Cartel Regulation

1. Regulation and Authority

1.1. The Regulation

1.1.1. What is the legislation in terms of cartel enforcement in Turkiye?

The legislation regulating cartel enforcement in Turkiye is the Law on Protection of Competition No. 4054 (“Law No. 4054”), adopted on 13 December 1994. Law No. 4054 is based on the Article 167 of Turkish Constitution, obliging the state to take necessary measures to secure a free market economy. The specific provision that regulated cartel enforcement is Article 4 of Law No. 4054, setting out the main principles to be applied.

Law No. 4054 has been subject to numerous revisions since it was first introduced. The latest amendment to Law No. 4054 was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye on 23 May 2024 and was effective as of 29 May 2024. The previous primary amendment to Law No. 4054 was made on 16 June 2020 (“Law No. 7246”) and was effective as of 24 June 2020. Per its recital, Law No.7246 was formed in line with the Turkish Competition Authority’s (the “Authority”) enforcement experience for over 20 years and brought Turkish competition law closer to European Union Law.

1.2. The Authority

1.2.1. Is there a separate, dedicated authority investigating cartel matters?

Yes. The Turkish Competition Authority investigates cartel matters in Turkiye. The Authority is composed of the Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”), along with the presidency and service departments and has administrative and financial autonomy. The Authority handles its operations through six different divisions, each focusing on specific sectors. As of 1 January, 2024, there were approximately 281 case handlers of the Authority. The following units assist the divisions and the presidency:

• economic analysis and research department;
• decisions unit;
• information management unit;
• external relations and competition advocacy department;
• management services unit;
• cartel and on-site inspections support unit; and
• strategy development unit.

The Board, which is the decision-making body of the Authority, is composed of a total of seven members. The responsibilities of the Board also include investigating and condemning cartel activity. However, if the activity amounts to a criminally prosecutable act (e.g. in cases of bid rigging in public tenders), penal courts and public prosecutors may separately investigate the matter.

The cartel members are adjudicated before the courts as well in private lawsuits as the Authority’s enforcement can be complemented with private lawsuits. Private antitrust litigation is also in an increasing trend. The litigants can claim three times their loss as compensation pursuant to a treble damages clause. In these instances, the Courts usually await the Board’s decision to render a decision in those.

1.3. Updates

1.3.1. What are the recent updates and/or proposals to the current enforcement procedure?

The latest update to Law No. 4054, Law No. 7511 was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye on 23 May 2024 and was effective as of 29 May 2024. Per this amendment, significant updates have been introduced to the procedure applicable to investigations. The investigated parties are no longer required to submit a first written defense and the additional opinion of the Authority is only prepared if the Authority changes its opinions in the investigation report.

A significant update brought with Law No. 7246 was the introduction of a de minimis principle, that is akin to the European Union application. The principles of the de minimis rule were introduced on 16 March 2021, through Communiqué No. 2021/3 on Agreements. Concerted Practices and Decisions and Practices of Associations of Undertakings That Do Not Significantly Restrict Competition (“Communiqué No. 2021/3”) setting out the principles of de minimis in Turkish competition law. Communiqué No. 2021/3 sets out certain thresholds and entitles the Board to decide not to launch a full-fledged investigation into undertakings in cases where these market shares are not met. However, Communiqué 2021/3 is not applied to hardcore restrictions (e.g. price-fixing, territory and/or customer sharing agreements, restriction of supply). The Authority is seemingly inclining more towards investigating violations that are more significant.

The Authority previously opted to utilize Article 9(3) of Law No. 4054 to conclude pre-investigations which only affected small markets, by referring to procedural efficiency (see Izmir Container Transporters, 2 January 2020, 20-01/3-2). This rather controversial approach can now be replaced with Communiqué No. 2021/3. Communiqué 2021/3 allows the Board to focus more on significant matters while bringing the Turkish competition law closer to the European Union law, on which it is modelled.

Law No. 7246 also introduced settlement and commitment mechanisms. The Guidelines on Vertical Agreements were also amended to include provisions on internet sales and most favored nation clauses. The amended version was published on 30 March 2018.

Lastly, Regulation on Fines to Apply in Cases of Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Limiting Competition and Abuse of Dominant Position (“Amended Regulation on Fines”) was amended and entered into force on 27 December 2024. Per the amended regulation, (i) there is no distinction between cartels and other violations in terms of the determination of the basic fine and (ii) upper and lower limits for the basic fine are removed.

The following texts have been either announced or enacted since 2013:

• the Communiqué on the Increase of the Lower Threshold for Administrative Fines specified in Paragraph 1, Article 16 of the Competition Law (to be valid until 31 December 2025);
• the Regulation on The Settlement Procedure Applicable in Investigations on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition and Abuses of Dominant Position;
• the Communiqué on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions and Practices of Associations of Undertakings That Do Not Significantly Restrict Competition (Communiqué No: 2021/3);
• the Communiqué on Commitments for Preliminary Investigations and Investigations on Anticompetitive Agreements, Concerted Practices, Decisions and Abuse of Dominant Position (Communiqué No. 2021/2);
• the Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicles Sector (Communiqué No. 2017/3);
• the Block Exemption Communiqué on R&D Agreements (Communiqué No. 2016/5);
• the Block Exemption Communiqué on Specialization Agreements (Communiqué No. 2025/2);
• the Guidelines On Administrative Fines To Apply In Cases Of Agreements, Concerted Practices And Decisions Limiting Competition And Abuses Of Dominant Position, enacted on 19 February 2025;
• the Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labor Markets, enacted on 3 December 2024 (Guidelines on Laber Market);
• the Guidelines on Vertical Agreements, enacted on 29 March 2018;
• the Guidelines Explaining the Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicles Sector (Communiqué No. 2017/3), enacted on 7 March 2017;
• the Guidelines on the General Principles of Exemption, enacted on 28 November 2013;
• the Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, enacted on 30 April 2013; and
• the Guidelines on the Explanation of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels, enacted on 17 April 2013.

1.4. Main regulation

1.4.1. What is the main regulation on cartel enforcement in Turkiye?

Article 4 of Law No. 4054, which is akin to and closely modeled on Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), aims to prohibit and illegalise the agreements and concerted practices, including cartel agreements, as well as the decisions of the associations of undertakings, which prevent, distort or restrict competition by object or by effect, directly or indirectly in a particular market for goods or services.

Similar to the TFEU, Article 4 itself does not set out a definition of “cartel”; instead, the Authority has defined it under Article 3(1)(ç) of the The Regulation on Active Cooperation for Discovery of Cartels (“Regulation on Leniency”) and Article 3 of the Amended Regulation on Fines. According to these regulations, cartels are described as agreements (i) restricting competition and/or concerted practices between competitors for price-fixing; (ii) allocating customers, providers, territories or trade channels; (iii) restricting the amount of supply or imposing quotas and bid rigging.

Likewise, akin to TFEU Law No. 7246 introduced the de minimis principle, allowing the Board to not launch full-fledged investigation upon agreements, concerted practices and decisions of association of undertakings, if the market share and turnover thresholds laid out in Communiqué No. 2021/3 are not exceeded.

Both by object and by effect restrictions are prohibited by Article 4 of Law No. 4054. The content, its aim and the economic and legal framework of the agreement is considered whilst determining whether the agreement restricts competition by object or by effect. The intention has no effect on the liability of the parties, although it may be considered as an aggravating or mitigating factor, subject to the circumstances of the case.

The agreements that have the potential to prevent, restrict or distort competition also fall within the scope of Article 4 of Law No.4054. This is specific to Turkish cartel regulation that reflects the vast discretionary power of the Board. Both potential and actual effects are considered. Per Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, restrictive effects are evaluated based on adverse effects on the market parameters. These parameters could be price, output, quality, product variety or innovation. Article 4 also bears a non-exhaustive list of restrictive agreement examples. This list closely resembles Article 101(1) of the TFEU. Accordingly, the list contains price-fixing, market allocation and refusal-to-deal agreements as examples. Horizontal restrictive agreements such as price-fixing, market allocation, collective refusals to deal (group boycotts) and bid rigging have been persistently deemed to be per-se unlawful. Agreements such as vertical agreements and purchasing cartels are mostly subject to competitive effects tests.

Before the introduction of Law No. 7246 in 2020, Article 4 of Law No. 4054 was delineated from TFEU in terms of de minimis exception.

With Law No. 7246, de minimis principle was introduced under Article 41 of Law No.4054 with an aim to focus on more significant violations. Per the
de minimis principle, agreements that exceed the thresholds to be determined by the Board do not benefit from this exception.

The de minimis principle is applicable to agreements that fall into the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054. That said, it is not applicable to hardcore violations such as resale price maintenance, price-fixing, territory or customer sharing and restriction of supply. As such, cartel agreements also do not benefit from the de minimis principle.

Agreements that benefit from a block exemption and/or an individual exemption are exempt from the prohibition of restrictive agreements and practices. The Block Exemption Communiqués are as follows:

• Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements (“Communiqué No. 2002/2”);
• Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector (“Communiqué No. 2017/3”);
• Block Exemption Communiqué in Relation to the Insurance Sector (“Communiqué No.2008/3”):
• Block Exemption Communiqué on Technology Transfer Agreements (“Communiqué No.2008/2”):
• Block Exemption Communiqué on Specialization Agreements (“Communiqué No.2013/3”): and
• Block Exemption Communiqué on Research and Development Agreements (“Communiqué No.2016/5”).

These Communiqués are akin to their equivalents in the European Union. The latest block exemption is the Communiqué No. 2017/3 that introduced revised set of rules for the motor vehicle sector in Turkiye, revising the Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2005/4 for Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector. A restrictive agreement that (i) falls out of the scope of the block exemption per the relevant communiqué and (ii) does not benefit from individual exemption, would be subject to the prohibition brought with Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

Concerted practices are also prohibited under Turkish competition law. In cases that concern a concerted practice allegation, the Authority can shift the burden of proof per “the presumption of concerted practice” mechanism.

1.5. Joint ventures

1.5.1. How does cartel regulation apply to joint ventures?

Per Law No. 4054, joint ventures are considered in between merger control and cartel regulation. The full-function characteristic of the joint venture will determine whether it falls within the scope of merger control or cartel regulation.

A full-functioning joint venture will be evaluated under merger control regime pursuant to Article 7 of Law No. 4054, if the thresholds foreseen are met. If the joint venture is not a full-functioning one, the joint venture will be subject to cartel regulation as it will be evaluated under the test foreseen in Article 4 of Law No. 4054 to determine whether it has an anticompetitive purpose or effect.

2. Application of the regulation and jurisdictional scope

2.1. Application of the regulation

2.1.1. Does Law No. 4054 apply to individuals, corporations and other entities?

Undertakings and associations of undertakings are subject to Law No. 4054. The definition of an undertaking is “single integrated economic unit capable of acting independently in the market to produce, market or sell goods and services”. Accordingly, Law No. 4054 may apply to individuals, corporations and other entities so long as they act as undertakings.

2.2. Territorial application

2.2.1. Does the regime apply to conducts taking place outside of Turkiye (as well as indirect sales into the jurisdiction)? If it applies, what is the jurisdictional basis?

Law No. 4054 takes into account whether the cartel had any effects in the Turkish markets as Turkiye is an “effects theory” jurisdiction. The nationality and/or the location of the cartel along with the existence of a Turkish entity are irrelevant. If the cartel had an effect in Turkish markets, the Board does not decline jurisdiction over non-Turkish cartels or cartel members in the past (e.g., the suppliers of rail freight forwarding services for block trains and cargo train services, 16 December 2015, 15-44/740-267; Güneş Ekspres/Condor, 27 October 2011, 11-54/1431-507; Imported Coal, 2 September 2010, 10-57/1141-430, Refrigerator Compressor. 1 July 2009, 09-31/668-156).

Mainly as a result of enforcement shortfalls such as difficulties of formal service or failure to identify a tax number, the Board is yet to enforce a sanction against firms without any Turkish presence. Indirect sales and its specific circumstances are yet to be evaluated by the Board. That said, given that a cartel activity that takes place outside of Turkiye will not in and of itself produce effects in Turkiye, per Article 2 of Law No. 4054, it could be argued that the Turkish cartel regime does not extend to indirect sales. Article 2 of Law No. 4054 lays the foundation of the Board’s jurisdiction. The scope of Article 2 of Law No. 4054 includes all restrictive agreements, decisions, transactions and practices so long as they produce an effect on a Turkish market, without subject to where the conduct takes place.

2.3. Export cartels

2.3.1. Do conducts that only affect customers or parties outside of Turkiye benefit from any exemption or defense?

Pursuant to Article 2 of Law No. 4054, export cartels are considered outside of the Board’s jurisdiction. Investigation launched in Poultry Meat Producers (25 November 2009, 09-57/1393-362), the allegations concerned, inter alia, an export cartel. The Board deemed that export cartels should not be sanctioned so long as they do not affect the host country’s markets. Despite certain decisions on the contrary which signal an incline of the Board to claim jurisdiction on export cartels (e.g., Paper Recycling, 8 July 2013, 13-42/538-238), it could be argued that so long as there is no effect in Turkish markets, an export cartel would fall outside of the Authority’s jurisdiction.

2.4. Provisions specific to industries

2.4.1. Are there any violations specific to an industry? Are there any exemptions and/or defenses specific to an industry?

There is no industry-specific offense or defense within the scope of Law No. 4054 as it applies to industries and without any exceptions. Slightly different rules for industry-specific exemptions are foreseen in certain communiqués, however, these do not set out industry specific offenses or defenses that are not laid out in Law No. 4054. That said, the Communiqué No. 2017/3 is considered in cases that concern the motor vehicle sector’s block exemption. Both the Board and the defending undertaking will consider the rules and thresholds set out in the Communiqué.

Article 4 of Law no. 4054 also applies to state owned entities to the extent that they fall into the scope of the undertaking definition.

Oligopolistic markets for the supply of homogeneous products (e.g., cement, bread yeast and ready-mixed concrete) are persistently investigated by the Board for concerted practice allegations, as a result of the presumption of concerted practice. However, whether this high number of cases (more than 32 investigations in the cement and ready-mixed concrete markets over 20 years of enforcement history) constitute industry-specific offense is subject to debate.

2.5. Conducts approved by the Government

2.5.1. Does Government-Approved Activity or Regulated Conduct Benefit from a Defense and/or an Exemption?

State-approved or regulated actions do not benefit from a defense and/or an exemption.

There are sector-specific exemptions in Turkish competition law. Block exemption regulations for the motor vehicle sector and insurance sector can be named as examples for these. Law No. 4054 does not foresee specific exceptions to government-sanctioned activities or regulated conduct.

That said, the Board has evaluated undertakings’ defenses on that they operate in a state-approved or regulated manner (e.g., Paper Recycling, 10 April 2025, 25-14/323-153, Paper Recycling, 8 July 2013, 13-42/538-238, Waste Accumulator. 4 October 2012, 12-48/1415-476, Pharmaceuticals. 2 March 2012, 12-09/290-91, Et-Balık Kurumu. 16 June 2011, 11-37/785-248, Türkiye Şöförler ve Otomobilciler Federasyonu, 3 March 1999, 99-12/91-33, Esgaz. 9 August 2012, 12-41/1171-384).

3. Investigations

3.1. Phases in an investigation

3.1.1. What are the phases in a typical investigation?

The Board may launch an investigation upon a cartel allegation either ex officio, or pursuant to a complaint. If the Board deems the complaint not serious, it rejects the complaint. If the Board remains silent for 30 calendar days upon a complaint, the complaint is deemed rejected. If the complaint (or notice pertaining to an allegation) is found serious, the Board deems to conduct a preliminary investigation. The undertakings concerned are not notified or aware of the preliminary investigation unless the Authority conducts a dawn raid. During this preliminary phase, the Authority opts to conduct dawn raids (i.e., unannounced on-site inspections) and/or utilize other investigatory tools (such as formal information request letters). Within 30 calendar days of the preliminary investigation decision, the Authority submits a preliminary report to the Board. Within 10 days following this preliminary report, the Board decides through a formal decision on whether to launch an investigation. If the Board decides to formally launch an investigation, within 15 calendar days, the undertaking(s) concerned are notified with an investigation notice. The investigation is completed in six months, although, if the Board deems necessary, it may extend the investigation period once only, for an additional period of up to six months.

Articles 4 and 5 of Law No 7511 on Amendments to the Turkish Commercial Code and Certain Laws (“Law No. 7511” - published in the Official Gazette on 29 May 2024) introduced certain amendments to Articles 43 and 45 of Law No. 4054. Prior to Law No. 7511, the period for the submission of the first written defense was 30 calendar days. This has now been abolished by the new regulation. Therefore, currently the investigation parties are not required to submit their first written defense.

Following the investigation notice, the Authority prepares and serves the main investigation report. Following the service of the investigation report, the investigated parties have 30 calendar days to respond to it. This is extendable for an additional 30 calendar days.

Law No. 7511 also made the additional opinion phase an option for the Authority. The Authority is no longer “required” to issue an additional opinion. If, however, the Authority changes the positions taken in the investigation report after the submission of the defenses, it will notify the relevant undertakings through an additional opinion within 15 calendar days. The investigated parties have 30 calendar days to reply to the additional report.

The Board may hold an oral hearing ex officio or upon request by the parties. Should the Board decide to hold an oral hearing, it is held within at least 30 calendar days and at most 60 calendar days following the completion of the investigation process. The oral hearing is carried out under the provisions of Communiqué No. 2010/2 on Oral Hearings Before the Board. The Board will render its final decision on the same day of the oral hearing. If this is not possible, the Board will render its decision (i) in 15 calendar days after the oral hearing or (ii) in 30 calendar days after the completion of the investigation process in cases where an oral hearing is not held.

The decisions of the Board can be appealed within 60 calendar days after the service of the reasoned decision. The Board usually serves the reasoned decision within three to eight months following the announcement of the final decision.

3.2. Investigative powers of the Authority

3.2.1. What are the investigative powers of the Authority? Do these powers require court approval?

The Board is entitled to request any information from all public institutions and organisations, undertakings, and trade associations should it deems necessary. The officials of these institutions are required to provide the required information within the deadline determined by the Board. Failing to comply with a decision that deems for production of information can result in a turnover-based fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not available, the turnover generated in the financial year that is closest to the date of the fining decision is taken into account). The minimum fine is currently 241,043 Turkish lira (Communiqué on the Increase of the Lower Threshold for Administrative Fines specified in Paragraph 1, Article 16 of the Law No. 4054 until 31 December 2025 (“Communiqué No. 2025/1”)). An incomplete or incorrect information in response to this request may also result in imposition of the same fine.

Pursuant to Article 15 of Law No. 4054, the Board is also entitled to conduct on-site inspections and dawn raids. The Board is authorized to:

• Examine the books, all types of data and documents of undertakings and associations of undertakings kept on physical or electronic media and in information systems, and take copies and physical samples thereof;
• Request written or oral statement on particular issues; and
• Perform on-site examination of any assets of undertakings.

If the staff of the Authority are not granted access to premises of the undertaking, the Board may impose a fixed fine of 0.5 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not available, the turnover generated in the financial year that is closest to the date of the fining decision is taken into account). This could also result in a daily fine for each day of the violation at 0.05 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not available, the turnover generated in the financial year that is closest to the date of the fining decision is taken into account).

Pursuant to Law No. 4054, the Authority has significant powers in terms of dawn raids. However, as a recent development, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkiye (“Constitutional Court”) published on 20 June 2023 its reasoned decision of 23 March 2023 where it ruled in brief, that the Authority is obliged to obtain a court decision (i.e., a warrant) allowing the Authority officials to conduct a dawn raid. Per the standard practice of the Authority, pursuant to Law No. 4054, the case handlers of the Authority have been able to legally conduct the dawn raids with the certificate of authorizations issued by the Board. Although the Authority’s practice was found to be compliant with Law No. 4054, the Constitutional Court deemed that the practice is unconstitutional as it does not require the Authority to obtain a court decision before conducting dawn raids in contravention of Article 21 of the Turkish Constitution protecting the immunity of domicile. Currently, the Board requires court approval only in cases where the undertaking objects to the dawn raid and apart from this scenario, the Board is not required to obtain approval from courts. In the meanwhile, the dawn raid practice of the Authority should not be significantly affected in a way that would lessen the frequency of the dawn raids.

The wording of Law No. 4054 may be interpreted as employees of the undertaking are compelled to give verbal testimony. However, so long as the response is provided quickly in written correspondence, the Authority does allow a delay for these answers. As such, if the response is provided in a timely manner and in the deadline agreed with the Authority, this allows the employees to avoid responding to issues that are uncertain to them. The Authority examines all computer records and also deleted items.

Furthermore, Law No. 7246 included an explicit provision authorizing the Authority to inspect and make copies of all information and documents in the companies’ physical records and those in electronic storage and IT systems. That said, this was the practice even prior to Law No. 7246. The proposed amendment to Law No. 4054’s preamble also confirms this by noting that the amendment serves further clarification on the powers of the Authority that are particularly important for discovering cartels. However, per Authority’s usual practice, this is not an update.

The officials carrying out the on-site inspection are required to possess a deed of authorization from the Board. This deed of authorization specifies the subject matter and purpose of the investigation. The Authority is not entitled to exercise its said powers (copying records, recording statements by company staff, etc.) for matters that are outside of the investigation’s scope (i.e., the scope specified in the deed of authorization).

4. Cooperation at international level

4.1. Cooperation between agencies

4.1.1. Does the Authority cooperate with authorities in other jurisdictions? If yes, what is the legal basis and the extent?

Pursuant to Article 43 of Decision No. 1/95 of the European Union-Turkiye Association Council, the Authority is authorized to notify and request application of relevant measures from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition if the Board deems that a cartel in the European Union has an adverse effect in competition in Turkish markets. This provision foresees reciprocal rights and obligations to the European Union and Turkiye. As such, the European Commission is also authorized to request the Board to apply necessary measures vice versa to restore competition in relevant markets.

The Authority also has various bilateral cooperation agreements on cartel enforcement matters with competition authorities in other jurisdictions (e.g., Romania, South Korea, Bulgaria, Portugal, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Croatia, Egypt, Hungary and Mongolia). The Authority also has close connections with other organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Trade Organization, the International Competition Network, and the World Bank.

Moreover, the Turkic States Competition Council was established between Azerbaijan, Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 23 January 2024. The Authority also hosted the first meeting of the Balkans Competition Platform on 30 September 2024 with the attendance of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania, Greece and Hungary.

The Authority’s research department carries out periodic consultations with certain foreign institutions and organizations on protection of competition. The Authority assesses their results and ultimately submits its recommendations to the Board. The cooperation protocol of 14 October 2009 signed between the Authority and the Turkish Public Procurement Authority is an example that aims to establish a competitive environment in terms of public tenders through cooperation and sharing information. Authority’s actions are not legally based on informal contacts.

4.2. Interaction between jurisdictions

4.2.1. Which jurisdictions significantly interact with Turkiye in cross-border cases? If so, what is the effect of this interaction on the investigation, prosecution and penalizing of the cross-border cartel activity?

The interaction between jurisdictions does not materially affect the Board’s investigation on cartels, including cross-border cartels. Principle of comity is not an explicit provision in Law No. 4054. A cartel can be prosecuted in Turkiye in case it has an effect on the Turkish market, regardless of whether it was investigated in another jurisdiction.

5. Cartel proceedings

5.1. Decisions

5.1.1. How does adjudications and determinations work in cartel proceedings?

The Board is entitled to initiate an investigation into an undertaking or an association of undertakings ex officio or upon complaint. Primarily, the Board adjudicates upon cartel matters. This enforcement may further be supplemented with private lawsuits. Private lawsuits on cartel matters are addressed in regular courts. The treble damages clause allows litigants to request three times their loss as compensation. Stemming from this clause, private lawsuits in competition cases are in an increasing trend. In these cases, most courts initially wait for the Board’s final decision before proceeding with their own ruling.

5.2. Burden of proof

5.2.1. Who bears the burden of proof? What is the requisite standard of proof?

The Board’s adoption of a low standard of proof is one of the most important material issues specific to Turkiye. Proof that (i) there was a cartel activity and (ii) the undertaking was a participant in cases of multilateral discussions or cooperation are required to prove an undertaking’s participation in cartel activity. The Board established a significantly low standard of proof in cartel proceedings, due to the broadening interpretation of Law No. 4054 and in particular the “object or effect of which” branch of it.

As for concerted practices, the standard of proof is even lower. If the Board established parallel behavior, the Board may readily infer the existence of concerted practice and the undertakings concerned may be in a position to prove that the parallel behavior did not stem from a concerted practice. Law No. 4054 includes the presumption of concerted practice. As such, the Board is authorized to carry out Article 4 enforcement upon price changes in the market, supply-demand equilibrium or fields of activity of enterprises bear a resemblance to those in the markets where competition is obstructed, disrupted or restricted. Per Board’s precedents, conscious parallelism is rebuttable evidence of forbidden behavior, that is deemed as ample ground to impose administrative monetary fines on the relevant undertakings. As such, burden of proof can be switched fairly easily in concerted practice cases, thereby requiring the undertakings concerned to prove that parallel behavior is not stemming from concerted practice but has economic and rational reasons.

Law No. 4054 does not give weight to the “conscious parallelism and plus factors” doctrine, delineating from the approach in the European Union where it is accepted that tacit collusion does not constitute a violation of competition. In cases where clear parallel behavior is established, the Board may not even seek plus factors in addition to conscious parallelism.

It is seen that in practice, the Authority and its officials are adopting a broadening interpretation on cartel definition as well.

5.3. Circumstantial evidence

5.3.1. Is Circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish an infringement in cases where there is no direct evidence of the actual agreement?

The evidence on communication and economic data indicating coordination between competitors are deemed as circumstantial evidence by the Board. Communication evidence may prove the undertakings concerned communicated or met each other, however, fails to demonstrate the contents of the said communication. If the content or the existence of the violation is not demonstrated through direct evidence, the Board may utilize circumstantial evidence to establish alone or in addition to direct evidence, particularly in cases of concerted practice.

5.4. Appeal

5.4.1.How to appeal against a decision?

The final decisions of the Board, including decisions on interim measures and fines, can be appealed before administrative courts in Ankara (“Law No. 6352”, which entered into force on 5 July 2012). The appeal can be made by filing an appeal case within 60 days after the Board’s reasoned decision is served on the parties. Legal actions against Board decisions are pursued in line with Administrative Procedure Law No. 2577 (“Law No. 2577”) given that the Board’s decisions are considered administrative acts. The judicial review includes both procedural review and substantive reviews.

The execution of the Board’s decision is not stayed automatically upon appeal per Article 27 of the Law No. 2577. That said, upon the plaintiff’s request, the Court may render a decision to stay the execution of the Board’s decision if executing the said decision is likely to cause serious and irreparable damages and the decision is highly likely to be against the law (i.e., showing of a prima facie case).

The appeal proceedings generally take approximately 12 to 24 months before Ankara administrative courts. Decisions of Ankara administrative courts can also be appealed against, before the regional courts and the High State Court. Should the courts annul the Board’s decision in full or in part, the decision is remanded to the Board for another review and reconsideration.

Changes in the competent body to review the Board’s decisions were a significant development in Turkish competition law enforcement. A three-level appellate court system was introduced and it comprises administrative courts, regional courts (appellate courts) and the High State Court. Regional courts review both the procedural and substantive grounds of the Board decisions, rendering a decision also by taking into account the merits of the case. Decisions of the regional courts may be subject to the review of the High State Court in exceptional cases as set out in Article 46 of the Law No. 2577. In these cases, the decisions of the regional courts are not final and the High State Court is entitled to uphold or reverse their decisions. A reversed decision is returned to the court rendering the decision for a new decision on the matter, by also considering the High State Court’s decision. The appeal before the High State Court generally takes approximately around 24 to 36 months. As for private lawsuits, the decisions are appealable before the Supreme Court of Appeals. The appeal process for private lawsuits differs in the sense that it is governed by general procedural laws and usually lasts 24 to 30 months.

The appeal process is usually initiated by the undertaking found to be in violation in cases where the Board finds a violation. In cases where there is no finding of a violation, the complainant may appeal the decision. The Authority can also challenge a court decision if a Board decision is overturned in judicial review.

6. Sanctions

6.1. Criminal sanctions

6.1.1. Are there any criminal sanctions for cartel activity? If yes, what are these?

The sanctions laid out in Law No. 4054 are administrative in nature. As such, the sanctions imposed pursuant to Law No. 4054 leads to administrative monetary fines and civil liability but no criminal sanctions. Therefore, cartel activity will in principle not lead to any imprisonment of individuals. However, certain cases were referred to a public prosecutor pursuant to the completion of competition law investigation. Relatedly, bid rigging is criminally prosecutable per section 235 et seq of the Turkish Criminal Code. Similarly, pursuant to section 237 of the Turkish Criminal Code, illegal price manipulation (manipulation through disinformation or other fraudulent means) may result in imprisonment up to three years and a judicial fine.

6.2. Civil and administrative sanctions

6.2.1. What civil and administrative sanctions does cartel activity entail?

Once a cartel activity is established, the participant undertakings will be subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of their Turkish turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision separately (if this is not available, the turnover generated in the financial year that is closest to the date of the fining decision is taken into account). 5 per cent of the fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings may be imposed on the employees and/or members of the executive bodies of the undertakings or association of undertakings that had a significant role (i.e., a determining effect) in the creation of the violation. Pursuant to recent amendments, Law No. 4054 now refers to Article 17 of the Law on Minor Offences. This now requires the Board to take into account the aggravating and mitigating factors (e.g., (i) assistance with on-site inspections (beyond fulfilling legal obligations), (ii) being coerced to the violation by other undertakings, (iii) limited involvement in the violation, (iv) low revenue share of the activities constituting the violation, (v) the presence of overseas sales revenues in the annual gross revenues.) while determining the amount of administrative monetary fine.

The sanctions are not limited to administrative monetary fines as the Board may render a decision to terminate the restrictive agreement, to abolish all consequences of every action that has been taken illegally and to take all other necessary measures to restore the level of competition and establish the status that was present before the infringement. In addition, the restrictive agreement is rendered legally invalid and hence unenforceable with all its legal consequences. Likewise, in cases where there is a possibility of serious and irreparable damages, Law No. 4054 authorized the Board to order interim measures to be applied until the final decision.

Civil lawsuits, although still rare, are increasing in number. Allegations of refusal to supply, price manipulation and exclusionary conduct give rise to the majority of private lawsuits pertaining to Turkish competition law enforcement. Claims in these civil lawsuits are usually settled between parties involved before a court renders a decision.

Akin to US competition law enforcement, Turkish competition law includes treble damages lawsuits, supplementing the administrative proceedings with civil lawsuits. Pursuant to Articles 57 et seq of Law No. 4054, violators may be sued for three times their damages in addition to litigation costs and attorney fees, by any legal or natural person that suffered damages in their business or property due to a competition law violation. These cases are brought before the competent general civil court. That said, the courts do not, in practice, engage in any evaluation to determine whether there is a condemnable anticompetitive agreement or concerted practice. Courts usually await the Board’s decision on the matter, rendering the issue as a pre-judicial question. Accordingly, the court’s decision can be obtained in a shorter period in comparison to full judiciary process pertaining to follow-on actions pertaining to the Board’s decision.

6.3. Sanction levels

6.3.1. Are there any fining or sentencing guidelines? If yes, are these binding? If not, how do adjudicators decide on the level of the sanction? Which aggravating and mitigating factors are considered?

Amended Regulation on Fines was amended and entered into force on 27 December 2024. This sets out detailed guidelines on how to calculate the amount of administrative monetary fines in cases of competition law violations. The Amended Regulation on Fines is applicable both for cartel activity and abuse of dominance. That said, it is not applicable to illegal concentrations.

Per the amended regulation, (i) there is no longer a distinction between cartels and other violations in terms of the determination of the basic fine and (ii) upper and lower limits for the basic fine have been removed. Accordingly, the basic amount of the administrative monetary fine is now determined by considering the gravity of the actual and/or potential damage along with whether the conduct has the characteristics of a naked and/or hardcore violation. Pursuant to Article 5/3 of Amended Regulation on Fines, the basic fine may be increased by:

• 20% if the duration is longer than one year but shorter than two years;
• 40% if the duration is longer than two years but shorter than three years;
• 60% if the duration is longer than three years but shorter than four years;
• 80% if the duration is longer than four years but shorter than five years; and
• 100% if the duration is longer than five years,

Aggravating and mitigating factors are factored in once the basic fine is determined. Article 6 of the Amended Regulation on Fines, lists aggravating factors in a non-exhaustive manner. Basic fine may be increased by:

• one-fold in case of recurrence of violations of Article 4 and/or Article 6,
• up to one-fold in cases of (i) continued violation after the notification of the investigation decision, (ii) decisive role in terms of infringement or the breach of confidentiality requirement under Article 12 of the the Regulation on The Settlement Procedure Applicable in Investigations on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition and Abuses of Dominant Position (“Settlement Regulation”).

Under Article 7 of the Amended Regulation on Fines, mitigating factors are also set out in a non-exhaustive manner. There are: (i) assistance with on-site inspections (beyond fulfilling legal obligations), (ii) being coerced to the violation by other undertakings, (iii) limited involvement in the violation, (iv) low revenue share of the activities constituting the violation, (v) the presence of overseas sales revenues in the annual gross revenues.

Per Article 8 of the Amended Regulation on Fines, 5 per cent of the administrative monetary fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings may be imposed on the employees and/or members of the executive bodies of the undertakings or association of undertakings that had a significant role (i.e., a determining effect) in the creation of the violation.

The Amended Regulation on Fines is binding for the Board.

6.4. Compliance programs

6.4.1. Can a compliance program in place result in a reduction of fine?

Article 7 of the Amended Regulation on Fines includes the examples of mitigating factors as (i) assistance with on-site inspections (beyond fulfilling legal obligations), (ii) being coerced to the violation by other undertakings, (iii) limited involvement in the violation, (iv) low revenue share of the activities constituting the violation, (v) the presence of overseas sales revenues in the annual gross revenues.

Yet, the list is non-exhaustive and the Board has significant discretion in determining mitigating factors. As per the Board’s previous practice, the Board had considered compliance programs as an indication of good faith whilst evaluating mitigating factors (see Unilever, 28 August 2012, 12-42/1258-410; Efes, 18 July 2012, 12-38/1084-343). However, the existence of compliance programs in and of themselves are not sufficient to deem for mitigating factors in the Board’s recent decisions (Nestle, 15 February 2024, 24-08/149-61; Unilever, 18 March 2021, 21-15/190-80; Enerjisa, 8 August 2018, 18-27/461-224; Frito Lay, 29 August 2013, 13-49/711-300; Industrial Gas, 29 August 2013, 13-49/710-297). That said, there are also decisions where the Board applied a reduction in the amount of the administrative monetary fine pursuant to compliance programs (e.g., Mey İçki, 16 February 2017, 17-07/84-34; Consumer Electronics, 7 November 2016, 16-37/628-279).

6.5. Director disqualification

6.5.1. Does cartel activity result in prohibitions on serving as corporate directors or officers?

The sanctions foreseen for undertakings may only apply to individuals to the extent that they engage in business activities as an undertaking. As for sanctions for cartel activity, employees and/or members of the executive bodies of the undertakings or association of undertakings that had a significant role (i.e., a determining effect) in the creation of the violation may be subject to separate sanctions. There are no additional sanctions foreseen for individuals. That said, bid rigging is criminally prosecutable per section 235 et seq of the Turkish Criminal Code. Similarly, pursuant to section 237 of the Turkish Criminal Code, illegal price manipulation (manipulation through disinformation or other fraudulent means) may result in imprisonment up to three years and a judicial fine.

6.6. Debarment

6.6.1. Are there automatic or discretionary debarment from government procurement procedures as a result of cartel infringement?

Pursuant to Article 58 of the Public Tenders Law No. 4734, bid riggers in government procurement tenders may be subject to blacklisting up to two years (i.e., debarment from government tenders). The ministry (i) implementing the tender contract or (ii) that the contracting authority is subordinate to or is associated with renders its decision on blacklisting. In cases of bid rigging in government tenders, the administrative authorities are required to apply blacklisting and hence is not optional.

That said, the blacklisting procedure is not applicable in cartel infringements other than bid rigging.

6.7. Parallel proceedings

6.7.1. Can criminal and civil or administrative penalties for cartel activity be pursued together?

This is possible. A single conduct may trigger administrative or civil sanctions (or criminal sanctions in the case of bid rigging or other criminally prosecutable conduct) at once.

7. Private rights of action

7.1. Private claims of damages

7.1.1. Can both direct and indirect purchasers claim damages? Can the purchasers that acquired the affected product from a non-cartel member also bring claims? What level of damages and cost can be compensated?

Turkish competition law includes a treble damages lawsuit, supplementing the administrative proceedings with civil lawsuits. Pursuant to Articles 57 et seq of Law No. 4054, violators may be sued for three times their damages in addition to litigation costs and attorney fees, by any legal or natural person that suffered damages in their business or property due to a competition law violation. That said, the Turkish Code of Obligations prevents the debtor from double recovery, regulating joint creditors. Every creditor should pursue a claim against the debtor. In this case, the debtor is obliged to pay on the amount of their shares. That said, a creditor would be liable to the others and the other creditors, in case if the debtor makes a payment to only one creditor as a whole.

Claims of indirect purchasers are yet to be addressed by the courts. However, Article 58 of Law No. 4054 does not prevent purchased claims as the text states the following, focusing on the existence of damage:

“Those who suffer as a result of the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition, may claim as a damage the difference between the cost they paid and the cost they would have paid if competition had not been limited.”

7.2. Class actions

7.2.1. Are there class actions? If yes, what is the process? If not, what is the scope for representative or group actions? What is the process for these cases?

Class action procedures are not allowed in Turkish procedural law. As such, Turkish courts would not grant class certifications. Class actions by consumer organizations are allowed per Article 73 of Law No. 6502 on the Protection of Consumers. However, these are limited to the violation of the said law and do not cover competition law infringements. Likewise, trade associations may take class actions in cases of unfair competition behavior per Article 56 of the Turkish Commercial Code. That said, this is not relevant to private lawsuits regulated under Article 57 of Law No. 4054.

Group actions are allowed pursuant to Article 113 of the Turkish Procedure Law No. 6100. A group action may be initiated by associations and other legal entities “to protect the interest of their members”, “to determine their members’ rights” and “to remove the illegal situation or prevent any future breach”. These group actions do not extend to actions for damages. Group actions shall be brought before the court with a single lawsuit and the decision shall encompass all individuals within the group.

8. Cooperating parties

8.1. Immunity

8.1.1. Are there immunity programs? If yes, what are the fundamentals? Is there any importance of being “first in” to cooperate?

Regulation on Leniency was enacted on 16 December 2023. Main principles of immunity and leniency mechanisms are set out in the Regulation on Leniency. This replaces the former regulation on leniency mechanism, which was enacted on 15 February 2009. The Board published Guidelines on Explanation of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Discovery of Cartels in April 2013, which was in line with the regulation prior to the Regulation on Leniency. The Authority is expected to release updated guidelines, explaining the Regulation on Leniency.

Regulation on Leniency is mainly applied in cartel cases. The definition of cartel is provided under Article 3(1)(ç) of the Regulation on Leniency. That said, in cases where the applicant believes the violation to constitute a cartel, and the Board deems for a different violation, the applicant may receive exemption from or reduction of the administrative monetary fine. This clearly signals the Authority’s aim to encourage leniency applications.

The first undertaking to apply for leniency through an appropriately prepared application for leniency before the service of the investigation report and when the Authority does not possess any finding that signals the existence of a cartel may benefit from full immunity. This full immunity is also applicable to employees or managers of the first applicant. The applicant should satisfy several conditions to receive full immunity. This includes not being the coercer of the reported cartel. If the applicant coerced other cartel members to participate, the applicant firm may only receive a reduction of between 25 per cent and 50 percent while its employees may receive a reduction of between 20 per cent and 100 per cent. Other conditions are:

• the applicant shall submit information and evidence in respect of the alleged cartel, including the products affected, geographical scope of the cartel, the duration of the cartel, the names and/or trade names of the undertakings party to the cartel and facilitators, and specific dates, locations and participants of cartel meetings;
• the applicant shall not conceal or destroy information or evidence related to the alleged cartel;
• the applicant shall end its involvement in the alleged cartel except when otherwise requested by the Cartels and On-Site Inspections Support Unit;
• the applicant shall keep the application confidential until the end of the investigation, unless otherwise requested by the Cartels and On-Site Inspections Support Unit; and
• the applicant shall maintain active cooperation to the extent necessary until the Board takes the final decision.

8.2. Subsequent cooperation

8.2.1. Is partial leniency possible after an immunity application? If yes, what are the fundamentals? If not, how can subsequent cooperating parties benefit from favorable treatment?

The second applicants are also provided with the possibility of a reduction pursuant to Regulation on Leniency. The Board may also evaluate their active cooperation as a mitigating factor.

8.3. Second cooperating party

8.3.1. What is the treatment for the second cooperating party? Is there any “immunity plus” of “amnesty plus”? If yes, what is the process?

The second party to file an application that is appropriately prepared can receive a fine reduction of between 20 per cent and 40 per cent. Employees or managers of the second applicant may benefit from a reduction anywhere between 20 and 100 per cent.

Applicants to apply for leniency following the first two applicants can benefit from a reduction of 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Employees or managers of these applicants may benefit from a reduction anywhere between 15 and 100 per cent.

8.4. Approaching the authorities

8.4.1. What are the deadlines for initiating and/or filing the immunity or partial leniency applications? What are the time limits?

A cartel member or a facilitating undertaking can file its leniency application until the official service of the investigation report. The applicant can place a marker and be granted a grace period by the Authority for the submission of necessary information and evidence. Eligibility for the grace period is contingent upon providing minimum information concerning the affected products, the duration of the cartel and the names of the parties. The applicant is provided with a document by the Authority, indicating the date and time of the application and the time granted to prepare the requested information and evidence.

An application cannot benefit from conditional immunity, if it is filed after the official service of the investigation report. Yet, such an application may still be taken into account in terms of fine reduction.

8.5. Cooperation

8.5.1. What nature, level and timing of cooperation is expected from the applicant? Do these differ for subsequent cooperating parties seeking partial leniency?

The applicant should submit the following:

• information on the products affected by the cartel;
• information on the geographical scope of the cartel;
• information on the duration of the cartel;
• the names and/or trade names and addresses of the cartelists and of cartel facilitators;
• the dates, locations and participants of the cartel meetings; and
• other information or documents about the cartel activity.

The foregoing may be provided verbally to the Authority. There are also markers available. An admission on the actual price effect is not necessary for the leniency application. The applicant shall refrain from concealing or destroying the information or documents concerning the cartel activity. The applicant shall stop taking part in the cartel, although the Cartels and On-Site Inspections Support Unit may order otherwise. The leniency application is kept confidential until the service of the investigation report, unless the Cartels and On-Site Inspections Support Unit decides on the contrary. The applicant is obliged to continue its active cooperation with the Authority until the Board renders its final decision. The applicant is also expected to submit any new documents to the Authority as soon as it discovers them, cooperate with the Authority on additional information requests and refrain from any statement that would contradict with the documents submitted as part of the leniency application.

These rules are also applicable to subsequent cooperating parties.

Until recently, the standard adopted for “necessary documents and information for a successful leniency application” and the “minimum set of documents that a company is required to submit” was extremely high. In 3M (, 27 September 2012, 12-46/1409-461), the Authority recommended the Board to revoke the full immunity granted to the undertaking, noting that the applicant did not provide documents that could be discovered during a dawn raid. Yet, the details of the matters were not disclosed in the reasoned decision as the case was closed without a finding of violation. It could be argued that this very high standard for “cooperation” in terms of the leniency program renders it almost impossible to meet and only met by very few companies. This trend was signified by the significant broadening in the interpretation of the “coercion” and “the Authority’s already being in possession of documents that prove a violation at the time of the leniency application” concepts.

The fresh yeast producers decision published on 30 March 2015 (14-42/783-346) handed a new decision which could signal a new era for the Turkish leniency program. The decision was novel one as the Board granted full immunity pursuant to Article 4/2 of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels. The full immunity was granted upon an application made following the initiation of the preliminary investigation and execution of dawn raids. The decision was the first of its kind as it granted immunity after dawn raids. This conclusion was justified through substantive evidence and added value were brought in through the leniency application. Likewise, in Mechanical Engineering (14 December 2017, 17-41/640-279), the Board granted full immunity to an applicant who applied for leniency during the course of the preliminary investigation. The Board rendered a decision to halve the administrative monetary fine for the undertaking who applied for leniency during the investigation phase in its decision regarding undertakings active in the roll-on, roll-off transportation sector (18 April 2019, 19-16/229-101). This was subject to whether the information provided significantly contributed to the investigation. The Board underlined in the decision that the contributions included evidence showing that the violation started earlier than what was detected during on-site inspections and evidence showing price information exchange by violating undertakings. The information provided also included details on how the price exchange was conducted.

In Gaziantep automobile expert-opinion (9 July 2020, 20-33/439-196), the Board rendered a significant decision on price-fixing arrangements. The investigation was launched into automobile expertise service providers in the Gaziantep province of Turkiye. Concrete evidence of a horizontal cartel agreement was found, aimed at determining automobile expertise service price tariffs and refusal to provide services on Sundays or to provide services on Sundays according to a rotation schedule set inter se. Pursuant to these findings, the Board imposed an administrative monetary fine on the investigated parties. Yet, one of the investigated parties was granted a 50 per cent reduction on the administrative monetary fine pursuant to its leniency application.

Lastly, the Board rendered two decisions, where it evaluated combined applications for the settlement mechanism and leniency mechanism. These decisions were rendered before the introduction of the Regulation on Leniency (i.e., they were evaluated under the previous leniency regulation of 15 February 2009). These decisions concerned Kınık Maden Suları A.Ş and Beypazarı İçecek Pazarlama Dağıtım Ambalaj Turizm Petrol İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. In Kınık (14 April 2022, 22-17/283-128), the Board applied a 25% reduction pursuant to the settlement application and a 35% reduction for the leniency application. Subsequently, in Beypazarı (18 May 2022, 22-23/379-158), the Board applied a 25% reduction for the settlement application and a 30% reduction for the leniency application, as the undertaking applied for leniency after Kınık.

8.6. Confidentiality

8.6.1. What is the confidentiality provided to the leniency applicant? Does this level of confidentiality also apply to subsequent applications? What information becomes public and when?

Pursuant to the principles set out in the Regulation on Leniency, unless the Cartels and On-Site Inspections Support Unit decides on the contrary, the applicant (an undertaking or the employees or managers of an undertaking) is obliged to keep the application confidential until the service of the investigation report. This confidentiality also applies to subsequent applications. The Board can evaluate the information and/or documents ex officio, however, the rule of thumb is that information and/or documents are not confidential to the extent that they are not requested to be treated as confidential. The undertakings shall request the treatment of commercial secrets as confidential in writing, by also justifying confidential nature of the information and/or these documents. The non-confidential information may be disclosed to the public through the reasoned decision that is usually announced within three to four months after the Board renders its decision.

8.7. Settlements

8.7.1. Can the Authority engage into a plea bargain, settlement, deferred prosecution agreement (or non-prosecution agreement) or other binding resolution with the investigated party to resolve the cartel activity? Are there any judicial or other oversights to these settlements?

Inspired by the European Union law, Law No. 7246 introduced commitment and settlement mechanisms aiming to enable the Board to end investigations without going through the entire pre-investigation and investigation procedures.

The commitment mechanism enables the undertakings or association of undertakings to offer commitments during a preliminary investigation or full-fledged investigation voluntarily. These commitments should aim to eliminate the Authority’s concerns that pertain to Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054. Subject to the timing and sufficiency of these commitments, the Board is authorized to decide not to launch a full-fledged investigation following the preliminary investigation or to end an ongoing investigation without going through the entire investigation procedure. That said, the commitment mechanism is not applicable for violations such as price-fixing between competitors, territory or customer sharing, or the restriction of supply. The Regulation on the Settlement Procedures to be Applied during Investigations Regarding Settlement Regulation entered into force on 15 July 2021. Settlement Regulation sets forth other procedures and principles of the settlement process. Contrary to the commitment mechanism, settlement is applicable to any type of competition law violation.

Per the Settlement Regulation, the Authority may ex officio invites the investigation parties to settlement negotiations. Upon Authority’s invitation, the parties should notify whether they accept the invitation to initiate settlement negotiations with the Authority within 15 calendar days. The Board has the discretion to reduce the amount of fine between 10 and 25 per cent per Article 4(4) of the Settlement Regulation. Settlement Regulation notes that the actual reduction of the administrative monetary fine cannot be less than 10 per cent. Per Article 6(5) of the Settlement Regulation, the Authority shall inform the settling party on:

• the content of the allegations;
• the nature and scope of the alleged violation;
• the main pieces of evidence that constitute a basis for the allegations;
• the potential reduction rate to be applied in case of settlement; and
• the range of the potential administrative monetary fine that might be imposed against the settling party.

The Board would adopt an interim decision upon the settlement negotiations. The interim decision would include, inter alia, the nature and scope of the alleged violation, the maximum rate for the administrative monetary fine in accordance with the Amended Regulation on Fines, and the rate of reduction applied pursuant to the settlement procedure. Should the settling party agree on the foregoing matters, the undertaking shall submit a settlement letter that includes, inter alia, an express declaration of admission as to the existence and scope of the violation. Article 9(1) of the Settlement Regulation obliges the Board to render its final decision concluding the investigation within 15 days after the submission of the settlement letter. This final decision should include the finding of the violation and the administrative monetary fine to be imposed against the settling undertaking.

The Board can re-launch an investigation if:

• there is a substantial change in any aspect of the basis of the decision;
• the relevant undertakings do not comply with the commitments; and
• there is a realisation that the decision was decided on deficient, incorrect or fallacious information provided by the parties.

8.8. Corporate defendant and employees

8.8.1. If immunity or partial leniency is granted to a corporate defendant, what is the treatment for its current and former employees

The same level of immunity or leniency granted to the entity also applies for the current employees of the cartel members. Yet, there are no precedents on former employees.

In addition, until the official service of the investigation report, a manager of the cartel member undertaking is able to apply for leniency per the Regulation on Leniency. This application is independent from the application of the cartel member undertaking, if there is one. A total immunity from, or reduction of an administrative monetary fine for such manager may be possible, subject to the application order. The reduction rates and conditions for immunity or reduction shall be the same as those foreseen for cartel members.

8.9. Dealing with the Authority

8.9.1. In terms of dealing with the Authority, what are the practical steps for an immunity applicant or subsequent cooperating party?

All applicant cartel members are required to actively cooperate with the Authority to maintain the leniency or immunity granted by the Board. Therefore, the Board should be kept up-to-date and informed on the cartel subject to the investigation to the maximum possible extent through extra effort.

9. Defending a Case

9.1. Disclosure

9.1.1. What information and evidence does the Authority disclose to the defendant?

Law on the Right to Obtain Information (the “Law No. 4982”) and Communiqué No. 2010/3 on the Regulation of Right to Access to File and Protection of Commercial Secrets (“Communiqué No. 2010/3”) are the two legal bases for right of access to the file in Turkish competition law. Pursuant to Article 5/1 of Communiqué No. 2010/3, right of access to the case file shall be granted upon the requests of the parties in written form, within due period during the investigation. Upon a written request, the right to access the case file can be exercised at any time until the deadline for the submission of the last written statement.

That said, Law No. 4982 is not subject to any timing or scope restriction. The applicant is able to gain access to information and documents within the case file through access to the case file, provided that the information and documents are not internal documents of the Authority or trade secrets pertaining to other parties.

9.2. Representing employee

9.2.1.Can a counsel represent the employee under investigation while representing the employing corporation? When should a present or former employee obtain independent legal advice and/or representation?

So long as there are no conflicts of interest, counsel can represent both an undertaking under investigation and its employees under Turkish law. However, separate investigations for employees are rare and there are no criminal sanctions against employees for antitrust infringements.

9.3. Multiple corporate defendants

9.3.1. Can a counsel represent multiple corporate defendants? If yes, is this dependent on the affiliation between the corporations?

Even if the corporations are not affiliated, attorneys-at-law (members of a Turkish bar association qualified to practice law in Turkiye) can and do represent multiple corporate defendants, provided that there are no conflicts of interest and the represented parties consent to such representation. People who are not registered attorneys are able to undertake representations. However, these representatives are not bound by the same ethics codes that bind attorneys in Turkiye.

9.4. Payment of penalties and legal costs

9.4.1. Can the legal penalties imposed on an employee and their legal cost be covered by the corporation?

This is possible. But seeking separate advice on tax or bookkeeping prior to paying such legal penalties and legal costs is advised.

9.5. Taxes

9.5.1. Are administrative monetary fines and/or other sanctions, along with private damages tax-deductible?

Administrative monetary fines are not considered to be tax-deductible pursuant to Article 11 of Corporate Tax Law No. 5520. Whether losses, damages and indemnities paid based upon judicial decisions are tax-deductible depends on circumstances. This is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and a separate tax or bookkeeping advice is advisable in each case.

Administrative monetary fines may be subject to reductions. So long as the payment is made within one month of the receipt of the reasoned decision, the relevant legislation on payment of administrative monetary fines allows the undertakings to discharge from liability by paying 75 per cent of the administrative monetary fine. The payment of such an amount is without prejudice to an appeal.

9.6. International double jeopardy

9.6.1. Are penalties imposed in other jurisdictions considered whilst determining the sanctions on corporations or individuals? Is overlapping liability for damages in other jurisdictions taken into account in private damage claims?

No. The penalties imposed in other jurisdictions are not taken into account by the Authority. Overlapping liability for damages in other jurisdictions is also not considered. Circumstances pertaining to indirect sales are yet to be addressed by Turkish cartel rules.

9.7. Reducing the administrative monetary fine

9.7.1. What is the optimal approach for reducing the amount of the administrative monetary fine?

In addition to the leniency program, Article 9 of Law No. 4054, which authorizes the Board to order structural or behavioral remedies to restore the competition as before the infringement, can also serve as a means through which infringement allegations are settled before a full-blown investigation is launched. Yet, this is only possible with a very diligent review of the relevant implicated businesses to identify all the concerns, and adequate professional coaching in eliminating all competition law issues and risks. The Board at least found a mitigating factor where the undertaking immediately took measures to cease any wrongdoing and if possible to remedy the situation in cases where the infringement was too far advanced to be subject to Article 9 notice.

10. Update and trends

10.1. The recent cases and developments in Turkiye

Per the Authority’s annual report for 2024 the Board finalised a total of 166 cases relating to competition law violations. Among the 166 cases, 148 were subject to Article 4 (anticompetitive agreements) only and five cases were subject to both Article 4 and Article 6 (abuse of dominant position). The Board issued administrative monetary fines amounting to a total of 5,946,683,069 Turkish Lira (approx. USD 145 million¹ ) in 2024 on merit related assessments, and the administrative monetary fine in 2024 for Article 4 cases was 3,130,521,386 Turkish lira (approx. USD 76 million² ). Specifically, the Board imposed administrative monetary fines totalling 2,138,216,979 Turkish lira (approx. USD 52 million³ ) in relation to horizontal anticompetitive arrangements in 2024.

In 2024, the Board increased its scrutiny of labor markets. The Board rendered its Doğa Koleji (3 October 2024, 24-40/948-407) where it investigated whether 19 private schools operating in the Kocaeli province violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 through no-poaching agreements and fixing employee salaries. As a result, Arı İnovasyon ve Bilim Eğitim Hizmetleri AŞ was imposed an administrative monetary fine of 591,347.22 TL for taking a part in the cartel. The remaining 18 undertakings benefitted from the settlement mechanism. Similarly in the French High Schools (24 April 2024, 24-20/466-196), the Board evaluated whether French high schools in Istanbul jointly determined school registration fees and certain items pertaining to these fees, along with the salaries of Turkish teachers. The Board evaluated the conduct as a cartel and rendered its decision imposing an administrative monetary fine of approximately 21 million TL on the undertakings because of the violation in the labor market.

In Healthcare Sector (24 February 2022, 22–10/152–62), the Board imposed administrative monetary fines on 29 undertakings and associations of undertakings due to (i) price-fixing agreements, (ii) restricting competition in the labor market and (iii) exchanging competitively sensitive information. The Board concluded that six undertakings established a cartel in two different cities. In addition, the Board found that the practices of 16 undertakings aimed at restricting competition in the labor market by preventing employee transfers, and wage fixing constituted another violation of Article 4 of Law No. 4054. Lastly, the Board imposed administrative monetary fines on eight undertakings for exchanging competitively sensitive information; where seven undertakings were found to have been directly active in information exchange, while one undertaking association was deemed as a facilitator.

Furthermore, the Board provided detailed theoretical background for hub-and-spoke cartels and use of algorithms for agreements in its recently published settlement decisions pertaining to the cosmetics sector (5 July 2023, 23–29/563–190; 31 August 2023, 23–40/768–270 and 21 September 2023, 23–45/853–304).

¹ At exchange rates as of 1 September 2025 based on the Turkish Central Bank’s announcement that USD 1 corresponds to TL 41.0379.

² At exchange rates as of 1 September 2025 based on the Turkish Central Bank’s announcement that USD 1 corresponds to TL 41.0379.

³ At exchange rates as of 1 September 2025 based on the Turkish Central Bank’s announcement that USD 1 corresponds to TL 41.0379.

10.2. Regime reviews and modifications

10.2.1. Are there any expected changes in terms of Turkish competition law in the form of ongoing or anticipated reviews or proposed changes?

Law No. 7246 introduced certain significant substantive and procedural changes to Law No. 4054. These are, among others, new provisions related to adoption of the significant impediment of effective competition (“SIEC”) test, de minimis principle, on-site inspection powers of the Authority, behavioral and structural remedies and commitment and settlement mechanisms and secondary regulations in relation to some of the relevant mechanisms. Moreover, the Regulation on Leniency was adopted.

Currently, the Authority is in the process of evaluating possible legislative action in terms of digital markets. This proposed legislation is also mentioned within the Online Advertising Sector Inquiry Final Report. Previously, the Authority noted that it is working on digital market regulations E-Marketplace Platforms Sector Inquiry Final Report, by referring to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 Digital Markets Act” as a basis for it.

The regulation on gatekeepers is expected to be incorporated into Article 6 of Law No. 4054 which regulates abuse of dominance. Once completed, the amendment is expected to be the most remarkable update in Turkish competition law within the scope of digital markets.

Along these lines, the Ministry of Trade formulated a Draft Regulation Amending Law No. 4054, with an emphasis on establishing and preserving competition in digital markets. The Authority conveyed the final draft with the certain parties and held stakeholder meetings to receive opinions on the draft. The timeline for the adoption of the draft, however, currently remains uncertain.

On 3 December 2024, the Authority published the Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labor Markets (“Guidelines on Labor Markets”), explaining the framework of competition law enforcement (including cartel enforcement) in labor markets. Per the Guidelines on Labor Markets, wage-fixing agreements are treated as price-fixing agreements, whereas no-poaching agreements are evaluated within the same ballpark with customer/supplier allocation. Information exchange and ancillary restraints are also addressed in the Guidelines on Labor Markets. Lastly, the application of Article 5 (on exemption), Article 6 (abuse of dominance) and Article 7 (merger and acquisition control) of Law No.4054 in Labor Markets are assessed in the Guidelines on Labor Markets. In view of the foregoing, it is anticipated that the Board may scrutinize labor markets in the upcoming years by utilizing the detailed explanations laid out in the Guidelines on Labor Markets.