Competition In Digital Markets

1. Legal scope

1.1. Regulation

1.1.1. Which Law regulates competition in digital markets in Turkiye? Does it differ from the standard competition law regulation?

Currently, there is no legislation in Turkiye specifically aiming to regulate competition in digital markets. The main competition law legislation in Turkiye is Law No. 4054 on Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). Law No. 4054 applies to competition in all markets, including digital markets. There are no specific rules or exemptions with respect to competition in digital markets in Turkiye.

However, recently, the Ministry of Trade prepared a Draft Regulation on Amending Law No. 4054 (“Draft Amendment”) that aims to update existing competition rules to establish and preserve competition in digital markets. The Draft Amendment closely resembles the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) in the European Union. Since its preparation, several revisions have been shared with certain institutions to receive comments before the Draft Amendment is enacted. Lastly, the Turkish Competition Authority (the “Authority”) has shared the final draft of the Draft Amendment to consult with related parties.

1.2. The Authority

1.2.1. Which authority enforces competition law in Turkiye’s digital markets?

The Authority enforces competition law in Turkiye’s digital markets. Although there is no dedicated digital markets unit, the Authority operates with several departments dedicated to specific sectors. Although there is no dedicated department for digital markets, the 1st Supervision and Enforcement Department oversees information and communications technology and services and media and advertising services, which are broadly related to digital markets.

1.3. Guidelines

1.3.1. Have the Authority issued any guidelines on the application of competition law to digital markets?

The Authority did not yet issue a dedicated secondary legislation (i.e., regulation, communiqué or guideline) for the application of competition law rules in digital sectors. That said, the Draft Amendment published by the Ministry of Trade and revised with pursuant to opinions of market stakeholders, aims to take legislative actions concerning digital markets and has published the Draft Amendment.

1.4. Reports

1.4.1. Are there any advisory reports in Turkiye on competition law issues in digital markets?

The Authority announced that it had commenced its work on a digitalisation and competition policy report at the beginning of 2020. The Authority specified its aim as “approaching business models that are at the focus of consumer-friendly innovations with greater sensitivity while shaping the competition policies of the future”.

On 18 April 2023, the Authority published the Study on the Reflections of Digital Transformation on Competition Law (“the Study”). The Study includes an overview of the competition law framework for digital markets and emphasizes the challenges posed by data practices, algorithmic collusion, interoperability and platform neutrality.

The Authority also started working on sector inquiries focusing on (i) online marketplaces in June 2020, (ii) online advertising in March 2021, and (iii) mobile ecosystems in April 2024. The Authority’s goal is to determine behavioural and structural issues pertaining to these sectors, and to propose solutions accordingly. These sector inquiries of the Authorityserved as preparatory elements facilitating legislative actions.

On 14 April 2022, the Authority published its final report upon its e-marketplace sector inquiry. The report evaluated the effect of e-marketplace platforms on competition and proposed a policy towards e-marketplaces. The report underlined that market power of e-marketplace platforms is supported by network externalities, multi-homing, economies of scope and scale, multi-sidedness, and data-driven business models.

Due to these market characteristics, e-marketplaces are associated with high barriers to entry and expansion and a tendency to evolve into a single platform (i.e., tipping). Initially, the Authority references its ongoing preparation of legislation regarding gatekeepers in digital platforms, where e-marketplace platforms are already covered under the category of “online intermediary services”. The Authority recommends that the new legislation should impose the following obligations on e-marketplace platforms with gatekeeper status:

• gatekeepers should not apply contractual or de facto exclusivity clauses or impose broad most-favoured-nation (“MFN”) clauses on their vendors;
• they should not use non-public data, that is acquired through the activities of vendors, in their own products competing with the products of these vendors;
• they should not favor their own products or the products belonging to their group companies in their platform rankings;
• they should provide their sellers with free, efficient, high-quality, and real-time access to the performance tools which will enable the sellers to track the profitability of their sales within the platform;
• they should not create a technical or behavioral impediment to the transfer of the data to other platforms, which the sellers or consumers provide to the marketplace;
• they should provide free, effective, good quality and real-time access to (1) the data provided by the vendor to the marketplace and (2) the data generated from this data to its vendors or third-parties authorized by the vendors;
• they should ensure interoperability between their main platform services and ancillary services;
• they should ensure platform transparency by providing their sellers with sufficient information on the scope, quality, performance, and pricing of their main and ancillary platform services; and
• they must notify the Authority on all acquisitions, regardless of the turnover thresholds in the Communiqué Concerning the Mergers and Acquisitions Calling for the Authorization (“Communiqué No. 2010/4”) of the Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”).

Moreover, the Authority advocates for a more conservative and strict application of competition rules in the digital markets. Therefore, the Authority recommends reinforcing the secondary legislation to achieve this goal. In particular:

• Market share thresholds and theories of harm should be revised in line with exclusivity and MFN obligations.
• Platforms’ exploitative behaviors should be defined and clarified. In terms of unfair contractual obligations, the legislation preparations already address topics such as MFN/exclusivity clauses, platform transparency, and excessive data collection and confidentiality. But a clarification and reinforcement of these elements through secondary legislation would be helpful.

In sum, the Authority suggests that secondary legislation complementing the primary legislation changes to be introduced in digital markets would be necessary.

On 30 May 2025, the Authority published its final report on the sector inquiry into online advertising on its website. The Authority previously defined the main aim for launching this sector inquiry as clarifying how the complex online advertising sector works, determining the concentration level in relevant markets, and investigating structural or behavioral problems in these markets. The Authority underlined that due to the digitalization in the world, the advertising sector also gravitated towards a digital structure. The ability to track users’ footprints, which enables advertisers to address their target audience is recognized in the report. The Authority emphasizes the pace of growth of online advertising and notes that it takes the biggest share of advertising spend.

The report evaluates the competition in search advertising and display advertising separately. For display advertising, the report acknowledges the significance and advantage of social media platforms stemming from detailed data at platforms’ service. The Authority also recognizes and suggests the following:

• A conflict of interest stems from vertical integration in the supply chain.
• The market carries concerns of potential tying and self-preferencing conducts.
• Potential data aggregation raises concerns about an advantage. For this concern the Authority emphasizes that the Draft Amendment, which limits data usage of gatekeepers, would be able to address this concern.
• There is a concern about transparency in the market, hindering conscious decisions of advertisers in choosing the publishers and services. The Authority once again underlines that this concern is addressed by the Draft Amendment.
• The quality of news content is jeopardized due to the decreased advertising income of news publishers because of their gravitation towards digital platforms. Concerns arise from this asymmetry between news publishers and digital platforms. The Draft Amendment is seen as a potential tool to eliminate this concern.
• Prevention of third-party cookie usage also arises concerns.
• Profitability and sustainability of advertising activities is under a risk as Operating systems limit third-party applications’ access to Mobile Advertising Identifiers. The Authority recommends investigating this matter further.

1.5. A priori guidance

1.5.1. Can the Authority provide advance guidance for undertakings on competition law compliance before entering into an agreement or determining a pricing strategy active in digital markets?

There is no system that provides advance guidance on competition law compliance in the Turkish competition law regime. An ex post review mechanism is available, called individual exemption for agreements, concerted practices and decisions. Parties to an agreement, concerted practice or decision are also able to conduct a self-assessment to see if the conditions of individual exemption are met, so notifying for individual exemption is not a positive duty but an option for obtaining legal certainty. The Authority would not carry out an ex ante review within the scope of an individual exemption filing and this is not available for unilateral conduct such as pricing.

1.6. Regulatory atmosphere and enforcement

1.6.1. How is the general approach towards digital companies in Turkiye in terms of government policy and the Authority’s approach?

To address the new economy’s challenges, the Turkish government has adopted various tailor-made economic agendas and policy choices. Accordingly, the Turkish government’s 11th Development Plan (the “Plan”) (2019–2023) demonstrates the goal of increasing its innovation capacities is included as a development priority. The Plan, inter alia, lists boosting productivity and competitiveness in priority sectors by accelerating digital transformation as a main objective.

The Authority also carefully follows the national and international developments in the digital economy sector. On 4 April 2021, the Authority announced on its official website that it closely scrutinizes digital markets and that it is working on a legislation proposal for digital markets. In its announcement, the Authority also referred to the EU DMA proposal. Accordingly, the Authority prepared a Draft Amendment and conveyed it to certain undertakings to receive feedback before its enactment.

The Authority has acknowledged the Draft Amendment in its final report on the sector inquiry regarding e-marketplace platforms and announced that it aims to adopt a sensitive approach for business models that are the focus of consumer-friendly innovations. The Authority confirmed that e-marketplaces dissociate from traditional markets in terms of their operation and effects of their platform economy. The Authority also noted that digital platforms “have become the main gateway to reach markets and customers” in its final report on the sector inquiry regarding e-marketplace platforms stated that:

“digitalisation transforms the appearance of market malfunctions and competition issues that we face in traditional markets in parallel to economic operations and consuming habits. E-marketplaces have certain features arising from platform economies that distinguish them from traditional markets. These, along with the business model that e-marketplaces adopt, make it more difficult to understand how competition works in this field.”

In a similar fashion, the Board considers that the digital sector has separate competitive dynamics and therefore has a different and more complex structure and operation than provisions of a traditional legislative landscape. Therefore, the Authority and the Government are working on relevant regulations with an aim of adapting the current legal framework to the digital age.

Likewise, the Authority’s Study emphasizes the rapid growth of digital markets. The Authority also notes that digital markets are characterized by network effects, data-driven business models, and platform economics that can pose challenges for competition authorities. Therefore, this requires the competition authorities’ proactive approach to ensure that digital markets remain competitive and fair for all competitors. The Study concludes by underlining that effective competition law enforcement in digital markets is an important element to ensure innovation and consumer welfare are not compromised.

The Board’s enforcement track record in recent years concerning digital sector players also mirrors its intention to put the digital economy, including big tech platforms, under scrutiny (See, e.g. Sahibinden/Otobid, 16 January 2025, 25-02/47-28; Google Advertising Technologies, 12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509; Google YouTube Advertising, 3 May 2024, 24-21/486-207; Google Search Features, 4 July 2024, 24-28/682-283; Meta/WhatsApp, 18 January 2024, 24-05/80-32; Amazon/Trendyol/Hepisburada, 15 November 2023, 23-49/940-M; Sahibinden, 13 July 2023, 23-31/604-204; Nadirkitap, 7 April 2022, 22-15/273-122; Trendyol, 30 September 2021, 21-46/669-334 and 27 February 2023, 23-11/177-54; Google Local Search, 8 April 2021, 21-20/248-105; Meta, 20 October 2022, 22-48/706-299; Meta/Facebook interim measures, 11 January 2021, 21-02/25-10; Meta/Threads, 8 February 2024, 24-07/125-50; Google Search and AdWords, 12 November 2020, 20-49/675-295; Kitapyurdu, 5 November 2020, 20-48/658-289; Google Shopping, 13 February 2020, 20-10/119-69; Google Android, 19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273; Çiçek Sepeti, 8 March 2018, 18-07/111-58; Booking, 5 January 2017, 17-01/12-4; Yemek Sepeti, 9 June 2016, 16-20/347-156).

2. Horizontal Agreements

2.1. Specific rules and examples

2.1.1. Are there any specific rules or exemptions for the assessment of anticompetitive agreements between competitors in digital markets in Turkiye?

There are no rules specific to horizontal agreements in digital markets. That said, the Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation will apply to any horizontal agreements including in the digital markets.

2.2. Accessing online platforms

2.2.1. How has the Authority addressed horizontal restrictions on access to online platforms?

The Board does not yet have any jurisprudence where it addressed horizontal agreements that bring restrictions on access to online platforms.

2.3. Algorithms

2.3.1. Did the Board address the application of competition law to the use of algorithms, in particular to algorithmic pricing?

The Board evaluated the pricing algorithms of D-Market Elektronik Hizmetler ve Ticaret AŞ (“Hepsiburada”) in the investigation concluded pursuant to Hepsiburada’s commitments (3 October 2024, 24-40/951-410).

The Board initiated its preliminary investigation into Hepsiburada with concerns on (i) alleged discriminatory behaviour and the MFN clauses included in its agreements with customers, and (ii) the automatic pricing mechanism. That said, the Authority dropped its initial allegations on discriminatory conduct and MFN clauses and proceeded with a focus on whether Hepsiburada had violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 through its automatic pricing mechanism.

The main concern in the investigation was the design of the tool (the “Match the Buybox Price” option) which was evaluated to have a potential to create price uniformity without any formal collusion. It should be underlined that Hepsiburada (“the platform”) did not directly set the prices, but provided a pricing tool with certain features, which was evaluated as potentially facilitating a risk of competition harm. As such, the platform was put in a responsible position for the competitive risks that may arise by the digital infrastructure and tools provided. Following the submission of its first written defense, Hepsiburada submitted its application to initiate the commitment procedure, proposing to address the Board’s competitive concerns through a set of proposed commitments.

Hepsiburada’s commitments included, inter alia:

(i) removing the “match buybox price” option from its automatic pricing mechanism, hence the “stay below buybox price” and “stay above buybox price” options were the only options remaining;

(ii) organizing “Stay below the Buybox Price” and “Stay above the Buybox price” options so that they will not output the same result as “Match the Buybox Price” option and

(iii) not obliging the sellers to use the automatic pricing mechanism and not offering any incentive that may lead to results that are the same as obliging sellers.

The Board deemed that the commitments submitted by Hepsiburada sufficient to resolve the concerns, thereby rendering them binding.

This was one of the first cases in Turkiye concerning the competitive risks and effects of algorithmic pricing mechanisms. This also sets an important precedent for how algorithm driven coordination risks will be evaluated and monitored in Turkiye.

2.4. Data collection and sharing

2.4.1. Has the Board considered the application of competition law to ‘hub and spoke’ information exchanges or data collection in the context of digital markets?

The Board addressed the allegations of a hub-and-spoke cartel through the “Buybox” system of e-marketplaces in its investigation launched against Ayaz ve Ortakları Ltd. Şti. (“Evdeeczane”), Ege Teknoloji Kimya Mak. San. Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Cosmed”), Farmakozmetika Sağlık Ürünleri ve Kozmetik Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Farmakozmetika”), and SB Grup Kozmetik AŞ (“Bakım Kutusu”) and rendered four separate decisions within the scope of these very closely related investigations (Bakım Kutusu, 21 September 2023, 23-45/853-304; Evdeeczane, 31 August 2024, 23-40/768-270; Farmakozmetika, 5 July 2023, 23-29/563-190; Cosmed 5 July 2023, 23-29/565-192). The Buybox system was explained as the system that determines which seller’s product will be promoted, by giving priority to the seller offering the product at the lowest price.

The Board found that Cosmed intervened in its reseller prices and determined which products would be included in the Buybox system. The Board also emphasized that (i) EvdeEczane, Farmakozmetika, and Bakım Kutusu had access to each others’ competitively sensitive information through the Buybox system and (ii) these undertakings were able to intervene in each others’ prices through Cosmed.

Pursuant to its findings, the Board concluded that Cosmed acted as the hub in a hub and spoke cartel, facilitating a horizontal coordination between undertakings. The investigation was concluded following settlement requests from all undertakings, and a 25% reduction in the administrative monetary fine.

2.5. Additional issues

2.5.1. Did any other key issue emerge in Turkiye in terms of application of competition law to horizontal agreements in digital markets?

The Board launched a full-fledged investigation against 32 undertakings active in the digital sector for an alleged gentlemen’s agreement in labor markets on 20 April 2021. The parties of the investigation appear to range from IT and software companies to platform businesses, along with undertakings in the media industry and undertakings in the food and beverages sector. The Authority emphasized the importance of employees’ contributions to connecting products and services with consumers in the digital age, where creativity and innovative intelligence have an increasing importance. The investigation was concluded through settlement mechanism and the Board imposed an administrative monetary fine on the following undertakings (26 July 2023, 23-34/649-218):

• 1. Arvato Lojistik Dış Ticaret ve E-Ticaret Hizmetleri AŞ,
• 2. Bilge Adam Yazılım ve Teknoloji Anonim Şirketi,
• 3. Binovist Bilişim Danışmanlık AŞ,
• 4. Çiçeksepeti İnternet Hizmetleri AŞ,
• 5. D-Market Elektronik Hizmetler ve Ticaret AŞ,
• 6. Flo Mağazacılık ve Pazarlama AŞ,
• 7. Koçsistem Bilgi ve İletişim Hizmetleri AŞ,
• 8. LC Waikiki Mağazacılık Hizmetleri Ticaret AŞ,
• 9. Sosyo Plus Bilgi Bilişim Teknolojileri Danışmanlık Hizmetleri Ticaret AŞ,
• 10. TAB Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ,
• 11. Türk Telekomünikasyon AŞ,
• 12. Veripark Yazılım AŞ,
• 13. Vivense Teknoloji Hizmetleri ve Ticaret AŞ,
• 14. Vodafone Telekomünikasyon AŞ,
• 15. Zeplin Yazılım Sistemleri ve Bilgi Teknolojileri AŞ,
• 16. Zomato İnternet Hizmetleri Ticaret AŞ

3. Vertical Agreements

3.1. Specific rules and examples

3.1.1. Are there any special rules or exemptions for the assessment of anticompetitive agreements between undertakings active at different levels of the supply chain in digital markets in Turkiye?

In Turkiye, there are no rules specific to vertical agreements in digital markets. The Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements (“Communiqué No. 2002/2”), the generally applicable communiqué will also apply to any vertical agreements in digital markets.

3.2. Online sales bans

3.2.1. How are absolute bans on online sales in digital markets evaluated by the Authority?

Pursuant to the Guidelines on Vertical Agreements (“Vertical Guidelines”), online sales are generally evaluated as passive sales and therefore cannot be restricted. However, there are certain exemptions where restrictions on online sales can benefit from the protective cloak of the block exemption. As an example, suppliers may impose quality conditions for online sales channels, in particular, if there is a selective distribution system in place. The restrictions must be objective, fair and reasonable, and should not directly or indirectly lead to the prevention of online sales to benefit from the block exemption.

The Board’s decisional practice shows that it adopts a strict approach in terms of restrictions on online sales and considers these online sales as passive sales, which cannot be restricted (e.g. Jotun, 15 August 2018, 18-05/74-40). As such, in Baymak (26 March 2020, 20-16/232-113), the Board evaluated an absolute restriction on internet sales covering both individual websites of the distributors and third-party platforms as a violation and likewise in Yataş (6 February 2020, 20-08/83-50) emphasized that online sales are passive sales and the restriction of passive sales may not benefit from block exemption.

Similarly, in BSH (16 December 2021, 21-61/859-423), the Board deemed that the undertaking prohibiting its authorised dealers from selling on digital platforms cannot benefit from the block exemption and does not meet the conditions for an individual exemption per Article 5 of Law No. 4054. The Board underlined that prevention of passive sales in a selective distribution is considered as a ‘hardcore restriction’.

The Vertical Guidelines do not provide a clear approach as to whether restrictions on sales through online marketplaces may be considered a hardcore restriction. That said, paragraph 28 of the Vertical Guidelines states that the supplier may demand the buyer to only sell through ‘sales platforms/marketplaces’ that meet certain standards and conditions. However, the Vertical Guidelines emphasize that this demand should not aim to prevent the distributor’s online sales or price competition. Therefore, a general prohibition of sales over platforms without objective and uniform conditions and justifications aligned with the characteristics of the product may be assessed as violations.

Therefore, the Board first explained that internet sales are, generally speaking, considered passive sales in Turkish competition law practice, akin to the European Commission’s practice. The Board further noted that the restriction of sales on marketplaces:

• means direct or indirect prohibition of online sales;
• is against the principle of equivalency and serves as a deterrent factor for the usage of internet by resellers as a distribution channel; and
• restricts the active and passive sales realised by the members (dealers and distributors) of the selective distribution system to the end users.

Further to these, the Board ruled that the restriction of sales through online marketplaces at the case at hand is not based on (i) objective grounds considering the nature of the product or (ii) any qualitative criterion. Therefore, the Board concluded that restrictions on online marketplace sales are considered ‘hardcore restrictions’ and therefore cannot be granted a block exemption as per the Vertical Guidelines.

The Board re-evaluated its decision from 2015 where BSH was granted an individual exemption, clarifying its stance on that it views resale price maintenance along with online sales restriction as naked and hardcore violations.

Furthermore, in Oriflame I (14 March 2024, 24-13/245-102), the Board approved the undertaking’s commitments upon the allegations of online sales ban. Oriflame I refers to various documents obtained, which demonstrate that Oriflame either entirely prohibited the resellers’ online sales or despite a total restriction on online sales was the general policy, allowing online sales for only a limited time. Findings also refer to blockage punishments by Oriflame on the resellers if they breach the online sales ban. The Board evaluated these as “competition law concerns” under the Communiqué on the Commitments to be Offered in Preliminary Inquiries and Investigations Concerning Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition, and Abuse Of Dominant Position (“Communiqué No.2021/3”) and evaluated Oriflame’s commitments.

To address these concerns, Oriflame committed to sign new agreements with its authorised resellers. Per the commitments, these agreements will include provisions to: (i) remove any clauses that may directly or indirectly restrict resellers’ online sales, (ii) avoid de facto restrictions on online sales, (iii) refrain from requiring authorization or approval for resellers wishing to make online sales, and (iv) announce these contractual revisions on its official website. The Board evaluated these measures as appropriate and sufficient to resolve the competition law concerns in question. Therefore, the Board rendered these commitments binding for Oriflame and concluded the investigation.

3.3. Resale price maintenance

3.3.1. How did the Authority address online resale price maintenance?

Pursuant to Communiqué No. 2002/2, vertical agreements of undertakings with market shares over 30 per cent cannot benefit from the block exemption. Yet, agreements that directly or indirectly restrict the buyer’s ability and freedom to determine its own resale prices do not benefit from the exemption of Communiqué No. 2002/2 as they are considered as hardcore restrictions.

In Sony (22 November 2018, 18-44/703-345), the Board deemed that Sony had (i) monitored the prices in online platforms; (ii) demanded compliance with its recommended resale prices; and (iii) the ability to threaten the distributors through withholding incentive payments in case of non-compliance. The Board ruled that Sony’s conduct restricted the distributors’ ability to autonomously determine their online prices. Therefore, the Board found Sony in violation of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by determining the resale prices of its online retailers and imposed an administrative monetary fine of 2,346,618.62 Turkish lira on the undertaking.

In Groupe SEB (4 March 2021, 21-11/154-63), the Board evaluated the allegations on violation of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 through determining the resale prices and restricting the online sales of their distributors and other resellers in the investigation launched into Groupe SEB İstanbul Ev Aletleri Ticaret A.Ş. (“Groupe SEB”) and İlk Adım Dayanıklı Tüketim Malları Elektronik Tekstil İnşaat ve İletişim Hiz. San. Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“İlk Adım”). The Board evaluated the practices of Groupe SEB and İlk Adım, that included interfering with distributors’ pricing strategies, imposing sanctions on distributors that disrupt the pricing strategy such as prohibiting online sales and also notifying distributors for price increases. The Board concluded that the undertakings violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and decided to impose administrative monetary fines on Groupe SEB and İlk Adım.

On 5 May 2023, the Board published its reasoned decision pertaining to the full-fledged investigation initiated against Korkmaz Mutfak Eşyaları San. ve Tic. A.Ş. (“Korkmaz”), Punto Dayanıklı Tüketim Malları İth. İhr. Tic. Ltd.Şti. (“Punto”) and Gençler Ev Araç ve Gereçleri Pazarlama Ticaret A.Ş. (“Gençler”) (10 November 22-51/754-313). The Board decided to launch the investigation pursuant to a complaint that Korkmaz had violated article 4 of Law No. 4054 by preventing resellers from operating with low profit margins and imposing measures for ensuring such a resale pricing policy. The Board found that dealers and distributors of Korkmaz were prevented from selling Korkmaz products at prices that differed from retail prices determined by Korkmaz. Furthermore, the Board deemed that the authorised dealership agreement between Korkmaz and its dealers prevented dealers of Korkmaz from determining retail prices on the online sales channel as well. As such, the Board concluded that Korkmaz has violated article 4 of Law No. 4054 by way of resale price maintenance practices.

In Olka/Marlin (30 June 2022, 22-29/488-197), the Board determined that Olka and Marlin had violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by explicitly interfering with the dealers’ prices. The investigation was concluded through settlement. Upon examining the findings, the Board found that Olka and Marlin had requested their dealers to (i) remove the discounts on the products and (ii) adjust or revise the prices in accordance with the resale prices determined by Olka and Marlin. The Board evaluated that Olka and Marlin actively interfered with their dealers’ sales on online marketplaces. The Board also found certain documents showing that Olka and Marlin contacted their dealers to withdraw certain products from the online sales. Olka and Marlin were also notifying their dealers that they would terminate ongoing commercial relationships if they continue their online sales. The Board deemed that Olka and Marlin had restricted competition through interfering with their dealers’ prices by actively controlling the prices, and imposing restrictions on the dealers’ online sales conducted through online marketplaces (both through agreements and unauthorised conducts). Board concluded that this constituted a violation of article 4 of Law No. 4054 and noted that, in some instances, the restriction of the online sales function as a complementary element to enhance the deterrence and effectiveness of the determination of resale prices. As such, the Board therefore evaluated these two conducts as a single violation. In addition to the evaluations of the single violation, the Board concluded the investigation process with a settlement procedure.

3.4. Geoblocking and territorial restrictions

3.4.1. How does the Authority address geoblocking and other territorial restrictions?

There is no specific rule in Turkish law concerning restrictions on online sales to customers in other countries nor the Board has any precedents on this front. Per Article 4 of the Communiqué No. 2002/2, restrictions requiring the buyer not to sell the products or services in certain territories or to certain customers may violate competition laws. That said, this rule has certain exceptions. As an example, a supplier may prevent its buyer’s active sales to an exclusive territory or to customers allocated to the supplier or another buyer.

In addition, the supplier may prevent its authorised distributors from making sales to unauthorised distributors in a selective distribution system. Yet, the restriction of passive sales to exclusive territories or customers fall outside of the scope of the block exemption. In any event, the jurisdiction of the Authority is limited to transactions that have an effect in Turkish markets. As such, as a rule of thumb, restrictions on sales to customers in other countries should fall into the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

3.5. Platform bans

3.5.1. How did the Authority address supplier-imposed restrictions on distributors’ use of online platforms or marketplaces and restrictions on online platform operators themselves?

According to the Vertical Guidelines updated on 29 March 2018, online sales are evaluated as passive sales and hence cannot be restricted. The Board considered online platform bans as anticompetitive in various decisions and carried out its analysis accordingly (e.g., Baymak; (26 March 2020, 20-16/232-113); Yataş; (6 February 2020, 20-08/83-50); and Marks & Spencer (11 April 2019, 19-15/208-93).

In BSH, (16 December 2021, 21-61/859-423), the Board deemed that the undertaking prohibiting its authorised dealers from selling on digital platforms cannot benefit from the block exemption and does not meet the conditions for an individual exemption per Article 5 of Law No. 4054. The Board underlined that prevention of passive sales in a selective distribution is considered as a ‘hardcore restriction’. The decision set a precedent clarifying the Board’s clear and consistent position on prohibiting online sales, especially through online marketplaces.

Following this, the Board initiated a full-fledged investigation into BSH along with five other undertakings active in the market for engaging in resale price maintenance and online sales ban on their dealers. The Board emphasized that the supplier is able to require the dealer to only sell through “sales platforms/marketplaces” that fulfil certain standards and conditions. That said, the Board underlined that this restriction should not aim to prevent dealers’ online sales or price competition. Therefore, a ban on sales through platforms should be implemented only if supplemented by objective and uniform conditions, and the justifications for these conditions should be aligned with the specific characteristics of the product. The investigation was concluded with commitments.

3.6. Targeted online advertising

3.6.1. How did the Authority address restrictions on using or bidding for a manufacturer’s brand name for targeted online advertising?

The Board ruled in Google Search and AdWords that it is not possible or appropriate to deem for a violation on Google’s display of third-parties’ text ads, given that these practices have aspects that increase competition (12 November 2020, 20-49/675-295). Similarly, in Çiçeksepeti, the Board did not consider the display of third-party websites’ text ads for branded queries within the scope of Law No. 4054 (8 March 2018, 18-07/111-58).

The Board concluded a pre-investigation launched against Google pursuant to allegations that Google’s bidding mechanism restrained competition between e-commerce sites. The Board decided not to launch a full-fledged investigation as it found that the allegations did not reflect the truth (7 November 2019, 19-38/575-243).

In Modanisa/Sefamerve (25 November 2021, 21-57/789-389), the Board refused to grant negative clearance or individual exemption to certain keyword bidding practices. The decision harbours extensive explanation and analysis on branded keyword bidding practices in terms of competition law and intellectual property law, hence is of great significance. The decision also indicated that the agreements restricting companies from bidding on each other’s brands could be exempted from Law No. 4054 so long as these agreements only contain narrow non-brand bidding restrictions. As such, the decision sets out that the Board threads a line between intellectual property protections and competition law sensitives while assessing agreements on the use of negative keywords.

The Board launched an investigation against four online platforms (Arabam Com, Vava Cars, Araba Sepeti Otomotiv Bilişim Danışmanlık and Letgo) that are active in second-hand car purchasing and selling. The investigation was launched pursuant to allegations that these undertakings engaged in negative matching agreements. The Board concluded that the undertakings have violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 through negative keyword agreements on each other’s brand names with their competitors for Google text ads. The Board concluded the investigation through settlement for Araba Sepeti Otomotiv Bilişim Danışmanlık, Letgo and Arabam Com with the decisions of 13 July 2023 (23-31/589-199), 20 July 2023 (23-32/629-211) and 20 July 2023 (23-32/630-212) respectively.

3.7. MFN clauses

3.7.1. How does the Authority address MFN clauses?

The Vertical Guidelines were updated on 30 March 2018 and recognize the pro-competitive nature of MFN clauses. Therefore, it adopts a ‘rule of reason’ approach to the analysis of anticompetitive effects of these clauses. The Vertical Guidelines provide that while analyzing MFN clauses, (1) the relevant undertakings’ and their competitors’ positions in the relevant market; (2) the object of the MFN clause in the relevant agreement; and (3) the specific characteristics of the market, should be taken into consideration. An MFN clause may benefit from the block exemption, if (i) the market of the beneficiary does not exceed 30% and (ii) other conditions are satisfied. MFN clauses are evaluated differently for online platforms in comparison to traditional markets. That said, the Vertical Guidelines do not provide any indication as to which party’s market (i.e., supplier, buyer or intermediary) share should be taken into account.

The Board’s first evaluation on online platforms’ MFN clauses in detail was Yemek Sepeti (9 June 2016, 16-20/347-156). The Board ultimately deemed that the undertaking violated Article 6 of Law No. 4054, which prohibits abuse of dominance. Yemek Sepeti (which is now owned by Delivery Hero SE, one of the leading online food ordering and delivery marketplaces), was the incumbent online food delivery platform in Turkiye. The undertaking had a significant market share and geographical coverage. Various competitors of Yemek Sepeti argued (mostly encouraged by investigations initiated in certain European countries upon the MFN clauses imposed by Booking.com) that Yemek Sepeti (i) held a dominant position in the market for online food delivery platform services and (ii) abused its dominant position by hindering the entry of competitors via the MFN clauses. The Board, after confirming that Yemek Sepeti held a dominant position with a market greater than 90 per cent, undertook an assessment of the MFN clauses that were in place between Yemek Sepeti and the restaurants on the online platform. The Board divided these clauses into two different categories: MFN clauses that required restaurants not to offer better terms in their own food delivery channels (narrow MFN clauses); and MFN clauses that required restaurants not to offer better terms in any other channel, including competing platforms (wide MFN clauses). The Board focused on wide MFN clauses, analysed its effects in detail and concluded that their anticompetitive effects outweighed the efficiency gains that they created under the specific circumstances of the case. Whilst deeming so, the Board underlined Yemek Sepeti’s significant market power. The Board did not evaluate narrow MFN clauses as a violation and refrained from conducting a detailed effects-based assessment in this particular case. In fact, the Board specifically noted that the narrow MFN clauses were not the subject of the investigation.

The Board set a landmark in Booking.com (5 January2017, 17-01/12-4) on the application of MFN clauses in online markets under the Turkish competition law regime. The Authority claimed that the provisions related to the price and availability parity clause as well as the best price guarantee (wide MFN) included in the agreements between Booking.com and the accommodation service providers, had the effect of restricting competition per Article 4 of Law No. 4054. The Board deemed that such clauses:

• foreclosed the market to the competitors and reduced the competition in the market for accommodation reservation services platforms;
• reduced Booking.com’s competitors’ incentive to offer lower commission rates to the accommodations that execute broad MFN clauses with Booking.com;
• prevented the application of competitive pressure to the commission rates applied by Booking.com; and
• protected Booking.com from new entrants to the market.

The Board concluded that Booking.com’s wide MFN clauses violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054. The Board’s findings in Yemek Sepeti and Booking.com were incorporated into the Authority’s amendments to the Vertical Guidelines.

In Kitapyurdu (5 November 2020, 20-48/658-289), the Board deemed that Kitapyurdu.com’s requests for additional discounts and access to similar or better discounts and campaigns that were applied to competitors could be evaluated under wholesale MFN clauses. The Board rule that such practices may benefit from block exemption so long as the undertaking’s market share is below 40 per cent (the previous threshold foreseen in Communiqué No. 2002/2).

In Hepsiburada (15 April 2021, 21-22/266-116), the Board evaluated that even under the narrowest market definition, Hepsiburada was not dominant. Although its agreement envisaged a wide MFN clause, the Board found that this clause was not enforced pursuant to responses submitted by undertakings and that the clause did not create any effect. That said, the Board emphasized that since the MFN clause may (i) foreclose the market to other online platforms that operate with a lower commission, (ii) create barriers to entry to the market and (iii) price stringency. Thus, the Board considered the wide MFN clause restrictive of competition after determining that it did not create any effects and stating MFN clauses are not per se violations. Consequently, the Board carried out an exemption analysis and concluded that the MFN clause benefitted from a block exemption.

The Board assessed whether Getir violated Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054 through its platform services regarding online food ordering and delivery in Getir (15 September 2022; 22-42/606-254). The allegations concerned the MFN clauses and practices on restaurants active on Getir. The allegations revolved around narrow and wide MFN clauses imposed by Getir on member restaurants in its platform. Despite the contracts not having an MFN clause, the Board identified that Getir was implementing de facto narrow and wide MFN practices. The Board also determined that Getir frequently checked the prices applied by member restaurants on competing platforms, particularly on Yemek Sepeti. The Board determined that Getir would negotiate with restaurants to apply similar conditions on Getir, should it detect lower prices or lower minimum purchase prices, or better contents on the competing platforms. Getir also applied certain penalties to these restaurants.

The Board rejected the allegations and did not launch a full-fledged investigation into Getir. The Board deemed that the narrow and wide MFN clauses implemented by Getir for its member restaurants benefit from block exemption since the undertaking’s market share in terms of both order amount and commission income remains below 30 per cent, and the relevant vertical agreement fulfils the other conditions set forth in the Vertical Guidelines. As such, the Board did not launch a full-fledged investigation into Getir. Through this decision, the Board has reaffirmed its commitment to thoroughly evaluating the competitive landscape, specifically related to MFN practices and shed light on the delicate balance that competition authorities must strike to foster innovation and fair market dynamics while ensuring compliance.

In another decision, the Board evaluated allegations that DSM Grup Danışmanlık İletişim ve Satış Ticaret AŞ (“Trendyol”) violated article 6 of the Law No. 4054 (5 January 2023, 23-01/2-2). Trendyol provides, inter alia, food order delivery services and fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) order delivery services. The allegations concerned Trendyol abusing its market power in multi-category e-marketplaces within the market for online food and FMCG by way of cross-subsidisation.

The Board also investigated the allegations on Trendyol imposing MFN clauses on the sellers for its FMCG delivery service. The Board determined that Trendyol’s contracts had narrow MFN clauses which prevented the sellers from determining different prices in their physical and online sales channels. That said, the Board found that Trendyol did not actively monitor whether the sellers complied with the MFN clauses and did not impose any sanctions for not complying with these MFN clauses. The Board then analysed whether the MFN clauses included in these agreements benefitted from the block exemption per Communiqué No. 2002/2.

The Board found that (i) Trendyol’s market share did not exceed 30%, (ii) the agreements did not include any provision which would prevent a block exemption (e.g., provisions concerning resale price maintenance or restrictions on passive sales). The Board, consistent with its precedents, deemed that the MFN clauses in these agreements benefitted from block exemption under Communiqué No. 2002/2.

Additionally, in its final report on e-marketplace platforms, the Authority stated that contractual arrangements that include MFN clauses and especially wide MFN clauses are problematic. The Authority emphasized that implementation of wide MFN clauses by platforms leads to serious competition concerns, such as a decrease in price competition and an increase in retail prices, price rigidity and possible anticompetitive collaborations in the market, and barriers to entry and expansion. As such, the Authority recommended e-marketplace platforms with gatekeeper status should not apply contractual or de facto exclusivity or MFN clauses.

Lastly, the Authority’s Study emphasized that stakeholders raised concerns about MFN clauses and exclusivity practices for Price Comparison, Comparison (Specialised Search) and Reservation Services. Yet, certain stakeholders noted that narrow MFN clauses may be implemented to ensure fair competition and preserve the investments.

3.8. Multi-sided digital markets

3.8.1. How did the Authority address vertical restraints imposed and efficiency arguments in multi sided digital markets? How were the efficiency arguments addressed?

Vertical agreements that fall outside the block exemption set out in Communiqué No. 2002/2 are not automatically deemed to be in violation of Law No. 4054. The undertakings may plead the efficiency defense. Article 5 of Law No. 4054 sets out the cumulative conditions for an individual exemption as follows:

1. the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress;

2. the agreement must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;

3. the agreement should not eliminate competition in a significant part of the relevant market; and

4. the agreement should not restrict competition by more than necessary for achieving the goals set out in (1) and (2).

Potential efficiencies or benefits for consumers are considered whilst deciding whether a restrictive agreement could benefit from an individual exemption. Restrictions should not exceed what is necessary to reach efficiencies and benefits, and the agreement should not eliminate competition in a significant part of the relevant market. No specific defense is referred to by the Vertical Guidelines, in addition to the “efficiency defense”. Therefore, possible defense scenarios heavily depend on case-specific parameters.

In Travel Agents (25 October 2018, 18-40/645-315), Kitapyurdu (5 November 2020, 20-48/658-289), and Hepsiburada (15 April 2021,21-22/266-116), the Board deemed that the relevant agreements or practices including MFN clauses benefit from the block exemption of Communiqué No. 2002/2.

3.9. Additional issues

3.9.1. Did any other key issue emerge in Turkiye in terms of the application of competition law to vertical agreements in digital markets?

No.

4. Unilateral anticompetitive conduct

4.1. Determining the market power

4.1.1. What are the criteria to determine market power in digital markets in Turkiye? Does the Turkish competition law regime have a concept of ‘abuse of economic dependence’ for cases where an undertaking’s market power does not amount to a dominant position?

There are no separate dedicated criteria for establishing market power in digital markets under Turkish competition law and the market share of an undertaking is the primary point for evaluating its position in the market. In contrast, dominance in a market is the primary condition for the application of the prohibition stipulated in Article 6 of Law No. 4054 in cases of unilateral conduct.

An undertaking with a market share of 40 per cent is a likely candidate for dominance, while a market share of less than 25 per cent would not generally be sufficient to consider a firm dominant. Yet, these are subject to exceptions. Although a large market share is the most indicative factor in assessing dominance, the Board also considers other factors, such as legal or economic barriers to entry and the portfolio power and financial power of the incumbent firm.

In terms of online platforms, in addition to its share, the Board would take into account network effects, entry barriers, innovation and the multisided aspects of the relevant activities. Overall, the Board’s dominance analysis resembles its analyses in brick-and-mortar markets.

4.2. Abuse of market power

4.2.1. To what extent are companies in digital markets subject to the rules preventing abuse of market power in Turkiye?

Article 6 of Law No. 4054 regulates abuse of dominance. The article does not define “abuse” per se, but provides a non-exhaustive list of specific forms of abuse. Article 6 of the Law No. 4054, generally prohibits the abusive exploitation of a dominant market position. These examples are as follows:

• directly or indirectly preventing entry into the market or hindering competitor activity in the market;
• directly or indirectly engaging in discriminatory behaviour by applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with similar trading parties;
• making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of restrictions concerning resale conditions, such as:
  • the purchase of other goods and services;
  • acceptance by intermediary purchasers of the display of other goods and services; or
  • maintenance of a minimum resale price; and
• distorting competition in other markets by taking advantage of financial, technological and commercial superiorities in the dominated market; and limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.

As there is no definition of abuse of dominance online in Turkish competition law, the general rule above also applies to the online space.

4.3. Data access

4.3.1. How did the Authority address concerns surrounding access to data held by undertakings with market power in digital markets?

There are no provisions precisely addressing concerns surrounding access to data held by companies with market power in digital markets in the Turkish competition law regime. That said, the Draft Amendment proposed restricting and regulating the access to data-related to gatekeepers in a manner akin to the DMA in the European Union.

The Authority acknowledged the difficulties whilst determining the scope of effect and establishing competition violations based on big data. The Authority stated that conventional practices and approaches would clearly fall short in terms of handling issues in the digital market.

In Nadirkitap (7 April 2022, 22-15/373-122), the Board decided that Nadirkitap holds a dominant position in the market for platform services for second-hand book sales. As such, the Board evaluated that Nadirkitap abused its dominance by way of unjustifiably preventing access to and the portability of book data uploaded to its website by third-party sellers. As a result, the Board issued an administrative monetary fine to Nadirkitap. Moreover, to ensure effective competition, the Board also required Nadirkitap to cease blocking access to data and provide sellers with their data in an accurate, understandable, secure, complete, free-of-charge and appropriate format, upon the sellers’ request. Thus, sellers were able to transfer data to other platforms.

In Sahibinden (17 August 2023, 23-39/754-263), the Board imposed an administrative monetary fine on Sahibinden Bilgi Teknolojileri Paz.ve Tic. A.Ş. (“Sahibinden”), a leading online platform in Turkiye, as it found that Sahibinden abused its dominant position by imposing restrictions on data portability and non-compete clauses. The Board also imposed certain measures on Sahibinden to terminate the violation and re-establish effective competition in the market. The Board found that Sahibinden obstructed corporate members to use more than one platform by preventing data portability, and hence imposed de facto/contractual exclusivity and hindered the activities of its competitors by implementing data portability restrictions and non-compete obligations. Ultimately, the Board decided to impose an administrative monetary fine of TRY 40,150,533.15 on Sahibinden and imposed obligations to (i) revise the contracts between Sahibinden and corporate members to remove clauses that were evaluated as a violation, (ii) establish a free of charge infrastructure for corporate members to effectively transfer their data on Sahibinden’s platform to other competing platforms and to keep this data up to date, and (iii) establish necessary infrastructure to allow seamless data transfer, if requested and therefore ensure that the request from competing platforms are responded to continuously and effectively.

Lastly, the Authority’s recent Study emphasizes that prevention of access to data or interoperability is an important method through which the competition can be distorted by an undertaking. The Authority finds it appropriate to regulate data access practices of platforms with significant market power, as a potential solution to address competition concerns in digital markets.

4.4. Data collection

4.4.1. How did the Authority address concerns surrounding the collection of data by companies with market power in digital markets?

There is no regulation in Turkish competition law regime precisely addressing the collection of data by companies with market power in digital markets. Yet, the Draft Amendment proposes to restrict and regulate the collection of data by gatekeepers in a similar fashion to the DMA in the European Union.

The Board has launched an ex officio investigation into Meta to determine whether the obligation to share data imposed on WhatsApp users violates article 6 of Law No. 4054 as the update in the privacy policy would enable Facebook to collect, process, and use more data (11 January 2021, 21-02/25-10). The Board focused on the scope and significance of WhatsApp data and imposed an interim measure requiring Facebook to cease the execution of the new privacy policy and notify all of its users. The Board’s concerns arising from the utilisation of WhatsApp data in other markets where Facebook operates and rendering this mandatory for using WhatsApp are as follows:

• tying WhatsApp data to other Facebook company products and data;
• Facebook uses its power in the consumer communication services market to restrict the operations of its competitors in online advertisements; and
• possibility of consumer exploitation as a result of the over-collection of data and utilisation of said data for other services.

In 2022 Meta (20 October, 2022 (22-48/706-299), the Board evaluated that by combining the data collected from its core services (namely Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp), Facebook abused its dominant position in the market through (i) hindering the activities of its competitors in the online display advertising market with its personal social network services, and (ii) creating barriers to entry to the market. The Board imposed an administrative monetary fine on Meta and imposed certain measures. The Board discussed the compliance proposal submitted by Meta and concluded that the measures were not sufficient to meet the obligation imposed. Therefore, the Board decided to impose on Meta a daily non-compliance administrative monetary fine (21 December 2023, 23-60/1162-417). Subsequently, the Board discussed the final compliance measures submitted by Meta on 5 April 2024 and decided on 24 April 2024 that the proposed remedies were sufficient to meet the imposed obligations. Therefore, the administrative monetary fine imposed on Meta totalled roughly half a billion Turkish lira (4 April 2024, 24-20/467-197).

In the final report on the sector inquiry on e-marketplace platforms, the Authority stated that “data is the currency of the digital world; however, consumers are either not aware of the payments made by this currency” and underlined that data collected by marketplaces can be an important competitive asset. The Authority also noted that platforms can develop their marketing strategies by estimating customers’ preferences more accurately and making advertisements for customers in a more targeted way as the customer data that platforms collect increases.

The Authority’s recent Study also underlined that excessive data collection and the use of data for other purposes as a method that can distort competition.

4.5. Leveraging market power

4.5.1. Did the Authority adopt any decision on leveraging market power in digital markets, such as through tying, bundling or self-preferencing theories of harm?

In Google Shopping (13 February 2020, 20-10/119-69) the Board evaluated the allegation that Google put rival shopping comparison services (“CSSs”) in a disadvantageous position as a result of its Shopping Unit, to which rival CSSs do not have access. The Board concluded that Google has a dominant position in the general search market and leveraged this dominant position in shopping comparison services.

Likewise in Google Android, the Board determined that Google gained advantages within the scope of economies of scale with the Android operating system and mobile application distribution. Google allegedly leveraged those economies of scale in its advertising services (19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273). Moreover, in Google Local Search, the Board found that Google abused its dominant position by way of restricting competition in the markets for local search services and accommodation price comparison services by way of hindering the activities of its rivals through preventing local search services from accessing the Local Unit and providing advantages to Google’s own local search and accommodation price comparison services in terms of position and display on the general search result page (8 April 2021, 21-20/248-105).

In Trendyol (30 September 2021, 21-46/669-334), the Board evaluated the documents obtained through the searches on Trendyol’s algorithms and systems, which revealed that Trendyol had manipulated the actual data on its platform by intervening in the algorithms and codes to favor its own products and services, and thereby misled sellers and users on its platform. Accordingly, Trendyol was found to have artificially increased the number of followers, deleted low user scores for Trendyol branded products and listed its own brands at the top in brand filters.

With regards to the use of third-party data monitored and obtained via its marketplace activities, the Board underlined the risk of copycatting, where Trendyol would be able to detect the profitable and popular products or services and offer these, without exposing itself to commercial risk or incurring the costs that third-party sellers had to face. The Board considered this to be a self-preferencing behaviour and noted that this could (i) discourage innovation efforts of third-party sellers and (ii) enable Trendyol to free-ride on these sellers’ efforts and data. The Board also emphasized Trendyol’s ability to offer even lower prices increasing the disadvantage for third-party sellers.

On 26 July 2023 (23-33/633-213), the Board rendered a decision fining Trendyol for violating Article 6 of Law No. 4054 by taking unfair advantage of its own retailing business through intervening in the algorithms and using the data of third-party sellers. The Board decided that to launch an investigation pursuant to the allegation that Trendyol has abused its dominant position and violated Article 6 of Law No. 4054 by way of sharing customer data with its subsidiary, Dolapcom Elektronik Hizmet ve Ticaret AŞ, which is an online intermediary platform for second-hand shopping and preventing data portability. The investigation was concluded through commitments.

In Meta (7 November 2024, 24-45/1053-450), the Board launched an investigation against the undertaking for allegedly abusing its dominant position by combining user data from Instagram to Thread application. The Board imposed interim measures to prevent data combining between two platforms. Although Meta had introduced an “account-free usage” option for Threads, the Board found the measure insufficient as it did not fully address the investigation’s fundamental concern regarding data combination. As a result of the investigation, Threads’ operations in Turkiye were ceased temporarily. The Board primarily focused on Meta integrating Threads and Instagram applications and considered this as a tying practice and an abuse of dominant position. Although Meta did not explicitly force users to sign-up for Threads, the Board deemed the requirement to have an Instagram account in order to sign-up for Threads as a form of coercion. Although Meta offered users an “account-free usage” option, since users cannot actively interact with others, this presented a limited experience that did not provide the core functionalities of Threads application. Considering Instagram’s high usage rate and user base, the Board evaluated such a practice could lead to competitive restrictions in the tying product market. The Board found that Meta holds a dominant position in the social media market and assessed that limiting user choice could further strengthen Meta’s dominant position. As such, the Board concluded that Meta leveraged its dominant position in one market to gain a foothold in another.

Meta’s final commitments were designed to apply both to users signing up for the Threads application for the first time, and to users whose accounts were deactivated following the removal of Threads in Turkiye. Per these commitments, users will have control over their personal data when signing up for Threads, as the application will no longer combine personal data with information from their Instagram accounts. Pursuant to this proposal, Meta’s commitments were deemed sufficient to address the competition concerns. The Board therefore concluded the investigation without imposing any administrative monetary fine on Meta.

4.6. Other theories of harm

4.6.1. What other conducts were deemed as abuse of market power in digital markets in Turkiye?

In Sahibinden, the Board found that Sahibinden.com abused its dominant position by applying excessive prices and imposed an administrative monetary fine against Sahibinden.com in the amount of 10,680,425.98 Turkish lira (10 October 2018, 18-36/584-285) Yet, Ankara 6th Administrative Court annulled this decision as it evaluated that the decision failed to meet the requisite standard of proof (E.2019/946 K.2019/2625). As a result, the Board re-evaluated its decision and ultimately opted to follow the Administrative Court’s decision by noting that direct harm to the end consumer could not be proved (2 May 2019, 19-17/239-108).

The Board also initiated a full-fledged investigation into Biletix.com (a Turkish subsidiary of Ticketmaster) to evaluate the allegations that Biletix applies excessive pricing to consumers (20 July 2019, 19-22/341-M). The investigation was launched pursuant to the allegations that Biletix added extra costs to tickets it sold under the categories of service, transaction and cargo costs via exclusive agreements it had signed with organisers. The Board concluded that Biletix should not enter into agreements that include exclusivity or provisions that would lead to de facto exclusivity. Yet, the Board did not issue an administrative monetary fine but notified the relevant authority as it found no abuse. (21 January 2021, 21-04/53-22).

In Facebook interim measures, the Board evaluated the market power of Facebook in (i) consumer communication services; (ii) social network services; and (iii) the online advertisement services market. The Board rendered its decision and ruled that Facebook’s data sharing requirement imposed upon WhatsApp users could lead to serious and irreparable damages until the final decision. This stemmed from the concern that Facebook can use its power in the consumer communication services market to restrict the operations of its competitors in online advertisement (11 January 2021, 21-02/25-10). This was the first time that the Authority has thoroughly analyzed the interface between data protection and competition law, and it has assumed jurisdiction over the matter, thereby leading to an interim measure on consent procedures.

5. Merger Control

5.1. Merger control framework

5.1.1. How does merger control framework apply to digital markets in Turkiye?

Article 7 of Law No. 4054 regulates mergers and acquisitions, and the principal regulation on merger control is the Competition Law and Communiqué No. 2010/4.

On 4 March 2022, the Authority published Communiqué No. 2022/2 on the Amendment of Communiqué No. 2010/4 on the Mergers and Acquisitions Subject to the Approval of the Competition Board (“Amendment Communiqué”). The Amendment Communiqué introduced certain new rules concerning the Turkish merger control regime, which had fundamental effects on merger control notifications submitted to the Authority. One of the most significant developments introduced by the Amendment Communiqué is the increase of the applicable turnover thresholds for the concentrations that require mandatory merger control filing before the Authority.

In addition, a threshold exemption for undertakings active in certain markets or sectors was introduced with the Amendment Communiqué. As such, these special thresholds will be applicable for the acquired undertakings active in or assets related to the fields of digital platforms, software or gaming software, financial technologies, biotechnology, pharmacology, agricultural chemicals and health technologies if they operate in the Turkish geographical market, conduct research and development activities in the Turkish geographical market, or provide services to Turkish users. Pursuant to the Amendment Communiqué, a transaction is required to be notified before the Authority if:

• the aggregate Turkish turnover of the transaction parties exceeding 750 million Turkish lira and the Turkish turnover of at least two of the transaction parties, each exceeding 250 million lira; or
• the Turkish turnover of the transferred assets or businesses in acquisitions exceeding 250 million lira and the worldwide turnover of at least one of the other parties to the transaction exceeds 3 billion lira, or the Turkish turnover of any of the parties in mergers exceeding 250 million lira and the worldwide turnover of at least one of the other parties to the transaction exceeds 3 billion lira.

That said, the 250 million lira turnover thresholds mentioned above will not be sought for the acquired undertakings (target companies) active in or assets related to the fields of digital platforms, software or gaming software, financial technologies, biotechnology, pharmacology, agricultural chemicals and health technologies, if they operate in the Turkish geographical market, conduct research and development activities in the Turkish geographical market, or provide services to the users in the Turkish geographical market.

The Amendment Communiqué does not seek a Turkish nexus in terms of the activities that render the threshold exemption. Accordingly, provided that the target company operates in the Turkish geographical market; conducts R&D activities in Turkiye; or provides services to the Turkish users in any field other than the said fields, the threshold exemption will be applicable so long as the target company is active in the fields of digital platforms, software or gaming software, financial technologies, biotechnology, pharmacology, agricultural chemicals and health technologies anywhere in the world.

As such, the Amendment Communiqué does not require the following:

• operating in the Turkish geographical market;
• conducting R&D activities in Turkiye; or
• providing services to Turkish users concerning the fields listed above for the exemption on the local turnover thresholds to become applicable.

5.2. Prohibited mergers

5.2.1. Did the Board prohibit any mergers in digital markets in Turkiye?

No.

5.3. Market definition

5.3.1. How did the Board define relevant markets in the context of digital markets?

The Board has not refrained from adopting new market definitions for digital markets should it deems necessary based on the specific features of each case that it assesses. The Board is inclined to define separate market definitions for online and offline services that provide the same goods and services. As an example, the Board separated the electronic and physical sale of event tickets and defined the relevant product market as “intermediary services for the electronic sale of event tickets over a platform” in the Biletix (11 November 2013, 13-61/851-359), which involved one of the largest companies for ticket sales and distribution for various cultural, musical and sports events in Turkiye. The Board evaluated that there was a distinction between brick-and-mortar retailers and online florist services in the Çiçek Sepeti (16 December 2010, 10-78/1623-623), where it rendered a decision concerning an online platform for flower sales. The Board defined the relevant product market as “online flower sale services”. In Yemek Sepeti (9 June 2016, 16-20/347-156) and Booking.com (5 January 2017, 17-01/12-4), the Board distinguished and separated the online and offline sales channels by evaluating that the offers of online sales channels are not available in a similar fashion or accessible in the offline sales channels.

The Board consistently defines the relevant geographical market as Turkiye, without further segmentation. Indeed, the decisions referred above define the geographic market as Turkiye. Only in Yemek Sepeti (9 June 2016, 16-20/347-156) the Board defined the geographical market as “each city that Yemek Sepeti is active in” along with Turkiye.

5.4. ‘Killer’ acquisitions

5.4.1. How did the Board address concerns surrounding ‘killer’ acquisitions in digital markets?

Pursuant to the Amendment Communiqué, the Authority introduced a threshold exemption for undertakings active in certain markets or sectors. As such, the 250 million Turkish lira turnover thresholds will not be sought for the acquired undertakings active in or assets related to the fields of digital platforms, software or gaming software, financial technologies, biotechnology, pharmacology, agricultural chemicals or health technologies, if they operate in the Turkish geographical market, conduct research and development activities in the Turkish geographical market, or provide services to Turkish users.

The Board discussed the killer acquisition theory in detail in Google LLC/Galileo AI Inc. (16 January 2025, 25-02/62-37). As Galileo is a start-up, the Board initially noted that it will carry out a killer acquisition analysis on the transaction. The Board emphasized that the three elements should be present concurrently for the transaction to be deemed as a killer acquisition:

• A large and established undertaking should be taking over a recently founded or a developing undertaking,
• The product or technology acquired should not be adopted or developed, should be disregarded or should exit the market and, as a result of this,
• Competition should cease at horizontal level and product development processes should end.

The Board ultimately approved the transaction and deemed that (i) the parties’ activities do not overlap horizontally or vertically and (ii) the transaction does not carry all elements of a killer acquisition.

5.5. Substantive assessment

5.5.1. What factors are considered by the Board in its substantive assessment of mergers in digital markets?

Before the amendment of Law No. 4054 (“Amendment Law”), there were no debates about the suitability of merger tools to address digital mergers and the dominance test was applicable to these mergers.

The Amendment Law replaced the previous dominance test and introduced the significant impediment of the effective competition (“SIEC”) test. With this new test, the Board is now able to prohibit not only transactions that may create a dominant position or strengthen an existing dominant position but also those that could significantly impede competition. Additionally, focusing more on whether and how much the competition is impeded as a result of a transaction, the SIEC test may also reduce over-enforcement. Thus, the test may prove beneficial for pro-competitive mergers and acquisitions even though the transaction leads to significant market power based on, for instance, major efficiencies. In a similar fashion, this new approach may also be beneficial for dominant undertakings contemplating transactions with de minimis impact. In TIL /Marport (13 August 2020, 20-37/523-231), the Board refused to grant approval to the transaction on the grounds that the notified transaction was likely to cause a significant impediment to effective competition for the first time.

The Turkish merger control regime takes into account the innovation in the assessment of mergers. As such, the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions and the Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions acknowledges innovation as a benefit created by competition and a factor for the Board’s assessment of mergers. In certain decisions of the Board where the transaction was approved (see Johnson and Johnson/Mentor, 8 January 2009, 09-01/10-8; Ticketmaster/Live Nation, 11 June 2009, 09-27/572-133; Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business, 1 October 2009, 09-43/1097-277; Atlas Elektronik/Advanced Lithium Systems, 21 April 2011, 11-25/476-145; Metair/Mutlu Holding, 21 November 2013, 13-64/901-381; Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business, 4 November 2014, 14-43/796-357; Apax-Accenture/Duck Creek, 9 June 2016, 16-20/330-149; and Linde/Praxair, 10 October 2017, 17-31/520-224), the parties claimed that the transaction would enable them to develop innovative products and encourage innovation in the future.

The Board acknowledged in Cisco Systems/IBM (2 May 2000, 00-16/160-82) that the transaction would benefit consumers with the development of innovative applications. Therefore, despite Cisco’s increased post-merger market share, the Board concluded that the transaction would not increase the concentration level or significantly lessen competition in the relevant market.

In Microsoft/Activision Blizzard (13 July 2023, 23-31/592-202), the Board determined that there is horizontal overlap between the parties’ activities in game publishing; game distribution; game-related licensed product sales; and online display advertising. However, the Board acknowledged that each of these markets contain many competitors with high market shares, both in Turkiye and globally, and that there will be many strong competitors after the transaction. As a result, the Board evaluated that the transaction will not result in significant impediment of competition both in terms of unilateral effects and coordination-inducing effects.

The Board also evaluated that there is a vertical overlap between the upstream market for the development and publishing of games and the parties’ activities in the downstream markets for digital distribution of console and computer games, console hardware and cloud gaming services. The Board evaluated that it would not make economic sense for Microsoft to impose input foreclosure considering the market shares in the console hardware market, Sony’s leading position in the market, the significance of the game ‘Call of Duty’ on Xbox and the importance of the cross-play feature.

As for unilateral effects in the cloud gaming services market, the Board deemed that even if Microsoft would not be able to foreclose input. This is because of (i) Microsoft’s global share and (ii) the presence of many large and powerful players in the cloud gaming services market.

Following this, the Board evaluated the commitments submitted by Microsoft to the European Commission regarding the cloud gaming market and their validity in Turkiye. Accordingly, in line with the information provided by Microsoft to the Authority, it was confirmed that the first of the open licences providing streaming rights for Activision Blizzard games within the scope of the commitments, the streaming provider license, will be valid globally and for 10 years, both for the undertakings already active in the market and for the undertakings that may potentially enter the market within this period, while the second of the open licenses, the consumer licence, will be valid for a period of 10 years for all existing and potential consumers globally. As such, the Board concluded that the relevant commitments will also be valid for Turkiye for 10 years.

Lastly, the Board determined that the presence of a large number of players operating in the market will render it difficult to establish coordination among undertakings and to discipline non-compliant undertakings as a result of a possible coordination. The Board deemed that the transaction would not significantly impede competition and may be approved.

5.6. Remedies

5.6.1. How did the Board approach the design of remedies in mergers in digital markets?

The Amendment Law, Article 9 introduced the “first behavioural, then structural remedy” rule for Article 7 violations. In case behavioural remedies are first applied and failed, the Amendment Law aims to grant the Board the power to order structural remedies for anticompetitive conduct infringing Article 7 of Law No. 4054. In addition, if the Board finds through a final decision that behavioural remedies have failed, undertakings or association of undertakings will be granted at least six months to comply with structural remedies.

Prior to the Amendment Law, structural remedies took precedence over behavioural remedies as the general approach. This can be considered in isolation only if structural remedies are impossible to implement as behavioural remedies are as effective as structural remedies. In order for behavioural remedies to be approved in and of themselves, they must produce results as efficient as divestiture. The Board will re-evaluate the behavioural commitments at the end of a three-year period.

In Ideasoft (10 April 2025, 25-14/336-158) the Board evaluated the acquisition of Ideasoft by GT Global in the market for “readymade e-trading software and infrastructure provision services”. The Board defined the transaction as a conglomerate transaction and noted that conglomerate transactions generally do not raise competitive concerns. That said, the Board emphasized that pursuant to the transaction, Sipay, an undertaking that is controlled by the same person who controls GT Global, would be able to access competitively sensitive information pertaining to its competitors through Ideasoft. Another concern raised by the Board was that Sipay may offer conditions that are less advantageous to Ideasoft’s competitors. To address the Board’s concerns, GT Global offered commitments to the Board. Per its commitments, GT Global committed that Ideasoft will (i) maintain its agreements with its existing customers, (ii) renew these agreements should the customer request, (iii) offer all products and services to Sipay and its competitors without any advantage to Sipay. To address Board’s concerns in terms of competitively sensitive information, GT Global committed that (i) there will be no competitively sensitive information sharing between Ideasoft and Sipay, (ii) agreements of Ideasoft will be revised accordingly, (iii) employees who have access to confidential and/or competitively sensitive information will sign a confidentiality agreement and (iv) databases of Sipay and Ideasoft will be kept separate. The Board concluded that the commitments were sufficient to address concerns and approved the transaction within the scope of the commitments.

In Kariyer.net (4 June 2024, 24-24/556-236) the Board assessed the transaction concerning the acquisition of Brotek by Kariyer.net. The Board found that the parties’ activities were overlapping horizontally in the market for “human resources software” and under further segmentation, the horizontal overlap was evaluated in the market for “candidate management systems software”. Moreover, the Board determined a vertical overlap between the market for “candidate management systems software” (downstream market) and market for “online employee electing and allocating services” (upstream market). The Board named the main concern as an input foreclosure in the downstream market stemming from Kariyer.net’s market power in the upstream market and its vertically integrated structure. To address the Board’s concerns, Kariyer.net committed to, inter alia, carry out its interaction with third-parties in line with tangible criteria, without any discrimination among equals. The Board accepted Kariyer.net’s behavioral remedies and approved the transaction.

6. Update and trends

6.1. Recent developments and future prospects

6.1.1. What are the recent trends, case law and policy initiatives in Turkiye in terms of competition law enforcement in digital markets?

The Ministry of Trade prepared a Draft Amendment that aims to update existing competition rules to establish and preserve competition in digital markets. The Draft Amendment closely resembles the DMA in the European Union. Since its preparation, several revisions have been shared with certain institutions to receive comments before the Draft Amendment is enacted. Recently, the Authority has shared the final draft of the Draft Amendment to consult with related parties.

On 4 March 2022, the Authority published Communiqué No. 2022/2 on the Amendment Communiqué. Pursuant to the Amendment Communiqué, the Authority introduced a threshold exemption for undertakings active in certain markets or sectors. As such, the 250 million Turkish lira turnover thresholds will not be sought for the acquired undertakings active in or assets related to the fields of digital platforms, software or gaming software, financial technologies, biotechnology, pharmacology, agricultural chemicals or health technologies, if they operate in the Turkish geographical market, conduct research and development activities in the Turkish geographical market, or provide services to Turkish users.

The Authority is working on the Digitalisation and Competition Policy Report, aiming to clarify the competition policies that it will be implementing in the future. The Authority acknowledged the difficulties whilst determining the scope of effect and establishing competition violations based on big data. The Authority stated that conventional practices and approaches would clearly fall short in terms of handling issues in the digital market. Within this scope, closely following the digital economy and potential competition violations by platforms, the Board incorporated new duties related to the digital economy into the work description of the Presidency of the Strategy Development Department to ensure that the Authority is in a position to move proactively. These developments show that the Authority may be inclined to change its enforcement policies concerning digital markets in the future.

On 14 April 2022, the Authority published its final report prepared upon its sector inquiry on e-marketplace platforms to address the developments in digitalisation in light of competition law. The Authority shed light on relevant competitive concerns in relation to e-marketplace platforms and proposed relevant policy recommendations.

On 18 April 2023, the Authority published its Study. The study provides an overview of the competition law framework for digital markets, and highlights the challenges posed by data practices, algorithmic collusion, interoperability and platform neutrality.

On 30 May 2025, the Authority published its final report on the sector inquiry into online advertising on its website. The Authority previously defined the main aim for launching this sector inquiry as clarifying how the complex online advertising sector works, determining the concentration level in relevant markets, and investigating structural or behavioral problems in these markets.

Recent case law

In Google Local Search, the Board found that Google abused its dominant position by way of restricting competition in the markets for local search services and accommodation price comparison services by way of hindering the activities of its rivals through preventing local search services from accessing the Local Unit and providing advantages to Google’s own local search and accommodation price comparison services in terms of position and display on the general search result page (8 April 2021, 21-20/248-105). . The Board imposed an administrative monetary fine of 296,084,899.49 Turkish lira and ordered various behavioural remedies. As such, Google had to provide conditions to competing local search services and competing accommodation price comparison services that are not disadvantageous against Google’s own related services on the general search results page. Pursuant to the Board accepting Google’s remedies, the Board decided that Google had failed to implement the new designs to be used in local search services with respect to hotel inquiries and therefore did not fully meet the obligations imposed. Therefore, the Board imposed a daily administrative monetary fine until the new designs were implemented with respect to the local search service-related to hotel inquiries. The Board deemed that Google implemented the designs it previously failed to apply with respect to the local search service for hotel inquiries and therefore completed the process on 21 May 2024.

In Google-YouTube Advertising, (3 May 2024 (24-21/486-207), the Board evaluated the commitments proposed by Google to address the allegations that (i) Google brings a restriction that YouTube inventory can only be purchased through Google’s own DSP and (ii) Google prevents the verification and measurement of the ads on YouTube via independent service providers. Google committed to grant access to certain third-party DSPs to the same types of programmatic advertising campaigns available in Google’s own ad buying tools (Google Ads and DV360), including YouTube video inventory served to users in Turkiye. The Board assessed the commitments separately for the allegations on (i) Google brings a restriction that YouTube inventory can only be purchased through Google’s own DSP and (ii) Google prevents the verification and measurement of the ads on YouTube via independent service providers. The Board concluded that the commitments significantly resolve the competition concerns raised and therefore, concluded the investigation for the said allegations.

In Nesine (29 February 2024, 24-11/194-78), the Board found that Nesine had engaged in an exclusive agreement on the purchase of advertisement services with one of the largest live match broadcasting platforms, Maçkolik and abused its dominant position by preventing competitors from purchasing these advertisement services.

In Obilet (15 June 2023, 23-27/521-177), the Board concluded that Obilet could be considered dominant in the markets for “ticketing software service regarding bus transportation”, “distribution of bus trip data to platforms (B2B)” and “sale of bus tickets through platforms (B2C)”. The Board evaluated that Obilet’s practices – which de facto sought to tie its ticketing software service for bus transportation to the sale of bus tickets through platforms – could be in violation of Article 6 of Law 4054. Obilet offered commitments to address the Board’s concerns and the Board concluded the investigation by making those commitments binding on Obilet.

In Google Advertising Technologies (12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509), the Board found that Google violated Article 6 of Law No. 4054 by way of providing an unfair advantage to its own supply side platform (“SSP”) by relying on its dominant position in the market for publisher ad server services and the relevant self-favouring conduct is of the nature that hinders the activities of its competitors. As a result, the Board (i) imposed an administrative monetary fine on Google and (ii) obliged Google to apply conditions to third-party supply-side platforms (third-party SSPs) that are no less favorable than the conditions that Google applies to its own service, in order in order to stop the violation and maintain effective competition in the market.