breaking cartel cases or record fines for cartel activity. In fact, there is an easily detectable decline in the number of cartel cases. Most of the fully fledged investigations did not result in monetary fines against the defendants.

According to the annual report of the Competition Board for 2016, the Board decided on 325 cases and 83 of them are related to competition law violations. Forty-one out of 83 are related to article 4 of the Competition Law. Furthermore, according to the report, the Board decided that there was no need to launch a fully fledged investigation in a leniency application in the finance sector, and the Board is currently investigating another leniency application.

Recently, the Competition Board published its reasoned decision on *Spot Currency Markets* (24 December 2016, 16-41/667-300). The Board launched a preliminary investigation against several banks in order to determine whether traders who are responsible for buying and selling in different currencies working in the treasury department of the banks exchanged potentially competition sensitive information with competing banks' traders in the chatrooms accessible through Bloomberg and Reuters screens between 2009 and 2013. With its decision, the Competition Board decided not to initiate a fully fledged investigation on the grounds that there was no violation of article 4 of the Competition Law. The case is important as it reflects the Board's approach of concentrating on the effects of a competition law violation instead of the object. The Board stated in its reasoned decision that the

information exchange had been 'far from causing a result' and thereby concluded that there was no need to launch a fully fledged investigation.

In the case of *Diye*, the Board had ordered the parties involved to cease and desist the infringing activities but spared them a fine by delivering its opinion pursuant to article 9/3 of the Competition Law, which is commonly called a 9/3 Order (12 December 2014, 14-51/900-410). In the decision, references were made to the lack of evidence to show any oral or written agreement or mutual consensus between the buyers, and to the share of advertisers' advertising expenses in the overall advertising expenses. The Board's decision weighed whether a cumulative effect might occur as a result of an increase in the number of undertakings that participate in the system owing to the nature of the information obtained by the advertisers within the scope of the service provided through the system under investigation, and whether certain competitive concerns could be raised in the relevant market in the medium and long term. As a result, the Board ordered an immediate halt of the activities in question. Recently, the High State Court annulled the decision of the Ankara Administrative Court on the grounds that the Board should have launched an investigation in order to determine whether undertakings were involved in an agreement that could restrict competition in the market (E 2016/641, K 2017/566). Subsequently the Board launched another investigation into *Diye*, and the investigation is still ongoing (1 June 2017, 17-18/264-M).

Defending a case

34 Disclosure

What information or evidence is disclosed to a defendant by the enforcement authorities?

The right of access to the file has two legal bases in the Turkish competition law regime: Law No. 4982 and Communiqué No. 2010/3 on the Regulation of Right to Access to File and Protection of Commercial Secrets (Communiqué No. 2010/3). Article 5/1 of Communiqué No. 2010/3 provides that the right of access to the case file will be granted upon the written requests of the parties within due period during the investigations. The right to access the file can be exercised on written request at any time until the end of the period for submitting the last written statement. This right can only be used once so long as no new evidence has been obtained within the scope of the investigation. On the other hand, Law No. 4982 does not have such a restriction in terms of timing or scope. Access to the case file enables the applicant to gain access to information and documents in the case file that do not qualify as either internal documents of the Competition Authority or trade secrets of other firms or trade associations. Law No. 4982 provides for similar limitations.

35 Representing employees

May counsel represent employees under investigation in addition to the corporation that employs them? When should a present or past employee be advised to obtain independent legal advice?

So long as there are no conflicts of interest, Turkish law does not prevent counsel from representing both the investigated corporation and its employees. That said, employees are hardly ever investigated separately, and there is no criminal sanction against employees for antitrust infringements in practice.

36 Multiple corporate defendants

May counsel represent multiple corporate defendants? Does it depend on whether they are affiliated?

So long as there are no conflicts of interest, and all the related parties consent to such representation, attorneys-at-law (members of a Turkish bar association qualified to practise law in Turkey) can and do represent multiple corporate defendants, even if they are not affiliated. Persons who are not attorneys sometimes also undertake representations, but they are not bound by the same ethics codes binding attorneys in Turkey.

37 Payment of penalties and legal costs

May a corporation pay the legal penalties imposed on its employees and their legal costs?

Yes. It is advisable to seek separate tax or book-keeping advice before the corporation pays the legal costs or penalties imposed on its employee.

38 Taxes

Are fines or other penalties tax-deductible? Are private damages awards tax-deductible?

Pursuant to article 11 of the Corporate Tax Law No. 5520, any administrative monetary fine is not considered as tax-deductible. Depending on the specific circumstances, losses, damages and indemnities paid based upon judicial decisions may or may not be tax-deductible. This requires a case-by-case analysis and it is advisable to seek separate tax or book-keeping advice in each case.

There is a reduction mechanism for the administrative monetary fines. The relevant legislation on payment of administrative monetary fines allows the undertakings to discharge from liability by paying 75 per cent of the fine, provided that the payment is made before any appeal. The payment of such amount is without prejudice to a later appeal. The time frame in which to pay the 75 per cent portion terminates on the 30th calendar day from the service of the full reasoned decision.

39 International double jeopardy

Do the sanctions imposed on corporations or individuals take into account any penalties imposed in other jurisdictions? In private damage claims, is overlapping liability for damages in other jurisdictions taken into account?

No. The Turkish Competition Authority would not take into account penalties imposed in other jurisdictions. The specific circumstances surrounding indirect sales are not tried under Turkish cartel rules (see question 9).

Overlapping liability for damages in other jurisdictions is not taken into account.

40 Getting the fine down

What is the optimal way in which to get the fine down? Does a pre-existing compliance programme, or compliance initiatives undertaken after the investigation has commenced, affect the level of the fine?

Aside from the recently introduced leniency programme, article 9 of the Competition Law, which generally entitles the Board to order

structural or behavioural remedies to restore the competition as before the infringement, sometimes operates as a conduit through which infringement allegations are settled before a full-blown investigation is launched. This can only be established through a very diligent review of the relevant implicated businesses to identify all the problems, and adequate professional coaching in eliminating all competition law issues and risks. In cases where the infringement was too far advanced for it to be subject to only an article 9 warning, the Board at least found a mitigating factor in that the entity immediately took measures to cease any wrongdoing and if possible to remedy the situation.

There have been cases where the Board considered the existence of a compliance programme as an indication of good faith (*Unilever*, 12-42/1258-410; *Efes*, 12-38/1084-343). However, recent indications suggest that the Board is disinclined to consider a compliance programme to be a mitigating factor. Although they are welcome, the mere existence of a compliance programme is not enough to counter

the finding of an infringement or even to discuss lower fines (*Frito Lay*, 13-49/711-300; *Industrial Gas*, 13-49/710-297). In *Industrial Gas*, the investigated party argued that it had immediately initiated a competition law compliance programme as soon as it received the complaint letters, which were originally submitted to the authority. However, the Board did not take this into account as a mitigating factor. On the other hand, the Board's recent *Mey İçki* decision (16 February 2017, 17-07/84-34) might be signalling a change in the Board's perception of compliance programmes. The Board decided to apply a 25 per cent reduction on the grounds that *Mey İçki* ensured compliance with competition law by taking into account the competition law sensitivities highlighted by the Board even before the final decision of the Board. Similarly, in *Consumer Electronics* (7 November 2016, 16-37/628-279), the Board applied a 60 per cent reduction to an undertaking because of its compliance efforts, since the undertaking amended its contracts before the final decision of the Board.

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