Unilateral Effects Assessment in Turkish Merger Control Regime

The Turkish merger control regime relies on the significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test to ascertain whether a merger may be cleared. As outlined in the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions(Guidelines), the substantive assessment in the Turkish merger control regime, similar to that of the European Commission, includes analyses of unilateral effects and coordinated effects under the SIEC test. The unilateral effects of concentrations might be seen when the undertakings can increase the prices and reduce the quality, options or innovation by their own behaviour, without needing the collaborative response of their competitors.

Many elements determine whether a horizontal merger transaction will cause unilateral effects which impede the competition substantially in the relevant market. As per the Guidelines, these elements are: (i) high market shares of the merging parties; (ii) merging parties being close competitors; (iii) customers having limited opportunity to change the suppliers; (iv) possibility for the competitors not increasing their productions in response to the price increase; (v) the merged undertaking having the power to prevent their competitors from expanding; and (vi) the merger transaction eliminating a substantial competitive force. Since these elements might not be considered decisive on an individual basis, it can be necessary to evaluate them all together.

For more information on unilateral effects in Turkey, please feel free to reach out to ELIG Gurkaynak at +90 212 327 1724 or through gonenc.gurkaynak@elig.com.