Dominance

1. Overall

1.1. Legislation

1.1.1. What is the legislation addressing the behaviour of dominant firms?

The primary legislation regulating the behaviour of dominant firms is Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). Law No. 4054 was last substantively amended on 8 July 2020, following a more comprehensive amendment on 24 June 2020 (“Law No. 7246”). Under article 6 of Law No. 4054, “any abuse on the part of one or more undertakings, individually or through joint agreements or practices, of a dominant position in a market for goods or services within the whole or part of the country is unlawful and prohibited”. Although Article 6 does not provide a per se definition of “abuse,” it offers a non-exhaustive list of conduct considered abusive, following an approach similar to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). In this regard, abuse may consist, in particular, of:

• directly or indirectly preventing market entry or restricting competitor activity;
• directly or indirectly engaging in discriminatory conduct by applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions involving similar trading parties;
• conditioning the conclusion of contracts on acceptance of resale restrictions, including bundling additional goods or services, requiring intermediaries to promote other goods or services, or setting a minimum resale price;
• leveraging financial, technological, or commercial superiority in the dominated market to distort competition in other markets; or
• restricting production, markets, or technical development to the detriment of consumers.

1.2. Definition of dominance

1.2.1. How is dominance articulated in the Law No. 4054 and case law? Which factors are considered in the assessment of dominance?

Under Article 3 of Law No. 4054 dominance is defined as “the power of one or more undertakings in a certain market to determine economic parameters such as price, output, supply and distribution, independently from competitors and customers”. Enforcement practice shows that the Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”) has increasingly broadened the interpretation of Article 6 by softening the “independence from competitors and customers” criterion. As a result, the Board has inferred dominance even in scenarios of dependence or interdependence (see Anadolu Cam, 8 December 2004, 04-76/980-306; Warner Bros, 22 March 2007, 07-19/192-63).

The Board regards a high market share as the most significant indicator of dominance. However, other elements are also taken into account, including barriers to entry (legal and economic), portfolio power, and financial strength. For instance, in Obilet (15 June 2023, 23-27/528-89), the Board concluded that Obilet was dominant due to its high market share combined with entry barriers. Similarly, in Maçkolik (20 February 2025, 25-07/170-84), Maçkolik was deemed dominant in the digital markets for live sports scores and betting-related services. The Board relied on its traffic share, brand recognition, network effects, portfolio power, and the absence of sufficient countervailing buyer power.

In the context of the merger control, the Law No. 7246 abandons the dominance test and introduces the significant impediment of effective competition (“SIEC”) test. Consequently, this amendment may also shape how unilateral practices, abuse of dominance, are assessed.

1.3. Objective of the legislation

1.3.1. Is Law No. 4054 founded on economic objectives? Does the legal framework on dominance standard embody an economic rationale, or does it safeguard other interests?

Influenced by the Turkish Competition Authority (the “Authority”)’s 2008 publication of The Prime Objective of Turkish Competition Law Enforcement from a Law & Economics Perspective (Dr. Gönenç Gürkaynak, Turkish Competition Authority Press, September 2007), the economic rationale is more typically described in Turkish competition law circles as “the ultimate object of maximizing total welfare by targeting economic efficiency”. While not directly applicable to dominance cases, more recent regulations emphasize “consumer welfare”, as seen in Communiqué No. 2010/4 on Mergers and Acquisitions Subject to the Approval of the Competition Board. The introduction of the SIEC test in merger control similarly reflects a stronger economic orientation. That said, the legislative history and the explanatory notes of Law No. 4054 also make explicit references to non-economic policy objectives, such as protecting small and medium-sized businesses. As a result, these objectives continue to influence enforcement, particularly in dominance cases, alongside the economic rationale. In practice, the Board does not allow either economic or non-economic considerations to entirely prevail, instead balancing both.

1.4. Sector-specific dominance rules

1.4.1. Does Law No. 4054 include dominance rules tailored to specific sectors, apart from the general dominance rules?

Although Law No. 4054 does not provide for sector-specific dominance rules, certain sector regulators hold concurrent authority to identify and regulate dominance in their respective industries. For example, secondary legislation issued by the Information and Telecommunication Technologies Authority prohibits “firms with significant market power” from discriminating between companies seeking network access. These firms may not reject, without justification, requests for access, interconnection, or facility-sharing, and must also maintain separate accounts for costs incurred in network operation, such as energy or air conditioning. Comparable measures are found in the energy sector.

1.5. Exemptions from the dominance rules

1.5.1 Who falls within the scope of dominance provisions under Law No. 4054? Does the legislation allow for exemption?

The dominance rules, as well as the other provisions of Law No. 4054, apply to all entities qualifying as an “undertaking”. The law defines an undertaking as a single integrated economic unit capable of acting independently in the market to produce, market, or sell goods and services. Consequently, Law No. 4054 covers both individuals and corporations, as well as state-owned entities so long as they act as undertakings.

In the early years of enforcement, the Board interpreted the independence criterion narrowly and excluded state-owned undertakings from the application of Law No. 4054 (see Sugar Factories, 13 August 1998, 78/603-113). However, more recent practice reflects a broader interpretation that encompasses public entities and sports federations, such as in Turkish Coal Enterprise (19 October 2004, 04-66/949-227), Turkish Underwater Sports Federation (3 February 2011, 11-07/126-38), Türk Telekom (24 September 2014, 14-35/697-309), and Devlet Hava Meydanları İşletmesi (9 September 2015, 15-36/559-182). Therefore, state-owned entities are also subject to the Authority’s enforcement, pursuant to the prohibition laid down in Article 6.

1.6. Transition from non-dominant to dominant

1.6.1. Is the scope of Law No. 4054 limited to the behavior of the firms that already hold a dominant position?

The prohibition under Article 6 applies solely to undertakings in a dominant position. Similar to Article 102 of the TFEU, dominance itself is not prohibited; only its abuse is unlawful. Article 7, which previously centered around structural changes creating or strengthening dominance, now incorporates the SIEC test. Notably “attempted monopolization or dominance” is not recognized in Turkish competition law.

1.7. Collective dominance

1.7.1. Does Law No. 4054 address the concept of collective dominance? What is the legal framework set forth for collective dominance in the legislation and case law?

Collective dominance falls within the scope of Turkish competition law. The phrase “any abuse on the part of one or more undertakings” in Article 6 explicitly covers collective dominance abuses. However, Turkish precedents are limited and not yet developed enough to outline definitive conditions for finding collective dominance. The Board has, nonetheless, considered “an economic link” a necessary element for such findings.

Examples include Biryay (17 July 2000, 00-26/292-162), Turkcell/Telsim (9 June 2003, 03-40/432-186), Chemical Solvents (25 February 2021, 21-10/140-58), Sinema TV (18 May 2016, 16-17/299-134), and Tuna (19 January 2022, 22-04/58-27).

1.8. Dominant purchasers

1.8.1. Is Law No. 4054 applicable to dominant purchasers? Do the rules applicable to dominant suppliers differ from those applicable to dominant purchasers?

Dominant purchasers are covered by the application of Law No. 4054 provided their conduct constitutes an abuse of their dominance. In TEB (6 December 2016, 16-42/699-313), the Board concluded that TEB abused its dominance by entering into exclusive agreements with suppliers and obliging them to comply with exclusivity provisions, thereby excluding competitors from the market. In Nesine (29 February 2024, 24-11/194-78), the Board determined that Nesine had abused its dominant position by concluding an exclusive agreement for the purchase of advertisement services with one of the largest live match broadcasting platforms, which prevented competitors from accessing those services. Similarly, in Ferrero (7 March 2023, 24-12/213-87), the Board found that Ferrero’s procurement practices, namely, increasing the purchase of shelled nuts while reducing the purchase of unshelled nuts, restricted competitors’ access to the market and distorted competition.

1.9. Market definition and share-based dominance thresholds

1.9.1. What is the legal framework for defining the relevant product and geographic markets? Does the legal framework set market-share benchmarks at which dominance is presumed or excluded?

Market definition follows the same test as in merger control. The Guidelines on the Definition of the Relevant Market (“Guidelines”) aim to clarify the method and the decision-making criteria of the Board in order to define the market The Guidelines align with the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law (97/C 372/03) and are applicable in the context of merger control and dominance. The Guidelines consider demand-side substitution as the primary factor in defining the market, and supply-side substitution and potential competition as secondary factors.

While designed for merger control, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions acknowledges that market shares exceeding 50 per cent may signal dominance. For collective dominance, the combined market shares of the parties may be considered. In addition, the Guidelines on the Assessment of Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (“Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct”) and the Board’s case law has consistently established that undertakings with a market share below 40 per cent are unlikely to be dominant. Examples include Mediamarkt (12 May 2010, 10-36/575-205), Pepsi Cola (5 August 2010, 10-52/956-335), Egetek (30 September 2010, 10-62/1286-487), Unmaş (20 May 2021, 21-26/324-150), D-Market (15 April 2021, 21-22/266-116), Aort (4 February 2021, 21-06/70-31), Kar Porselen (7 December 2023, 23-56/1108-391), Align (7 December 2023, 23-56/1119-397), Obilet (15 August 2024, 24-33/815-345), Google Advertising Technologies (12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509), and Microsoft (12 December 2024, 24-53/1166-502).

The Board and the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct stress that market shares remain the main, but not the sole, benchmark for dominance. Other relevant elements include barriers to entry, market structure, the position of competitors, and overall market dynamics. Undertakings may rebut presumptions of dominance by showing that they lack the ability to act independently of market parameters, and economic or market studies may serve as significant evidence in this respect.

2. Abuse of dominance

2.1. Definition of abuse of dominance

2.1.1. How does Law No. 4054 define and determine abuse of dominance? What conduct is subject to a per se prohibition?

Law No. 4054 does not expressly define abuse; instead, it provides a non-exhaustive list of examples. However, paragraph 22 of the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct defines abuse as conduct whereby a dominant undertaking exploits its market power in a way that directly or indirectly reduces consumer welfare. Moreover, Article 2 of Law No. 4054 endorses an effects-based approach, meaning that the decisive element in determining whether a practice constitutes abuse is its effect on the market, regardless of the specific type of conduct. Consistently, paragraph 24 of the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct provides that in evaluating exclusionary conduct, both the conditions surrounding the conduct and its actual or potential effects on the market should be considered.

2.2. Exploitative and exclusionary practices

2.2.1. Are both exploitative and exclusionary conduct encompassed by the concept of abuse?

The concept of abuse extends to both exploitative and exclusionary practices. It also encompasses discriminatory conduct.

2.3. Link between dominance and abuse

2.3.1. What link must be demonstrated between dominance and abuse? Can conduct by an undertaking that is dominant in one market be considered abusive if it takes places in a different, but related or adjacent, market?

In principle, the finding of abuse must rest on a causal link between dominance and abuse. This was underlined in Meta (20 October 2022, 22-48/706-299), where the Board held that establishing abuse requires a demonstrable connection between the abusive conduct and the dominant position, either explicitly or implicitly. The Board, however, has not yet adopted a strict causality test. In some cases, it has relied on the same circumstantial evidence that was used to establish dominance to infer abuse.

Article 6 also prohibits abusive conduct in markets distinct from the one in which dominance exists. For instance, the Board found undertakings to have infringed Article 6 by engaging in abusive behaviour in neighbouring markets, as in Google Shopping (13 February 2020, 20-10/119-69), Google Android (19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273), Volkan Metro (2 December 2013, 13-67/928-390), Türkiye Denizcilik İşletmeleri (24 June 2010, 10-45/801-264), Türk Telekom (2 October 2002, 02-60/755-305), and Turkcell (20 July 2001, 01-35/347-95).

2.4. Defenses

2.4.1. Which defenses may be relied on against the allegations of abuse of dominance? May defenses be invoked once exclusionary intent is demonstrated?

Whether a defense is available or successful relies on the factual context of each case. According to Paragraph 30 of the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct, the Board will take into account arguments from dominant undertakings that their conduct are justified on the grounds of “objective necessity” and “efficiency”, or both. Efficiency gains may be relied on if the pro-competitive benefits demonstrably outweigh the anti-competitive effects.

Regarding the availability of defenses in cases where exclusionary intent is established, objective justifications – such as “objective necessity”, “efficiency” or both – may still be raised. Paragraph 24 of the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct specifies that when assessing exclusionary conduct, both the specific features of the conduct and its actual or potential market effects should be considered. Therefore, an actual or potential impact on the relevant market should be established in order to conclude that an undertaking has engaged in abuse.

3. Specific forms of abuse

3.1. Types of conduct

3.1.1. Rebate schemes

Although rebate schemes are not directly set out under Article 6 as a specific category of abuse, such schemes may nonetheless amount to abuse. In Turkcell (23 December 2009, 09-60/1490-379), the Board held that Turkcell abused its dominance by, among other things, employing incremental rebate schemes to incentivize use of the Turkcell logo and by withholding rebates from buyers cooperating with rivals. A comparable stance was taken toward both retroactive and incremental schemes in Doğan Media Group (30 March 2011, 11-18/341-103), where the Board found abuse through rebate practices. The Board reached a similar conclusion regarding Luxottica (23 February 2017, 17-08/99-42), addressing unit and retroactive discounts, and determined in Unilever (18 March 2021, 21-15/190-80) that rebate mechanisms in industrial ice cream resulted in de facto exclusivity and thus abuse. In Ortadoğu Antalya Liman İşletmeleri (3 March 2022, 22-11/169-68), the Board again identified de facto exclusivity created via rebates in container stuffing services and found a violation of Article 6. The Board’s initial decision on Mey İçki’s behaviour in the vodka and gin market was annulled by the administrative court. On review, the Board determined that Mey İçki had abused its dominance by using retroactive rebate schemes, which it classified as exclusionary practices (11 June 2020, 20-28/349-163). This assessment echoed an earlier finding on exclusivity-enhancing rebates applied by the same undertaking in the rakı market (12 June 2014, 14-21/410-178).

3.1.2. Tying and bundling

Article 6 lists tying and bundling as a specific category of abuse. While the Board has evaluated numerous tying, bundling, and leveraging allegations, the Board has occasionally issued fines based on tying and leveraging (see Google Android, 19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273; Google Shopping, 13 February 2020, 20-10/119-69). In Google Android, the Board determined that Google leveraged dominance in licensable smart mobile operating systems and abused its position by tying search and app store services, engaging in exclusivity, and obstructing manufacturers’ use of alternatives, both in that market and in related markets. In Google Shopping, the Board found that Google exploited dominance in general search to prioritize its own product in comparison-shopping services. In some instances, the Board has imposed behavioural remedies without fines to prevent tying/leveraging, as in TTNET-ADSL (18 February 2009, 09-07/127-38). More recently, in Obilet (15 June 2023, 23-27/521-177), the Board indicated that de facto tying between ticketing software and B2C ticket sales could infringe Article 6 and made commitments binding. A similar commitment-based resolution was adopted in Meta (Instagram–Threads) (23 November 2024, 24-45/1053-450), where the Board assessed Meta’s tying of its newly launched Threads platform to Instagram and found that such conduct, including cross-platform data integration, could raise exclusionary concerns. After imposing interim measures and issuing daily fines for non-compliance, the Board accepted Meta’s commitments to cease the tying of Threads to Instagram and terminate data sharing between the services.

In Google Advertising Technologies (12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509), the Board examined tying and self-preferencing allegations in the programmatic advertising sector. The Board found that Google violated Article 6 of Law No. 4054 by way of providing an unfair advantage to its own supply side platform (“SSP”) by relying on its dominant position in the market for publisher ad server services and the relevant self-favouring conduct is of the nature that hinders the activities of its competitors. As a result, the Board (i) imposed a monetary fine on Google and (ii) obliged Google to apply conditions to third-party supply-side platforms (third-party SSPs) that are no less favorable than the conditions that Google applies to its own service, in order to stop the violation and maintain effective competition in the market.

3.1.3 Exclusive dealing

Exclusive dealing typically falls under Article 4 of Law No. 4054, which covers agreements, concerted practices, and decisions of trade associations. That being said, exclusive dealing practices may also be examined under Article 6. The Board has, in fact, previously identified Article 6 infringements arising from exclusive dealing practices (see Karboğaz, 1 December 2005, 05-80/1106-317).

In relation to single branding obligations, the Board, in Unilever (18 March 2021, 21-15/190-80), reviewed rebate schemes in the industrial ice cream market and found that they resulted in de facto exclusivity.

Furthermore, in Trakya Cam, the Board examined whether the de facto implementation of an exclusive dealership system by Trakya Cam infringed Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054. While the Board declined to grant an individual exemption to Trakya Cam’s dealership system (Trakya Cam I, 2 December 2015, 15-42/704-258), it later found that Trakya Cam’s practices constituted an abuse of dominance (Trakya Cam II, 14 December 2017, 17-41/641-280).

Tadım Gıda (7 July 2022, 22-72/505-202) is another decision in which the Board evaluated discounting practices and booth placement conditions and found that they create de facto exclusivity or loyalty inducing by limiting the visibility and accessibility of competing products. The investigation was concluded without a finding of infringement following the Board’s acceptance of a comprehensive commitment package submitted by Tadım. The commitments included refraining from granting bonuses or retroactive rebates conditional upon exclusivity, avoiding exclusive supply arrangements in the traditional channel, and ensuring that no financial advantage would be tied to the imposition of non-compete obligations or to minimum purchase thresholds exceeding 60% of the buyer’s annual procurement in the previous year.

In EssilorLuxotica (17 August 2023, 23-39/749-259), the Board imposed an administrative fine on the undertaking for breaching binding commitments set out in a previous decision dated 1 October 2018. Additionally, the Board found that the bundling of ophthalmic lenses and optical machinery led to de facto exclusivity and constituted an abuse of dominance in both the ophthalmic lens wholesale and optical equipment markets. However, the Board refrained from issuing a separate fine for the Article 6 violation, invoking the ne bis in idem principle.

In Storytel (30 November 2023, 23-55/1076-380), the Board’s assessment centered on the long-term exclusive agreements Storytel concluded with publishers, in light of the allegations that such agreements restricted market entry and expansion of rival audiobook platforms. During the ongoing investigation process, the Board accepted Storytel’s commitments, thereby addressing the competitive concerns and terminating the proceedings without finding an infringement.

Most recently, in Nesine (29 February 2024, 24-11/194-78), the Board found that the undertaking had entered into long-term exclusivity agreements, including an exclusive arrangement for the purchase of advertising services with one of the major live match broadcasting platforms, thereby abusing its dominant position in the fixed-odds betting games market. These practices were deemed to hinder competitors’ access to advertising, sponsorship, and broadcasting opportunities. While the investigation was ongoing, the Board applied interim measures to cease the application of such exclusivity clauses, and upon concluding the investigation, imposed an administrative monetary fine on the undertaking.

3.1.4. Predatory pricing

While the Board has, in many instances, recognized that predatory pricing may amount to an abusive practice (see TTNet (11 July 2007, 07-59/676-235); Denizcilik İşletmeleri (12 October 2006, 06-74/959-278); Coca-Cola (23 January 2004, 04-07/75-18); Türk Telekom/TTNet (19 November 2008, 08-65/1055-411); Trakya Cam (17 November 2011, 11-57/1477-533); Tüpraş (17 January 2014, 14-03/60-24); THY (30 December 2011, 11-65/1692-599); and UN Ro-Ro (1 October 2012, 12-47/1413-474)), the Board frequently rejects complaints of this nature, reflecting its reluctance to micromanage pricing conduct. This approach was illustrated in the Board’s Sony Eurasia (7 February 2019, 19-06/47-16) decision where the Board held that short-term below-cost pricing strategy did not, in itself, suffice to establish a violation of Article 6 (see also BİM (27 June 2008, 08-41/568-216), Migros (25 February 2010, 10-19/241-95)).

When reviewing allegations of predatory pricing, the Board’s main consideration is whether the pricing conduct results in market foreclosure for competitors. The Board’s Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct and precedents of the Board do not require the evidence of recoupment as a precondition for establishing a violation. In principle, the Board considers that predatory pricing may be found where the following criteria are met (see Kale Kilit (6 December 2012, 12-62/1633-598):

• the undertaking holds a financial advantage over its competitors;
• prices are set at an abnormally low level;
• the conduct is aimed at excluding competitors from the market; and
• the undertaking is prepared to bear short-term losses with the expectation of long-term profits.

In evaluating exclusionary effects, the Board frequently employs the “as-efficient competitor test” (“AECT”) to assess whether predatory pricing could result in the exclusion of competitors from the market. Under this framework, if an equally efficient competitor is deemed capable of remaining in the market despite the predatory pricing strategy pursued by the dominant undertaking, the Board is unlikely to step in, as such pricing would not be considered harmful to effective competition or consumer welfare (see Port Akdeniz (03.03.2022, 22-11/169-68); Çiçek Sepeti (8 March 2018, 18-07/111-58)). However, if the Board determines that the dominant undertaking’s pricing conduct has the potential to drive equally efficient competitors out of the market, it will reflect this in its overall anticompetitive foreclosure analysis, considering remaining quantitative and qualitative evidence. In particular, the pricing strategies of the undertaking may be deemed exclusionary if as-efficient competitors are unable to implement effective counter-measures for the targeted segment of the customer’s demand without engaging in below-cost pricing. While the Board may, in certain cases, consider the impact of below-cost pricing on less efficient competitors (see UN Ro-Ro (1 October 2012, 12-47/1413-474)), such considerations are exceptional. The general preference remains for relying on the AECT, which helps avoiding over-enforcement and the risk of chilling legitimate price competition (see Türk Telekom (3 May 2016, 16-15/254-109)). This reflects the Board’s effects-based approach to predatory pricing, grounded in preserving competitive market dynamics while ensuring that pricing strategies do not lead to exclusionary outcomes.

3.1.5. Price or margin squeezes

Under Turkish competition law, price squeezing may constitute an abusive conduct, leading to the imposition of fines. The Board examines such allegations with particular rigor as illustrated in its decisions (see Şişecam (21 October 2021, 21-51/712-354); Türk Telekom (19 October 2004, 04-66/956-232); TTNet (11 July 2007, 07-59/676-235); Doğan Dağıtım (9 October 2007, 07-78/962-364); Türk Telekom/TTNet (19 November 2008, 08-65/1055-411); Türk Telekomünikasyon AŞ (3 May 2016, 16-15/254-109)). In determining whether price squeezing constitutes abusive conduct, the Guidelines on Exclusionary Conduct highlight four elements: (i) the presence of a vertically integrated undertaking operating both upstream and downstream markets; (ii) an upstream input that is indispensable for downstream competition; (iii) the undertaking’s dominance in the upstream market; and (iv) a margin between upstream and downstream prices so limited that even an equally efficient competitor could not achieve sustainable profitability.

3.1.6. Refusals to deal and denied access to essential facilities

Among the frequently observed types of abuse are refusals to deal and denied access to essential facilities, both of which the Board has examined on numerous occasions (see Eti Holding, (21 December 2000, 00-50/533-295); POAŞ (20 November 2001, 01-56/554-130); Ak-Kim (4 December 2003, 03-76/925-389); Çukurova Elektrik (10 November 2003, 03-72/874-373); BOTAŞ (27 April 2017, 17-14/207-85); Sanofi (29 March 2018, 18-09/156-76); Lüleburgaz (7 September 2017, 17-28/477-205); Akdeniz/CK Akdeniz Elektrik (20 February 2018, 18-06/101-52) Enerjisa (8 August 2018, 18-27/461-224); Aydem/Gediz (1 October 2018, 18-36/583-284); MDF/Chipboard (1 April 2021, 21-18/229-96); D-Market (15 April 2021, 21-22/266-116); İsttelkom (11 April 2019, 19-15/214-94)). A particularly notable case is the Board’s Varinak (19 December 2019, 19-45/768-330) decision in which the Board held that Varinak, which was in a dominant position in the market for maintenance and repair of linear accelerator devices as well as treatment control devices , had abused its dominant position by refusing to grant access to training certifications necessary for competing undertakings to provide such services, thereby foreclosing effective competition in the market. A similar decision was reached in Medsantek (28 March 2019, 19-13/182-80) where the Board concluded that the undertaking engaged in exclusionary practices by denying access to critical inputs in the sequence analysis devices market.

The Board also reviews whether the refusal is grounded on an objective justification (Türk Telekom (27 February 2020, 20-12/153-83)). Moreover, the Board has generally declined to uphold refusal to supply allegations concerning supplier/reseller relations on the basis that there was no meaningful competition between a supplier and a reseller (Allergan (8 September2022, 22-41/594-248); Novartis (11 April 2019, 19-15/215-95); and Baymak (6 September2018, 18-30/523-259)).

3.1.7. Predatory product design or failure to disclose new technology

While Article 6 of Law No. 4054 provides an illustrative list of abusive practices, it is non-exhaustive, and other forms of conduct may be considered abusive under this provision. In practice, though, the Board’s enforcement record indicates that no administrative fines have been imposed in relation to other potential forms of abuse, such as strategic capacity construction, predatory product design or process innovation, failure to disclose new technology, predatory advertising, or excessive product differentiation.

3.1.8. Price discrimination

Both price and non-price discrimination may fall within Article 6. The Board has condemned discriminatory pricing (see TTAŞ (2 October 2002, 02-60/755-305); Türk Telekom/TTNet, (19 November 2008, 08-65/1055-411); MEDAŞ (2 March 2016, 16-07/134-60); Türk Telekom, (9 June 2016, 16-20/326-146)) and discriminatory trading conditions (see Krea (14 September 2023, 23-43/826-292)).

3.1.9. Exploitative prices or terms of supply

Although Article 6 of Law No. 4054 does not expressly mention exploitative pricing or supply terms, such conduct may nevertheless fall within the scope of Article 6. The Board has previously found that excessive or exploitative pricing by dominant undertakings may amount to an infringement (see Port Akdeniz (5 November 2020, 20-48/666-291); Sahibinden (1 October 2018, 18-36/584-285 and 13 July 2023, 23-31/604-204); Tüpraş (17 January 2014, 14-03/60-24); TTAŞ (2 October 2002, 02-60/755-305); Belko (9 April 2001, 01-17/150-39); Soda (20 April 2016, 16-14/205-89); DFDS (26 July 2023, 23-34/642-215) (no full investigation in Soda and DFDS)). Nonetheless, many complaints on these grounds fail given the Authority’s unwillingness to intervene excessively in pricing strategies. In addition, the Board’s excessive pricing finding against Sahibinden was quashed by Ankara 6th Administrative Court (18 December 2019, E. 2019/946, K. 2019/2625), a ruling upheld by the 8th Administrative Chamber of Ankara Regional Administrative Court (20 January 2021, E. 2020/699, K. 2021/68), on the basis that the standard of proof had not been met. The court underlined that intervention in pricing is an exceptional measure.

3.1.10. Abuse of administrative or government process

Although the Board has not yet issued an infringement decision based on abuse of a governmental or regulatory process, and the matter has not been formally raised before the Authority to date, there appears to be no apparent reason to such conduct being found to violate Article 6, provided that sufficient evidence is presented to substantiate the abuse.

3.1.11. Mergers and acquisitions as exclusionary practices

While mergers and acquisitions are normally assessed under the merger control regime set out in Article 7 of Law No. 4054, the Board has, albeit in exceptional cases identified structural abuses whereby dominant undertakings have relied on joint venture arrangements as a means of excluding competitors. Such conduct has been held to constitute a breach of Article 6, as exemplified in the Biryay I decision (17 July 2000, 00-26/292-162).

Similarly, in Trakya Cam (9 February 2015, 15-08/110-46), the Board launched an investigation into Trakya Cam whether the dominant flat glass producer’s acquisition of its main competitor’s assets amounted to an abuse of dominance through structural foreclosure. The Board concluded that no violation had occurred due to insufficient evidence of anticompetitive effects.

3.1.12. Other abuses

Because Article 6 is non-exhaustive, additional conduct may be categorized as abuse. That said, the enforcement record indicates that the Board has not imposed fines for allegations such as strategic capacity construction, predatory product design or process innovation, failure to disclose new technology, predatory advertising, or excessive product differentiation.

4. Enforcement

4.1. Enforcement authorities

4.1.1. Is there a separate enforcement authority investigating abuse of dominance rules?

Yes. The enforcement of competition law in Turkiye is entrusted to the Authority, an independent legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy. The Authority is composed of the Board, the presidency, and various service departments. Six divisions with sector-specific allocations carry out enforcement functions, supported by approximately 288 case handlers. Additional units, such as economic analysis and research department; decisions unit; information management unit; external relations and competition advocacy department; management services unit; cartel and on-site inspections support unit; and strategy development unit and a regional office in İstanbul, assist the technical divisions and the presidency in their tasks. The Board, as the decision-making body of the Authority, consists of seven members, and is also competent to investigate and sanction abuses of dominance.

The Board is vested with extensive investigative powers. It may request any information it deems necessary from public institutions and organizations, undertakings, and trade associations. All addressees are legally obliged to comply within the timeframe specified by the Board. A failure to comply with an order to provide information, or a failure to meet the deadline, may result in an administrative monetary fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the decision. If such turnover is not calculable, the turnover from the nearest financial year is taken into account. The same penalty may be imposed where incorrect or misleading information is provided. For 2025, the minimum administrative monetary fine amounts to 241,043 Turkish liras (effective as of 1 January 2025).

Article 15 of Law No. 4054 authorizes the Board to conduct on-site inspections. Within this framework, the Board may examine the books, all types of data and documents of undertakings and associations of undertakings kept on physical or electronic media and in information systems, and take copies and physical samples thereof. It may also request written or oral statements on specific issues and extend its review to any asset of an undertaking. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law No. 7246 and the Board is authorized to examine electronic information and documentation contained in company systems and devices. Mobile devices such as phones and tablets may also be reviewed, unless it is established that they are solely for personal use. At the very least, the Board is authorized to conduct a preliminary review to determine whether a device is of a personal nature.

The law grants the Board comprehensive powers to carry out dawn raids. Judicial authorization is only required if an undertaking refuses to permit such an inspection. Although the statute allows for oral testimony to be compelled, in practice, case handlers usually allow employees to defer their answers, provided a timely written response is subsequently submitted. Records held on computers and phones, including emails and instant messaging communications such as WhatsApp, are subject to inspection, and even deleted items are reviewed. Any refusal to grant access to premises or relevant records may lead to the imposition of fines.

The Board has imposed fines for obstructing on-site inspections even in cases where the correspondence or messages in question were restored or no violation was ultimately found. Illustrative precedents include Hepsiburada (7 October 2021, 21-48/678-338,); Unmaş (25 January 2022, 21-26/327-152); Güven (8 December 2022, 22-54/831-341); Vatan (28 April 2023, 23-19/363-125); Canon (28 April 2023, 23-19/365-127); Misdağ (22 June 2023, 23-28/530-179); AbbVie (5 October 2023, 23-47/898-318); Epson (12 October 2023, 23-48/910-324); Lyksor (18 April 2024, 24-19/416-169); Serin Beton (3 October 2024, 24-40/955-413); Kloroplas (15 August 2024, 28 November 2024, 24-50/1125-483); Koçak Baklava (24-33/772-322); and Arzum (20 February 2025, 25-07/178-89).

The Turkish Constitutional Court delivered a significant decision on 20 June 2023 (application no. 2019/40991, filed on 23 April 2023), which may affect the Authority’s procedures regarding on-site inspections. The Court determined that the provision allowing inspections to be conducted without a court warrant contravened Article 21 of the Turkish Constitution, which safeguards domicile immunity. Consequently, the Authority may now be required to seek a warrant from the Criminal Judgeship of Peace before performing an on-site inspection, although such authorization had already been envisaged in the legislation and was occasionally pursued when undertakings refused to cooperate.

4.2. Sanctions and remedies

4.2.1. Which sanctions and remedies may the Authority apply? Do fines and sanctions apply individuals?

Sanctions for abuses of dominance under Law No. 4054 are administrative. Where an abuse of dominance is established, each infringing undertaking may be fined up to 10 per cent of its Turkish turnover generated in the financial year preceding the fining decision. If this turnover is not calculable, the turnover of the nearest financial year will be considered. In addition, employees or members of the executive bodies of undertakings or associations of undertakings who have played a decisive role in the infringement may be fined up to 5 per cent of the fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings. In this context, Law No. 4054 refers to Article 17 of Law No. 5326 on Minor Offences. The applicable framework is further detailed in the Regulation on Administrative Fines to Apply in Cases of Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Limiting Competition, and Abuse of Dominant Position (“Amended Regulation on Fines”), which replaced the previous regulation.

The Regulation provides guidance on how monetary fines are calculated. In determining the base fine, the Board will consider the severity of the harm caused or likely to be caused by the violation and whether the violation qualifies as naked and/or hard-core. Different base fine rates are set depending on the duration of the violation, ranging from more than one year but less than two years to more than five years. The Board also considers aggravating factors, such as repeated infringements of Article 4 and/or Article 6, continuation of the infringement after the investigation decision has been notified, a decisive role in the infringement, or breach of the confidentiality obligation under Article 12 of the Regulation on the Settlement Procedure Applicable in Investigations on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition and Abuses of Dominant Position. Conversely, mitigating factors may reduce the fine, such as providing assistance during on-site inspections beyond legal obligations, being coerced by other undertakings, having limited involvement in the violation, generating a low share of revenues from the infringing activities, or including overseas sales revenues in annual gross revenues.

Besides monetary fines, the Board is empowered to adopt any measure necessary to terminate abusive conduct, eliminate both de facto and legal consequences of the infringement, and restore competition to the level that existed before the abusive conduct. Moreover, Article 56 of Law No. 4054 declares that agreements and trade association decisions infringing Article 4 are null and void with all their consequences. Although debate continues as to whether this “null and void” provision also extends to contracts concluded by dominant undertakings engaged in abusive conduct, such contracts may nevertheless be deemed invalid and unenforceable if they give rise to or facilitate the abusive practice in violation of Article 6.

Article 43 of the Law No. 7246introduced settlement and commitment procedures. A settlement may be requested by parties that admit to an infringement until the official notification of the investigation report. In such cases, the administrative fine may be reduced by up to 25 per cent, and the parties waive the right to dispute the infringement or the fine once the investigation is finalized by settlement. Under the same provision, undertakings or associations of undertakings may voluntarily propose commitments during a preliminary or full-fledged investigation in order to remove the Authority’s competition concerns under Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054. Commitments may be submitted until three months after the official notification of the investigation notice. Depending on their adequacy and timing, the Board may refrain from launching a full-fledged investigation or may terminate an ongoing investigation before completion. Nevertheless, commitments are not admissible for violations such as price fixing, market or customer sharing, or supply restrictions under Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

The most significant fine to date in relation to abuse of dominance was imposed in the Google Advertising Technologies (12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509), where the Board ordered Google to pay 2,607,563,963.59 Turkish liras. The Board did not disclose the exact fine rate it applied in the calculation.

4.3. Enforcement practice

4.3.1. Does the Authority have autonomous sanctioning powers, or must it seek approval from a court or other authority?

The Board is empowered to impose sanctions directly. Pursuant to Article 27 of Law No. 4054, the Board has the authority to adopt necessary measures to bring infringements to an end and to impose administrative monetary fines. The exercise of this power does not require prior approval or authorization from any court or other public authority.

4.4. Enforcement record

4.4.1. What does the recent enforcement record reveal?

Over the recent years, the Authority has demonstrated a strong enforcement focus on digital markets, particularly in abuse of dominance cases under Article 6 of Law No. 4054. The Board has initiated and concluded several high-profile investigations against major technology companies, many involving data-driven practices, self-preferencing, discriminatory conduct, or restrictions on multi-homing (see Google Android (19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273), Google Shopping (7 November 2019, 19-38/575-243), Google Adwords (12 November 2020, 20-49/675-295), and Google Local Search (8 April 2021, 21-20/248-105).

Recently, in Google General Search Features (4 July 2024, 24-28/682-283), the Board assessed whether certain rich results, such as “videos”, “people also ask”, “translation box”, and others, unfairly pushed rival content down the page. The Board found no infringement. However, in Google Advertising Technologies (12 December 2024, 24-53/1180-509), it concluded that Google had leveraged its dominance in publisher ad server services to benefit its own supply side platform (SSP), in breach of Article 6 and the relevant self-favouring conduct is of the nature that hinders the activities of its competitors. As a result, the Board (i) imposed a monetary fine on Google and (ii) obliged Google to apply conditions to third-party supply-side platforms (third-party SSPs) that are no less favorable than the conditions that Google applies to its own service, in order to stop the violation and maintain effective competition in the market.

In Meta (20 October 2022, 22-48/706-299), the Board evaluated that by combining the data collected from its core services (namely Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp), Facebook abused its dominant position in the market through (i) hindering the activities of its competitors in the online display advertising market with its personal social network services, and (ii) creating barriers to entry to the market. The Board imposed an administrative fine on Meta and imposed certain measures. The Board discussed the compliance proposal submitted by Meta and concluded that the measures were not sufficient to meet the obligation imposed. Therefore, the Board decided to impose on Meta a daily non-compliance fine (21 December 2023, 23-60/1162-417). Subsequently, the Board discussed the final compliance measures submitted by Meta on 5 April 2024 and decided on 24 April 2024 that the proposed remedies were sufficient to meet the imposed obligations. Therefore, the administrative fine imposed on Meta totalled roughly half a billion Turkish lira (4 April 2024, 24-20/467-197).In Trendyol (26 July 2023, 23-33/633-213), Turkiye’s leading multi-category e-marketplace was found to have abused its dominance by manipulating algorithms and misusing third-party seller data to gain an unfair competitive advantage. Similarly, in Sahibinden (17 August 2023, 23-39/754-263), the Board found that the online classifieds platform violated Article 6 by preventing data portability, enforcing de facto exclusivity, and introducing non-compete obligations.

The Board has also applied the commitments procedure to resolve investigations. In Storytel (30 November 2023, 23-55/1076-380), the audiobook platform proposed commitments in response to allegations of market foreclosure through long-term exclusivity agreements with publishers, which the Board accepted. A similar approach was taken in Krea (14 September 2023, 23-43/826-292), where the Board investigated discriminatory practices in the sub-licensing of football match broadcasting rights and concluded the case upon accepting commitments.

Beyond digital platforms, the Authority has also pursued enforcement in agricultural and raw material purchasing markets. In Ferrero (7 March 2023, 24-12/213-87), the Board evaluated whether purchasing practices in the hazelnut supply chain distorted competition. The Board emphasized that Ferrero’s conduct arising from its reduced procurement of shelled nuts, increased procurement of unshelled nuts, and failure to Commitments offered by Ferrero were accepted to address the Board’s concerns.

The Authority has also examined refusal to deal and essential facilities claims. (see MDF/ChipBoard (1 April 2021, 21-18/229-96), D-Market (15 April 2021, 21-22/266-116), Türk Telekom II (16 April 2020, 20-20/267-128), Türk Telekom I (27 February 2020, 20-12/153-83), Akdeniz/CK Akdeniz Elektrik (20 February 2018, 18-06/101-52); Enerjisa (8 August 2018, 18-27/461-224) Aydem/Gediz (1 October 2018, 18-36/583-284); İsttelkom (11 April 2019, 19-15/214-94)), Varinak (19 December 2019, 19-45/768-330), Medsantek (28 March 2019, 19-13/182-80), Daichii Sankyo (22 May 2018, 18-15/280-139), Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri (12 June 2018, 18-19/321-157), Pharmaceuticals (8 March 2019, 19-11/126-54), Zeyport Zeytinburnu (15 March 2018, 18-08/152-73) and Kardemir Karabük Demir Çelik (7 September 2017, 17-28/481-207)). Investigations into exclusive dealing have also emerged in decisions such as: (see Tırsan (23 May 2019, 19-19/283-121), Mars Media (18 January 2018; 18-03/35-22), Frito Lay (12 June 2018; 18-19/329-163) and Trakya Cam (14 December 2017; 17-41/641-280).) The Authority has also scrutinized rebate schemes (see Unilever (18 March 2021, 21-15/190-80) and Port Akdeniz (3 March 2022, 22-11/169-68)).

Overall, the duration of abuse of dominance proceedings varies by case and workload, but typically ranges from one to one and a half years.

4.5. Contractual implications

4.5.1. If a contractual clause involving a dominant undertaking is found to be incompatible with the legislation, does this result in the invalidity of the clause or the entire contract?

Article 56 of Law No. 4054 stipulates that agreements and decisions of associations of undertakings contrary to Article 4 are invalid and unenforceable with all their consequences. The agreement will remain valid if the inconsistent clause may be severed under the principles of severability. In İsttelkom (11 April 2019, 19-15/214-94), the Board found that İsttelkom abused its dominance in the electronic communication infrastructure instalment market in Istanbul through provisions of the Facility Sharing Protocol. The Board ordered İsttelkom to remove clauses requiring ownership of infrastructure whose costs were borne by the operators and clauses preventing the use, rental, or transfer of such infrastructure to third parties. Similarly, in Google Android (19 September 2018, 18-33/555-273), the Board required contractual amendments, including the removal of pre-instalment and exclusivity clauses in manufacturer agreements and the inclusion of an explicit provision to secure competition in the app store.

4.6. Private enforcement

4.6.1. Is private enforcement possible? Does the legislation provide a basis for a court or other authority to order a dominant firm to grant access, supply goods or services, conclude a contract, or invalidate a provision or contract?

Yes, private enforcement is possible, but it is limited to damages actions. Moreover, Law No. 4054 does not provide a mechanism for private lawsuits to impose behavioural or other remedies.

Application of the remedy mechanism was introduced in Articles 4 and 6 of the Law No. 7246, and replaced the mechanism previously applicable under Article 7. In this regard, where behavioural remedies are insufficient and have failed, structural remedies can be imposed against anticompetitive conduct by the Board.

Non-compliance with the Board’s orders triggers the possibility of an investigation. Yet, the initiation of an investigation does not necessarily result in a finding of an infringement. However, the legislation does not grant the Board the explicit power to compel, through a court order, performance of specific obligations such as granting access, supplying goods or services, or entering into a contract.

4.7. Claims of damages

4.7.1. How can harmed companies enforce their claim for damages? What forum is competent to hear such claims and what criteria govern the calculation of damages?

While the Board investigates and sanctions abuse of dominance, private parties may bring civil lawsuits for damages. Article 57 of Law No. 4054 allows real or legal persons that incur losses from a distortion of competition to recover such losses from the responsible parties. Article 58/1 of Law No. 4054 specifies that the damage equals the difference between the cost actually paid by the injured party and the cost that would have been paid absent the restriction of competition. This provision ensures compensation for actual losses. Additionally, competitors uninvolved in the violation, yet suffered due to the violation, may claim compensation for all damages, including both actual damages and loss of profit.

Furthermore, Turkish competition law regime allows for treble damages. Article 58/2 of Law No. 4054 provides that if damage results from an agreement, decision, or gross negligence of the parties, the judge may, upon the claimant’s request, award compensation up to three times the material damage incurred or the profits gained or likely to be gained by those who caused the harm. For treble damages to be awarded, (i) the harm should stem from an agreement, a decision or the parties’ gross negligence and (ii) the harm should be material (not moral). Debate persists regarding whether judges may apply treble damages once these conditions are satisfied, or whether they retain discretion to award less. Case law reflects varying outcomes: onefold compensation (Istanbul 12th Consumer Court, 6 June 2017, 2016/82 E, 2017/220 K); twofold compensation (Istanbul Anatolian 4th Commercial Court of First Instance, 12 December 2017, 2015/1008 E, 2017/1325 K); and threefold compensation (Marmaris 1st Civil Court of First Instance, 14 November 2017, 2017/17 E, 2017/494 K).

Civil courts usually wait for the Board’s decision before ruling on damages. For instance, the Court of Appeals has emphasized that applications to the Board should be treated as preliminary issues (19th Civil Chamber, 1 November 1999, Decision No. 99/3350 E, 99/6364 K; 11th Civil Chamber, 5 October 2009, 2008/5575 E, 2009/10045 K). While the Board’s decisions are not binding on courts, they have a significant role in various aspects of civil litigation.

4.8. Appeal process

4.8.1. What is appeal process against the Competition Board’s decisions?

The final decisions of the Board, including decisions on interim measures and fines, can appealed before administrative courts in Ankara. Since the Board’s decisions are considered administrative acts, legal actions against Board decisions are pursued in accordance with Administrative Procedure Law No. 2577 (“Law No. 2577”). Appeals should be filed within 60 days after the Board’s reasoned decision is served on the parties in line with Law No. 2577.

5. Unilateral conduct of non-dominant firms

5.1. Does the legal framework extend to govern the unilateral conduct of non-dominant firms?

Article 6 of Law No. 4054, which is similar to Article 102 of the TFEU, is intended to apply exclusively to the unilateral conduct of dominant undertakings. Dominance is thus a prerequisite for the application of the prohibition set forth in the Article 6 of Law No. 4054. However, recent enforcement practice by the Board reveals a tendency to stretch the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054, which governs restrictive agreements, to cover unilateral conduct by non-dominant firms within the vertical supply relationships. Relying on the notion of “implied consent” in vertical relationships, the Board has, at times, treated unilateral conduct such as discrimination or refusal to deal by non-dominant undertakings as if they fall within Article 4 of Law No. 4054, despite the absence of dominance. This emerging shift, treating Article 4 of Law No. 4054 as a substitute where Article 6 of Law No. 4054 is inapplicable, has led to instances in which unilateral actions that should only be assessed under Article 6 of Law No. 4054 have been sanctioned under Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

The Board has issued several decisions cautioning non-dominant undertakings for practices such as imposing dissimilar conditions on their distributors or introducing unilaterally supply requirements to meet minimum objective criteria.

Notable examples include the 3M Türkiye (9 June 2016, 16-20/340-155), where the Board evaluated discriminatory practices under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 despite 3M Türkiye not being dominant, and the Turkcell (13 August 2014, 14-28/565-253), where the Board assessed exclusive agreements under both Articles 4 and 6 of Law No. 4054 but ultimately found no infringement. The Board, in turn, did not address the subtle differences between Article 4 and Article 6 of Law No. 4054.

6. Trends

6.1. Are there any anticipated legislative amendments or other regulatory measures to affect this area in the near future?

Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets, adopted on 21 November 2024, focus on potential violations of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 in labour markets. Notably, it acknowledges that abuse of dominance can occur in different forms in labour markets and require a case-by-case analysis.

Another notable development is the entry into force of the Amended Regulation on Fines on 27 December 2024. It replaced the former regulation on fines, which had been enforced since 15 February 2009. It sets out detailed guidelines on the calculation of monetary fines. In the case of a violation under Articles 4, 6 and 7, the Board has discretion to determine a base fine rate up to the statutory maximum of 10% of the undertaking’s turnover. In accordance with the recently amended Regulation on Fines, the distinction between “cartel” and “other violations” in the determination of base administrative monetary fines and lower and upper limits for said base fines determined based on the type of violation (i.e., 2% to 4% for cartels and 0.5% to 3% for other violations) has been revoked. Furthermore, the Amended Regulation on Fines foresees that the base fine will be determined by considering, in particular, the severity of the harm caused or likely to be caused by the violation and whether the nature of the violation is naked and/or hard-core. Under the Amended Regulation on Fines, duration of the violation plays crucial role for determination of the base administrative monetary fine. Moreover, while the revoked Regulation prescribed an increase in base administrative monetary fines if the violation lasted for more than one but less than five years or more than five years, the Amended Regulation puts forth specific base rates for different violation terms. In this regard, there are base fines for violations lasting:

• more than one year but less than two years,
• more than two years but less than three years,
• more than three years but less than four years,
• more than four years but less than five years, and
• more than five years.

Amended Regulation on Fines also sets out aggravating factors such as recurrence of violations of Article 4 and/or Article 6, continued violation after the notification of the investigation decision, decisive role in terms of infringement or the breach of confidentiality requirement under Article 12 of Regulation on the Settlement Procedure Applicable in Investigations on Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition and Abuses of Dominant Position, and also mitigating factors such as assistance with on-site inspections (beyond fulfilling legal obligations), coercion to the violation by other undertakings, limited involvement in the violation, low revenue share of the activities constituting the violation, the inclusion of overseas sales revenues in the annual gross revenues and so on, in determining the magnitude of the monetary fine.